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Abstract 
The research presented in this thesis describes a model for aiding human-robot interactions based on 
the principle of showing behaviours which are created based on 'human' cognitive biases by a robot in 
human-robot interactions. The aim of this work is to study how cognitive biases can affect human-robot 
interactions in the long term.  
Currently, most human-robot interactions are based on a set of well-ordered and structured 
rules, which repeat regardless of the person or social situation. This trend tends to provide an unrealistic 
interaction, which can make difficult for humans to relate ‘naturally’ with the social robot after a number 
of relations. The main focus of these interactions is that the social robot shows a very structured set of 
behaviours and, as such, acts unnaturally and mechanical in terms of social interactions. On the other 
hand, fallible behaviours (e.g. forgetfulness, inability to understand other’ emotions, bragging, blaming 
others) are common behaviours in humans and can be seen in regular social interactions. Some of these 
fallible behaviours are caused by the various cognitive biases. Researchers studied and developed 
various humanlike skills (e.g. personality, emotions expressions, traits) in social robots to make their 
behaviours more humanlike, and as a result, social robots can perform various humanlike actions, such 
as walking, talking, gazing or emotional expression. But common human behaviours such as 
forgetfulness, inability to understand other emotions, bragging or blaming are not present in the current 
social robots; such behaviours which exist and influence people have not been explored in social robots.  
The study presented in this thesis developed five cognitive biases in three different robots in 
four separate experiments to understand the influences of such cognitive biases in human–robot 
interactions. The results show that participants initially liked to interact with the robot with cognitive 
biased behaviours more than the robot without such behaviours. In my first two experiments, the robots 
(e.g., ERWIN, MyKeepon) interacted with the participants using a single bias (i.e., misattribution and 
empathy gap) cognitive biases accordingly, and participants enjoyed the interactions using such bias 
effects: for example, forgetfulness, source confusions, always showing exaggerated happiness or 
sadness and so on in the robots. In my later experiments, participants interacted with the robot (e.g., 
MARC) three times, with a time interval between two interactions, and results show that the likeness 
the interactions where the robot shows biased behaviours decreases less than the interactions where the 
robot did not show any biased behaviours.  
In the current thesis, I describe the investigations of these traits of forgetfulness, the inability 
to understand others’ emotions, and bragging and blaming behaviours, which are influenced by 
cognitive biases, and I also analyse people’s responses to robots displaying such biased behaviours in 
human–robot interactions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Outline 
This thesis investigates social interactions between humans and robots and how these 
interactions might be improved. The approaches we consider include the introduction of 
cognitive biases in a robot, and we investigate the effect of those biases on human–robot 
interaction. The thesis paper presents a model which can be used to develop the social 
interactions between humans and robots.   
In social robotics studies, scientists follow various approaches to make robots’ 
behaviours sociable and understandable to humans, so that humans can easily interact with the 
robots: for example, robots mimicking human behaviours, expressing various emotions, 
developing trait-based behaviours and different moods, etcetera. In the current study, I 
investigate different cognitive biases of humans and develop few biases in the robot to study 
their effects in the human–robot interactions. The founding assumption of this research is that 
the effects of cognitive bias exist in humans alongside their emotions, moods and 
characteristics, and such biases can have an important impact in human interactions. In the 
existing social robotics research, the role of anthropomorphic emotions, moods and character 
traits in robots are widely studied, but the role of cognitive biases has not been investigated in 
detail and thus calls for further study. The research presented in this thesis investigates the 
effects of such biases in human–robot interactions.  
Section 2.1 discusses the motivations and significance of this study. The section offers 
a brief literature review of the topic and a hypothesis. Subsequently, I state the hypothesis and 
research objectives. Section 1.3 states the questions I seek to answer in the study. Section 1.4 
offers an overview of the remaining parts of the thesis.  
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1.2 Motivation 
This thesis is based on social robot–human interactions. A social robot can interact with others 
based on social skills (e.g. social rules and norms) which humans follow in daily social 
exchanges (Breazeal, 2003). A number of studies have used different social robots which 
exhibit such social behaviours in human–robot interactions. For example, Sony’s Artificial 
Intelligence Robot (AIBO) dog is a social robot which interacts in different ways so that the 
user can understand; for example, it jumps and barks to seek attention and follows the user 
around (Sony, n.d.). The AIBO dog has been used in many studies, one of which was to increase 
diversity in an undergraduate computer science program (Gini, Pearce & Sutherland, 2006) 
where students had to develop different AIBO-related projects and program the robot to play 
(e.g. develop a game on AIBO for children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
[ADHD]). Another was to develop game activities for AIBO which elderly people could enjoy. 
Another popular social robot, Paro the robot seal, can learn to behave according to user 
preferences and respond to its name, as if it is alive, moving its head and legs and making 
sounds (PARO, n.d.). Paro has mainly been used for therapeutic purposes and in care homes, 
where it was intended to provide company for the elderly (Shibata & Wada, 2010). Paro 
interacts differently than AIBO, as it makes noises of a seal, closes it eyes when someone 
touches its fur, and moves its head and tail (PARO, 2017). These two robots demonstrate such 
understandable behaviours so that the human interaction is possible. Many other social robots 
also interact in ways that people can understand; for example, the Keepon (Kozima, 
Michalowski & Nakagawa, 2009) robot dances and makes meaningful noises; the Kismet 
(Breazeal, 2003) and KASPAR (Dautenhahn et al., 2009) robots can expresses emotions; and 
many other robots manifest social cues, skills and interactions based on various anthropocentric 
behaviours.  
Researchers worldwide continue to study the different approaches by which social 
robots can interact with people. Different social skills and anthropomorphic behaviours are 
developed in robots so that their behaviours can be recognised and easily understood by people. 
Social robots are being used in different studies where various human-like behaviours are 
developed and investigated in robots for human–robot interactions, for example, mimicking 
human actions (Scheeff, Pinto, Rahardia, Snibbe & Tow, 2002), accompanying musicians 
(Otsuka, Nakadai, Takahashi, Ogata & Okuno, 2009), walking and jumping in humanoid form 
(ASIMO, n.d.), dancing to music (Michalowski, Simmons & Kozima, 2009), and doing various 
 3 
 
other things. Such skills and behaviours in social robots make them superior to similar 
technologies; however, scientists argue that the actions of such robots are limited and may not 
provide sufficient reason for people to create and maintain social relationships for a long period 
of time (Baxter et al., 2012). Baxter, in this case, has pointed out that social robots have memory 
issues, as occasionally the robots were unable to pick up conversations from a previous 
interaction. In a later chapter (5.1) of this thesis, we will see that the forgetfulness of a robot 
can play an important role in human–robot interactions. However, in human–human 
interactions, people meeting others are able to form different kinds of relationships, but not 
always in human-robot interactions. This inability raises the question: ‘What happens in 
human–human interactions that is absent in human–robot interactions, thus preventing a social 
relationship forming between the human and the robot?’   
To answer this question, I investigate how humans interact and form relationships. 
Russell and Shoare (1994) concluded that human behaviour is derived from the thoughts, 
feelings and actions of individuals, and it develops from 10 variables found within each human 
being: individual’s will, motivation, psychological dimensions, learning styles, cognitive 
development, beliefs, physiological needs, social and emotional development, language 
development and spiritual beliefs (Russell & Shoare, 1994). These variables can differentially 
influence individuals, so an individual will act uniquely in different situations. This 
individuality does not mean, however, that people behave randomly, but that they behave in 
certain ways to particular situations. For example, one individual’s act of aggressiveness may 
be wholly different than another’s.  
A further example clarifies the above point: Some may feel happy watching videos of 
cats on the Internet, but others may think that the Internet is too full of cat videos. Such 
differences in reactions are, perhaps, as scientists suggest, based on individuals’ idiosyncratic 
thoughts, social norms and cultures (Haselton, Nettle & Murray, 2005). Social norms are the 
unwritten rules of how to behave in a particular social group or culture ((Cialdini et al, 1990), 
(McLeod, 2008)). For example, it is expected that employees arrive at an office on time and 
complete their work. As James (2015) puts it, ‘Culture is defined as a social domain that 
emphasizes the practices, discourses and material expressions, which, over time, express the 
continuities and discontinuities of social meaning of a life held in common’ (pp. 53). 
‘Thinking’ is the mental process of manipulating information for problem solving, reasoning 
and decision making (Beresford & Sloper, 2008). One can say, in sum, that individuals can 
behave differently in particular situations, depending on their own thoughts, social norms and 
 4 
 
culture. Studies suggest that norms and culture for a large group usually do not change: ‘Culture 
is thus synonymous with group identity’, concludes Spencer-Oatey (2012, pp. 16), and 
Richardson (1999) writes, ‘Having a set of norms—or ground rules—that a group follows 
encourages behaviours that will help a group do its work and discourages behaviours that 
interfere with a group’s effectiveness’ (pp. 1). Thus, individuals born within the same culture 
usually accept the norms of that culture. Therefore, from this discussion it can be said that it is 
the human ‘thinking’ which drives individuals to act differently than others. However, various 
studies have suggested that human thinking is not strictly rational and may occasionally be 
affected by variety of cognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
 
1.2.1 Cognitive bias  
Cognitive bias can regarded as people’s tendency to create their own versions of social reality 
from their perception of sensory input which is not actual input and which may dictate their 
behaviour in the social world (Bless, Fiedler & Strack, 2004). For example, thinking that of a 
certain number will or will not appear in the next round of a lottery just because it appeared 
several times before is misguided, since the numbers appear randomly. This is called ‘the 
gambler’s fallacy’, and it is associated with people who gamble frequently (Coltfelter CT, Cook 
PJ, 1993). Cognitive biases can be classed by their effects: for example, decision-making biases 
(empathy gap, belief bias, etc.), social bias (the halo effect, self-serving bias, etc.), or memory 
bias (misattribution, the effect of humour, the bizarreness effect, etc.) (I discuss biases in 
Chapter 3 and add collected lists of biases in the Appendix G).  
In a given context, individuals may act differently based on the effects of their biases 
on their thinking processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Cognitive biases can help people 
to make faster decisions, but with some cost to the reliability of those decisions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Coxall (2013) has stated that cognitive biases explain people’s limited 
capacity for information processing, and Baron (2008) has suggested that cognitive biases (e.g. 
social biases) have a reasonable amount of influence on human thinking processes, leading to 
misjudgements, mistakes and fallible activities. As most relevant studies have suggested that 
biases play crucial role in decision making, it can be assumed that such cognitive biases have 
influence the choices made in interactions between individuals in given contexts. Such 
differences in cognitive responses among individuals seem to make human interactions unique 
and natural to humans. For example, it is common during social interactions that one party may 
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pay more attention to someone yawning as a sign of disinterest but not so much attention to 
other cues suggesting interest in a conversation (such as leaning in). Based on such incidents, 
an individual’s behaviour towards the yawning person might change. 
Biases are not the only factor which influences the human decision making, but such 
systematic errors in judgement and decision making are common in all individuals (Wilke & 
Mata, 2012). Cognitive biases play crucial roles in human thinking, effecting people’s 
decisions about certain things; decisions are not based only on the facts but also on a person’s 
biased thinking. The different types of biases include memory biases (which result in people 
misattributing and forgetting information), social biases (which effect people’s social thinking 
and interpersonal relationships, e.g. through Dunning-Kruger effects) and many others (lists of 
cognitive biases are attached in the Appendix G). Similar to emotions, moods, traits and 
personalities, cognitive biases are one of the main components that influence each individual’s 
thoughts. Unlike moods, emotions and traits, however, the effects of such biases are never 
tested in social robots for human–robot interactions.  
In the social robotics research, robots can imitate human actions. For example, Kismet 
can understand human affection through vision and sound and express itself with emotive facial 
expressions (Breazeal, 2004). Recognising the wrong emotions and acting accordingly, 
however, is also a human behaviour which can happen in many social situations; for example, 
people often fail to recognise others’ emotions in different situations; if someone feels secure, 
then it is hard for them to discount the idea that other people are anxious (e.g. hot-cold empathy 
gap bias) (Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning & Nordgren, 2013). Therefore, such humans 
common characteristics (i.e. faults, unintentional mistakes) are, however, absent from these 
social robots. Many robots can present social behaviours in human–robot interactions but are 
unable to show anthropomorphic cognitive biased behaviours such as faults, unintentional 
mistakes and task imperfectness, and people often find social robots difficult to relate to. Many 
researchers (e.g. Leite et al., 2016; Castellano, Pereira, Leite, Paiva & McOwan, 2009) 
investigate user engagement issues between human and companion robots, providing game-
playing scenarios to make the responses of the companion robots more ‘empathic’, but in the 
real world, people can sometimes refuse to accept losing in games and sometimes accuse their 
opponents of cheating (e.g. self-serving bias effects, Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder & Elliot, 
2000).  
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Modern social robots, such as the robot Nadine built by Prof. Nadia Thalmann from 
Nanyang Technological University Singapore (NTU) (Kok L, 2015), can recognise past guests 
and initiate conversation based on previous interactions. The robot can exhibit happiness or 
sadness, depending on the topic of the conversation. Thalmann stated in an interview that this 
robot was built to be a companion robot similar to C-3PO from Star Wars: ‘This is somewhat 
like a real companion that is always with you and conscious of what is happening. So in future, 
these socially intelligent robots could be like C-3PO, the iconic golden droid from Star Wars, 
with knowledge of language and etiquette’ (Knapton, 2015). However, C-3PO is liked not only 
for being an intelligent humanoid robot, but also for its fussy and worry-prone personality 
throughout its decades of operation (Star Wars Wikia, n.d.). In the movie, the robot fears 
changes and strives to maintain order and peace. Such worry-prone behaviours are common in 
humans and can be seen in everyday life. Hence, plausibly, if a robot could show 
anthropomorphically fallible behaviours (e.g. mistakes, faults and biases), it could appear more 
human-like, facilitating a more natural relationship between humans and robots. 
People commonly forget the names and faces of others or misremember past events, 
brag about their achievements, or blame others for their own failures. Such behaviours arise 
widely between friends, family members and colleagues, but are absent in current social robots. 
Many studies have investigated the effects of human-like emotions and expressions 
(Yannakakis & Pavia, 2014), empathic behaviours (Leite et al., 2016) and personality traits 
(Lee, Peng, Jin & Yan, 2006) in robots, but cognitive biases are also one of the main factors 
responsible for human actions manifesting in specific ways (Bless et al., 2004). No research 
has explored in detail how human interlocutors react if a robot shows such fallible behaviours 
based on cognitive bias in human–robot interactions. This thesis examines the importance of 
the effects on people of such biases exhibited in robots, and studies whether such behaviours 
presented by social robots can influence human–robot interactions.  
This research thus focusses on developing cognitive biases in robot behaviours, with 
regard to verbal and non-verbal abilities, emotions and gestures expressions, and so forth, to 
investigate their effects in human–robot interactions. The idea of developing cognitive biases 
in a robot is novel. It is expected that the use of cognitive biases in robots can result in a model 
which will help people to understand more easily the behaviours of robots. 
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1.3 Hypothesis 
The research described in this thesis recognises the importance of the effects cognitive biases 
in humans and commits to investigating their effects in the social robots for human–robot 
interactions. The research examines the following hypothesis: 
If a robot can exhibit behaviours that include selected cognitive biases when interacting 
with humans, then humans will have increased fondness for the robot. 
This main hypothesis addresses three key challenges:  
• the development of cognitively biased behaviours in robots, which could 
demonstrate the bias’s behaviours properly and in an understandable manner,  
• study of cognitively biased behaviours in a robot to find out what kind of effects 
they have on the participants, and 
• study of the effects of such biased behaviours in human–robot interactions for a 
long period of time to find out whether such influences change.  
Based on such challenges, additionally I seek answers to the three research questions: 
o Despite a robot’s appearance, functions and features, can it interact with humans 
in ways similar to human-human interaction by engaging with humans in both 
the long term and the short term and drawing on cognitively biased behaviours? 
o With cognitive biases introduced in a robot, is it possible to develop 
anthropomorphically biased behaviours in robots to influence human-robot 
interactions? 
o Will cognitive biases help humans to develop human-robot interactions in the 
long term? 
As it features in the hypothesis, the selection of cognitive biases is an important part of 
the current study, as explained in Chapter 3. I investigated the hypothesis and research 
questions in four different human–robot experiments (e.g. with conversations and game 
playing) based on the five different cognitive biases, e.g. misattribution, empathy gap, lack of 
knowledge (based on Dunning-Kruger effects), self-serving and humours effect biases. In these 
experiments, I developed biased and non-biased algorithms in robots to manipulate their 
behaviours to show the effects of such biases in interactions with participants. In the non-biased 
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interactions, however, the robot did not show such biased behaviours and engaged in similar 
conversational and game playing interactions. At the end of each experiment, the participant’s 
feedback was compared to determine the participant’s preferred interactions. I further discuss 
the procedures and results in the later chapters in details.  
 
1.4 Objectives 
As the current research investigates a novel approach for developing human-like skills in social 
robots based on cognitive biases, the objectives of the research are important for the field of 
social robots and for that of psychology. Apart from its main objective—to develop different 
cognitive biased behaviours in robots to explore the effects of biases in human–robot 
interactions— the study has other collective objectives:  
• To seek the appropriate cognitive biases to develop in social robots for human–
robot interactions.  
Because over 200 kinds of cognitive bias have been identified, it is important to 
understand which biases would be appropriate to develop in social robots and whether it is 
possible to create any rules or principles by which to select cognitive biases suitable for social 
robots.   
• To determine how such cognitive biases can be developed in social robots. 
As this is a novel approach to establish whether cognitive biases in robots can be useful 
in developing human–robot interactions, it is important to understand how such biases can be 
used in the robots.  
• To study whether a certain cognitively biased behaviour in a robot can change the 
participant’s behaviours towards the robot and how such behaviours change over a 
long-term period.  
Most cognitive biases produce negative responses in human interaction; therefore such 
biases introduced in social robots may discourage human from interacting with these robots. 
For this reason, human response to certain biases must be understood.  
• To discover and compare the differences in participants’ preferences between a 
robot with a certain cognitive bias and a robot without that bias, over the long term. 
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Investigating this objective may reveal the effects of cognitive biases on the robot in 
human-robot interactions over the long term.   
• To evaluate the change in the participant’s response over time in conversational and 
game-playing interactions with the selected biased and non-biased robots.  
This objective investigates the changes in response even if the users like or dislike their 
first interactions with the robot based on cognitive biases, since responses may change with 
repeated interactions over a long period of time between two interactions. It is important to 
know the effects of such biases over the long term.  
The above objectives are addressed through this thesis. In Chapters 5 and 6, I describe 
the experiments and examine the statistical analysis of the collected data based on the 
hypothesis and research questions.  
  
1.5 Thesis organisation 
Chapters 2–8 describe the research as a whole and all of its experimental details. These chapters 
are organised as below.  
• Chapter 2: Social Robot 
The chapter describes the stand of the social robots in society. In this chapter, a brief 
history of social robots is offered, after which the relation of sociable robots to our current 
research is described.  
• Chapter 3: Long-Term Human–Robot Companionship 
In this chapter, the study of long-term human robot interactions is discussed. Existing 
studies in this field are talked about, and the problem domains are briefly described.  
• Chapter 4: Cognitive Biases and Imperfectness in Humans 
This chapter focusses on the biases in humans and why they are important, the common 
characteristics flaws in human behaviours and how such behaviours in social robot during 
human-robot interactions can impact the interactions between robots and humans. 
• Chapter 5: Interaction Algorithms and Experimental Setup 
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In this chapter, the model of biased and non-biased algorithms used in the experiments 
and the basis of each of the different experiments are discussed. Also discussed is how such 
algorithms are formed and applied in the robot for specific interactions. The experimental 
details, participants, groupings, settings, measurements and other details are described in this 
chapter. 
• Chapter 6: Statistics for All Experiments 
In this chapter, the general statistics of the collected data from all the experiments 
described in the previous chapter are presented. Data are shown for each experiment as per the 
set dimensions, assessment of the biased and unbiased interactions and the algorithms 
effectiveness. 
• Chapter 7: Discussion of Hypothesis and Research Questions 
In this chapter, the results of the previous chapter are discussed. After that, the statistical 
analysis from the previous chapter, based on the hypothesis and research questions, is 
discussed.  
• Chapter 8: Future Work 
In this chapter, the possibilities for future research are briefly described, the research as 
a whole is discussed and the thesis concluded. 
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Chapter 2  
Social Robots and Human–Robot Interaction 
2.1 The social robots  
This research investigates the effects of cognitive biases, introduced in social robots, on 
human–robot interactions. The aim of this study is to make social robots more cognitively 
anthropomorphic in order to improve users’ experiences in human–robot interactions. In recent 
years, many studies have suggested that human-like behaviours in robots can improve the 
quality of human–robot interactions, as the user finds it easy to understand such behaviours, 
which helps them relate with the robot. In the following sections, I discuss the importance of 
social robots equipped with various social skills. In the discussions, I point out the skills in 
such systems and discuss the possibilities of improving interactions.  
The concept of the social robots must be defined for the purposes of this study. Breazeal 
(2003) defines a social robot as a robot which can have social interactions with people. To 
create such ‘social interactions’, it is important to develop knowledge in the robot of, for 
example, the social norms and cues that humans follow in regular social interactions. Currently, 
social robots are used in many different fields, for example healthcare, tourism, reception, 
education, hospice and many more, where robots engage with the users in social interactions. 
Breazeal (2003) has proposed four subclasses of the existing social robots:  
• ‘socially evocative’ robots—designed to resemble humans and other social entities 
(e.g., robot pets, animated characters); 
• ‘social interface’ robots—designed to use anthropomorphic modes of interaction 
(e.g., facial expressions, eye contact, facial analysis, etc.). Robots with such social 
interfaces can be used as tour guides, receptionists, and so on, to engage people with 
understandable expressions, gestures, speech, and so forth;  
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• ‘socially receptive’ robots—designed to learn from their interactions with people 
(e.g., learning new words, geometrical shapes, gestures, etc.); and 
• ‘sociable’ robots—designed to engage with people to help them to perform tasks 
and to update their own performances. These robots interact with people following 
social cues and anthropomorphic cognitive behaviours, developed from the field of 
psychology.  
 
Describing the vision of a sociable robot, Breazeal (2002) states, ‘…a sociable robot is 
socially intelligent in a humanlike way, and interacting with it is like interacting with another 
person’ (pp. 1); this definition indicates that people should be able to relate to socials robot as 
they relate to other people or objects. Dautenhahn (2007) identifies various definitions of social 
robots from the literature, including Breazeal’s (2003) ‘socially evocative’ and ‘sociable’ 
robots. The other definitions she raises are as follows:  
• ‘socially situated’—as earlier mentioned by Fong, Nourbakhsh, and Dautenhahn 
(2003), these robots are placed in a social environment, reacting socially to different 
social entities. This definition states that the social robot should be in the society and 
should be able to understand and react to the different objects in the environment; and  
• ‘socially intelligent’ robots—Dautenhahn (1998) also describes that socially intelligent 
robots can be based on human-like cognition and social knowledge and should be able 
to demonstrate human-like social intelligence in human–robot interactions.   
Synthesising the above definitions, one can say that a social robot should be able to 
understand and express its social intelligence in interactions, and it should be able to perceive 
and update its social knowledge by continuing such interactions. Researchers worldwide are 
studying different social skills to develop in social robots to express and understand human 
social interactions. Such social skills should also help humans to understand and relate to the 
robots as they can relate with others. So far, the various social robots show different social 
abilities (e.g. Advanced Step in Innovative Mobility [ASIMO] can walk, jump, talk; the 
Flexible LIREC1 Autonomous Social Helper [FLASH]) humanoid robot can express emotions 
in interactions (Leite I et al, 2012); Paro robot can learn to behave in a way that the user prefers; 
and many other robots might also be mentioned). In the next section I discuss the importance 
                                                     
1 LIREC (Living with Robots & Interactive Companions) http://lirec.eu/flash  
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of such social robots with different social skills in the various areas of the modern society. In 
the later section (2.3), I discuss the skills that the social robots use in human–robot interactions 
(HRI) and what more could be added in order to develop HRI more human friendly. 
 
2.2 The importance of social robots 
In the previous section, I have discussed the various definitions and subclasses of the social 
robot, and in this section I discuss the importance of such social robots in our society. More 
specifically, I explain various applications of these robots in different sectors of society, for 
example healthcare, education, house maintenance, hospice, retail and others.  
The ageing population is a major concern in the UK. Based on the information from the 
UK government project called 'Future of an Ageing Population', in the coming decades the 
average age in the UK population is expected to increase significantly (Government Office for 
Science, 2017). In this scenario, the social robot could be useful in assisting elderly people in 
need. Robots can be programmed with caring and empathetic behaviours, obeying users 
unconditionally, and they can provide many entertaining applications useful in helping the 
elderly. In Europe, many studies are proceeding with collaboration from different countries to 
develop care robots for the elderly in care homes and hospitals: for instance, Hobbit2  (Pripfl J 
et al, 2016), Robot-Era3 (Subash S et al, 2013), EnrichMe4 (Bellotto N, Fernandez-Carmona M 
and Cosar S, 2017), the Mario Project5 (Casey D et al 2015), and more. The reasons for such 
interest in the use social robots in elderly care include ageing populations and new 
technological advancements. Projects such as HOBBIT aim to support independent living for 
the elderly by providing physical and cognitive assistance (Pripfl J et al, 2016). The information 
on the project website indicates that with this project the user and robot can develop 
companionship based on taking care of each other, so that users accept the robot in their houses. 
The European project ENRICHME offers an intelligent robotic system which interacts and 
monitors elderly users in a smart-home environment (Bellotto N, Fernandez-Carmona M and 
                                                     
2 HOBBIT – The mutual care robot, http://hobbit.acin.tuwien.ac.at/index.html  
3 Robot Era (The Robot-Era Project has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement num. 288899 FP7 - ICT - Challenge 5: ICT for Health, 
Ageing Well, Inclusion and Governance) http://www.robot-era.eu/robotera/index.php 
4 EnrichMe - ENabling Robot and assisted living environment for Independent Care and Health Monitoring of 
the Elderly, http://www.enrichme.eu/wordpress/about/ 
5 Mario project - Managing Active and healthy aging with use of caRing servIce robots, http://www.mario-
project.eu/portal/  
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Cosar S, 2017). If the robot notices any emergency situation, it can directly contact the care 
assistant and the family members for immediate assistance. In the Robot-Era project, the robot 
Johnny offers various services to its elderly users: shopping, cleaning house, washing the 
laundry, ordering food, calling friends and family, and organising events, among other things 
(Subash et al, 2013.). In this project, the entire system uses three different robotic platforms 
(i.e. domestic, condominium and outdoor), each intended for specific tasks; for example, the 
user orders shopping using the interfaces of the domestic robot, the outdoor robot collects the 
ordered goods from the store and brings them to the condominium robot at the house, and this 
condominium robot then transfers the goods to the domestic robot (Subash S et al, 2013). In 
most of the care-robot projects, the robotic system offers multiple ways to interact with the 
robot, for example based on their health and preferences, the user can interact with the robot 
using speech, a tablet computer or even simple gestures. In these projects, the robot provides 
companionship to the users and monitor patients alongside the caregiver to offer the cognitive 
mental supports. However, since some elderly people are less technologically advanced, the 
interaction with the robots must be easy, so that they can relate to the robot in order to receive 
all the benefits. In this thesis, I study such human-like skills in robots to make their behaviours 
more familiar and understandable to users, so that the interactions are much easier for them.   
Studies have suggested that social robots such as KASPAR can be useful in educating 
the autistic children to improve their social interactions (Syrdal, Lehmann, Robins, & 
Dautenhahn, 2014). This robot is a minimally expressive child-like humanoid robot developed 
by the Adaptive System Research Group at the University of Hertfordshire (Dautenhahn, 
2009). The developers’ study concluded that KASPAR’s minimal expressions and imitative 
behaviours, playing a drum or peek-a-boo, helps autistic children to understand and learn basic 
behaviours, because the children tend to pay much attention to the robot (Dautenhahn, 2009). 
Another recent study (Valadão et al., 2016) between a robot called MARIA and children with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) found out the robot to be useful in enhancing the social skills 
in ASD children because they reacted well to the robot. In their research, children with ASD 
looked at the robot, touched it, and paid much attention to the interactions and the robot where 
the robot plays mediator role (Valadão et al., 2016). In recent years, studies using social robots 
to teach social behaviours to ASD children have become more common (among others, 
Bharatharaj, Huang, Mohan, Al-Jumaily & Krägeloh, 2017; Nelson, 2013; Feil-Seifer & 
Mataric, 2009). Ricks and Colton (2010) have argued that such robot-based therapeutic trends 
can indeed help autistic children, proven through the social skills children show during their 
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interactions with the robots. However, they mention also that robot-based studies need to 
extend beyond the laboratory to examine how well children can interact in the real world, with 
the children without ASD (Ricks & Colton, 2010). Clearly, social robots can play an important 
role in engaging ASD children to teach them social skills. This insight has inspired this thesis 
to investigate the different social behaviours of humans as expressed in regular social 
interactions, and how such common behaviours can benefit human–robot interactions if 
developed in social robots.  
The social robots are being used in the collaborative learning, where children can 
memorise and learn language, science and technology (Mubin, Stevens, Shahid, Al-Mahmud 
& Dong, 2013). In their review on the acceptance of the robots in the education, Mubin et al. 
(2013) concluded that robots can provide a tangible and physical representation of learning 
outcomes which could be valuable for employing the robots in education. Preschool children 
can be naturally attracted to some robots, for example the BeeBot robot (Janka, 2008). The 
BeeBot is a colourful bug-like programmable robot used in a kindergarten to study how young 
people learn and respond to technology with the help of a robot (Janka, 2008). Janka (2008) 
concluded that using robot to teach children could be appealing. Not only the robot, moreover, 
but robot construction kits may be useful in the classrooms to teach children about 
programming, technology and engineering (Sullivan & Bers, 2015). In my understanding, such 
collaborative lessons require children and robots to work side by side, so it is important that 
the actions of the robot be easily understandable for the children. To be understandable for 
children, a robot must present behaviours easily recognised by children. For example, in 
collaborative games, if a robot always loses and lets the child win, the child may get bored; on 
the other hand, however, bragging after success and blaming after losing are well-known 
human behaviours that arise even among friends and families (e.g. self-serving bias, De 
Michele, Gansneder & Solomon 1998). Therefore, in playing games, if the robot wins and 
brags, then the children may feel challenged, and they may be more likely to play again to 
defeat the robot. This competitive reaction could make child-robot interactions more enjoyable 
to the children as well.   
Not only in healthcare and education can the social robots be used as alternative helpers, 
but also in stores and shopping malls. According to an article published in Consumer News 
and Business Channel (CNBC) (Kercheval, 2015) the chief executive officer (CEO) of the 
International Council of Shopping Centers discussed the possibilities of using the robots in 
shopping malls to provide useful services such as carrying products, pushing or carrying carts, 
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helping customers navigate, assisting them in finding specific products, and so on. Based on 
the IEEE Spectrum article (Ackerman, 2016) Robots such as Budgee can follow customers 
around like a trusted friend and guide. In shopping malls, these robots may meet different types 
of people, of all ages and backgrounds, who would respond to such technology differently; for 
example, some might be too enthusiastic, while others might be confused or frightened, and 
still others might not interact properly, thinking that the robot might be too complex to operate. 
Therefore, these robots in such public places need to be more socially active by showing much 
more anthropomorphic behaviours.  
Based on an article published in the New York Times (Markoff, 2013), a guard robot, 
Knightscope's K5 (Knightscope, n.d.), can help security guards and police do their jobs more 
efficiently and safely. The robot is able to detect guns and anomalies, collect video, record 
audio and even has forensic capabilities (Knightscope, n.d.). However, such a security guard 
robot needs to exhibit humanoid behaviours in order to work alongside human guards in a team, 
and it must also show such behaviour in communicating with the public. In this thesis, I try to 
determine how such robot behaviours can be made more human-like, so that working alongside 
people in public places can be made easier for both humans and robots.  
Social robots can furthermore entertain their users, like pets in households. In a study 
using robotic pets in the households to understand children’s behaviours towards living and 
robotic dogs, Melson et al. (2009) found that children usually become attached to such robotic 
pets, and they sometimes even feelings as if the pets are alive. Francis and Mishra (2009) 
observed similar results in a study with children and the Sony AIBO robot dog: Children treated 
the interactive robot dog as ‘real’, with intentional qualities, even knowing that such toys are 
not real. Sparrow (2002) has argued that even if people enjoy having a robot pet for 
entertainment and social interaction, but having such artificial pet might have ethical issue in 
case of a socially isolated elderly person. However, as people tend to enjoy robotic pets, to 
develop human–pet companionship such robotic pets need to show known and understandable 
behaviours to their owners, in order to grow the relationship quickly and firmly. In the current 
thesis, I seek human behaviours that can be developed in robots so that people may easily 
recognise and relate to their behaviours.  
The examples in this section describe the usability of social robots in various fields of 
society, showing the relevance and promise of social robots. I have described the different 
studies and applications of social robots’ various social skills in interacting with people, for 
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example eye movement, emotion, gestures, human-like behaviour, and verbal and non-verbal 
communication. It is my understanding that robots’ interactions with users should be as simple 
as human–human interactions and as easy to understand. To this end, the robots must be given 
various social skills. Presently, research worldwide have developed various methods and social 
skills for robots to make their behaviours understandable to their users (e.g. imitating human 
behaviours or otherwise expressing anthropomorphic behaviours). In Section 2.3, I briefly 
discuss the different social skills developed in the robots for human–robot social interactions.  
 
2.3 The social skills used in robots 
In the previous examples of the different social robots (e.g. Kismet, KASPAR, AIBO), the 
robots used various social skills, for example eye contact, emotional expression, verbal or non-
verbal sounds, and so forth, to interact with people. All such skills in robots were developed 
based on familiar social skills among humans and other social animals. In this section, I 
exemplify some of the important skills of robots, including expressions of mood and emotion, 
trait-based personalities, and other anthropomorphic behaviours. 
  
2.3.1 Emotions 
Expressing emotions is one of the major human-like skills robots can have, and various studies 
have shown the importance of social robots possessing emotional understanding. For example, 
Breazeal’s (2003) Kismet robot can express emotions through various facial and auditory 
expressions. Kismet is known for its anthropomorphic expressions and natural ability to engage 
with people. The robot has been designed to support several social cues and skills that may 
play important roles in socially situated learning with a human instructor (Kismet, n.d.). Kismet 
was an early-stage robot built by a research group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), and their most recently developed robot, Nexi, is capable of learning from human 
behaviours (Siegel M, Breazeal C and Norton MI, 2009).   
Another expressive robot, KASPAR, mentioned earlier, can express emotions and helps 
autistic children learn social skills (Figure 2.2). This robot’s face is capable of range of 
simplified expressions, with some of the complexities of a real human face. It has movable 
arms, head and eyes, which can be controlled by the teacher or the parent, but also can respond 
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to the touch of a child. The robot was designed to be inexpensive and to explore the reactions 
of autistic children. It has been used in many autistic studies since its development in 2005, 
and KASPAR has been designed for use as a social mediator, thus encouraging and helping 
children with autism to interact and communicate with adults and other children (Wainer J et 
al, 2014). The robot was built to express predictable and repetitive expressions so that the 
autistic child finds the robot easy to interact with (Wainer J et al, 2014).  
The robot KASPAR can show other human-like skills, such as blinking and movement 
in the mouth and neck and arms, but his rubbery face lacks the intricate detail of a human face. 
Teachers and parents have been impressed by the results that they have witnessed; some saw 
their child interact, mimic or make eye-contact for the first time in their lives (Wainer J et al, 
2014). 
Many robots are used in research of human–robot interactions based on emotional 
expressions and understanding. One of the most popular is Keepon (Figure 2.1), a small yellow 
robot capable of anthropomorphic expressions. Keepon has been used in studies with autistic 
children, in schools and in much HRI research (Kozima et al., 2009). It is touch sensitive, reacts 
to emotions using sound, dances upon hearing music, and reacts when someone pokes, pats or 
squeezes it. Keepon’s simple appearance and behaviours are intended to help children with 
developmental disorders such as autism to understand its attentive and emotive actions 
(Kozima et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 2.1. The Keepon robot 
 
 19 
 
The above examples suggest that expressing emotions is an important skill, which helps 
robots to interact with people. The examples above show that robots expressing emotions can 
help to teach various aspects of communication to children with ASD and can be used as 
therapeutic devices for those children. In other words, it can be said that social robots 
expressing emotions help children to relate to the robot, so they can understand the robot and 
learn from the robot important social communication skills.  
 
2.3.2 Mood and personality traits 
Human personality is one of the most researched areas in psychology. Scientists study trait 
theory to study human personalities. Traits are the habitual patterns of people such as emotions, 
thoughts and behaviours (Kassin, 2003). In the current world of social media, accessible 
communication, global migration and the Internet, it is important to understand the behaviours 
and attitudes of people. Character and personality can be used to describe an individual’s 
behaviours, but it is likely that overall character is revealed through time, while characteristics 
are easier to notice in the short term. Different personality traits are the reason why people 
differ from one another. Traits usually are consistent and stable, so they have been studied 
based on a set of trait dimensions such as the five-factor model and the HEXACO model of 
traits (Ashton & Lee, 2007), among others.  
In the Robotics study, researchers have found that if a robot can interact based on 
human-like mood and various personality traits, similar to emotional expressions, then users 
find easy to interact with the robot. For social robots, Moshkina, Park, Arkin, Lee, and Jung 
(2011) developed a behavioural model called time-varying affective response for humanoid 
robots at the Samsung Research Lab. The model’s complex architecture was based on traits, 
attitudes, moods, and emotions which could be developed in humanoid robots (which is why it 
is often called TAME). The model was built for effective human–robot interactions based on 
the robot’s affective state being easily interpreted by the user (Moshkina & Arkin, 2009). Their 
studies with large numbers of the participants show that a story-telling, socially expressive 
robot is more likely to be perceived as social engaging than other story-telling robots that are 
less expressive or non-expressive (Moshkina et al., 2011). This model suggests that if the robot 
can show such anthropomorphic social skills, it can maintain more attention and engagement 
from its users.  
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Meerbeek, Saerbeck, and Bartneck  (2009) have proposed and designed model for user-
centred personality for domestic robots. Based on the individual user, they have proposed that 
personality in the robot can be developed over five steps: creating personality profile, designing 
the expressions, sketching scenarios, visualising objects with 3D animation and evaluating the 
design (Meerbeek et al.,2009). Their previous research investigated users’ control over a 
robotic TV assistant based on personality traits, and they concluded that ‘personality’ in robots 
‘can be used as a means to increase the amount of controls that user perceives’ (Meerbeek, 
Hoonhout, Bingley & Terken, 2006, pp. 1). Their study suggests that personality in a domestic 
robot could be useful for users and may support human–robot interactions.  
Lee et al. (2006) have investigated behaviours of extraverted and introverted 
personality traits on a popular dog robot called AIBO in human–robot interactions. The robot 
expressed and differentiated between extraverted behaviours and introverted behaviours by 
manipulating its voice, verbal and non-verbal cues, LED lights, movement angle and speed. 
The study found that ‘individuals regarded a robot with a complementary personality as being 
more intelligent, more attractive, and more socially present than a robot with a similar 
personality’. This study, much like the previous example of the robotic TV assistant 
(Meerbeek, Hoonhout, Bingley & Terken, 2006), shows that behaviours based on personality 
traits in robots may make the robots more likeable, hence may be useful in human–robot 
interactions.  
 
2.3.3 Anthropomorphism 
Anthropomorphism is another popular area of study in human–robot interactions, where human 
attributes are put into the robots. Humans interactions with other humans, animals and objects 
are based on their conceptions of such entities and, they try to understand such entities and 
interactions by projecting their existing concepts onto such animals and objects (Fussel, 
Kiesler, Setlock & Yew, 2008). This phenomenon can be observed in social robots and other 
technologies as well; for example, in a recent study Lee, Lau, Kiesler, and Chiu (2005) have 
observed that people create predictable mental models about robots’ knowledge based on the 
limited information they have. Previously, Reeves and Nass (1996) showed that humans can 
engage in social interactions with computers and other technology. It is therefore possible that 
humans can easily anthropomorphise social robots, regardless their appearances (e.g. machine-
like or humanoid).  
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In a review of the literature on anthropomorphism and human likeness, Fink (2012) has 
suggested that robots with social cues can hold people’s attention, which could help to develop 
acceptances of robots by their users. In addition to the issue of acceptance, DiSalvo and 
Gemperle (2003) have stated that anthropomorphic forms can solve design issues and can be 
used to project and reflect human values in other objects and robots. Therefore, in order to gain 
social acceptance, the social robot should be developed based on human social skills and values 
so that people could easily relate to it. The reason for anthropomorphism’s ability to foster such 
‘acceptance’ and ‘relatability’ may be, as Duffy (2003) has suggested, that anthropomorphism 
provides powerful physical and social cues suggesting humanity, which can be implemented 
and used in social robots ‘to a great extent’ for human–robot interactions. However, he argued, 
anthropomorphism is not be the solution of the ethical and implementation issues in HRI. This 
argument also can be supported by another case study (Eyssel, Hegel, Horstmann & Wagner, 
2010) on the emotional, non-verbal cues of robots, which found that people responded more 
positively to the robots showing emotional behaviours and social cues in interactions than those 
with only functionality.  
From this discussion, it can be said that human-like behaviours, social cues and skills 
can be helpful in anthropomorphising robots, perhaps enabling people to relate with and accept 
them.  
 
2.3.4 Faulty behaviours 
Apart from mood, emotions and trait-based personalities, recent studies have focussed on faulty 
behaviours in robots to uncover their effects on human trust in robots in collaborative tasks. 
Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, and Dautenhahn (2015) have studied how the perception of 
erroneous robot behaviour influences human interaction choices and willingness to cooperate 
with the robot. The hypothesis was tested in a home environment and with a robot which had 
both faults and correct behaviours, each set as two different modes of interaction. Their study 
suggests that people do not trust to the unusual requests from robots and prefer to trust the robot 
in the correct conditions. Although the purpose and methods of this study were totally different 
than those of the present research, in the further chapters I discuss that, it is possible if the robot 
shows behaviours based on cognitive biases in conversation and game playing then people 
usually like the interaction more than the interaction without such behaviours from the robot.  
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The study of faulty behaviours in robots and excess trust of participants were pointed 
out by Robinette et al. (2016). In their study, participants followed the robot in an emergency, 
despite having observed the same robot performing poorly in a navigation guidance task just 
minutes before. They concluded that the robots have the potential to save lives in emergency 
scenarios, but could have an equally disastrous effect if participants trust them too much. This 
thesis does not address trust issues between humans and robots, however; rather, it studies 
making a robot’s behaviours more human-like by applying biased behaviours in robot. It is 
noted that, as in this example, humans can trust a faulty robot in emergency situations.  
As we have seen, researchers have developed various social skills in robots to make 
their behaviours more human-like, such as emotions, trait-based personalities and moods; such 
human-like components make human–robot interactions more effective. In the research 
presented in this thesis, I study common human behaviours such as mistake making, bragging, 
forgetfulness and such relatedly biased behaviours in social robots, specifically in their 
connection to human–robot interactions. It is hoped that such behaviours in a robot could make 
human–robot interaction more enjoyable, familiar and understandable for people.  
 
2.4 Problem domain and solution angle 
The studies presented in this chapter have described different methods used by researchers to 
develop social skills in robots for human–robot interactions. In the previous section, I presented 
various studies in which emotional expressions, trait-based personalities, social cues and skills, 
and erroneous behaviours were instilled in social robots. Researchers developed such 
behaviours in these robots so that users can easily anthropomorphise and relate to them. In my 
understanding, human behavioural characteristics also include faults, unintentional mistakes, 
cognitive biases, and tasks imperfectness—which are still absent from such social robots. 
Sometimes, a robot’s social behaviours lack that of a human’s common characteristics such as 
ideocracy, humour and common mistakes, but such behaviours are very common in people. 
Most of the robots described in the examples till now, show the social cues in human–robot 
interactions but lack human-like, naturally flawed behaviours, and sometimes human-like 
behaviours presented by the robots do not meet the standards expected by humans. As we have 
seen, researchers have developed personality traits, various moods and emotions, and other 
human-like behaviours in robots, to make them more sociable. These robots express emotions 
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and interact based on the developed traits, but in human social interactions, making 
unintentional mistakes in judgment and showing various cognitive biased behaviours (e.g. 
brag, blame, ideocracy, etc.) are common. The absence of such natural biased behaviours (e.g. 
brag, blame, ideocracy, etc.) in the social robots interactions may be one of the many reasons 
that social robots remain far from an ideal state allowing ‘companionship’ between robots and 
humans. In current robotics, most of the time, it is expected that the robot could do a task 
repeatedly without asking questions or making mistakes and without showing any fatigue, but 
in reality, expressing tiredness and boredom are very common human behaviours, and such 
behaviours are present in all living creatures; these may be the key to fostering human–robot 
companionship. Therefore, this issue needs to be addressed and investigated that if a social 
robot shows cognitive biased behaviours during human-robot social interactions then how 
people responds to that.   
In the current study, I examine human behaviours based on the common cognitive 
biases and develop such biased behaviours in robots to investigate the responses of participants 
in human–robot interactions. It is expected that biased behaviours in robots could help people 
to relate to them and make the interaction more likeable to people.   
  
2.5 Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed briefly the different definitions of the social robots 
found in the literature. I then discussed the importance of the social robots, where I stated 
different EU-funded projects for elderly care and discussed the different roles for the social 
robots in the different fields, such as autism therapy, collaborative learning, robots in the 
shopping mall retail, robots in the security, household pets, entertainment and others. I then 
discussed the different social skills used in such social robots, for example expression of mood 
and emotion, trait-based skills and also faulty behaviours, helping people to anthropomorphize 
the robots. After discussing the different social skills used in social robots, I briefly stated my 
argument for using humanlike cognitively biased behaviours. This chapter offers, in sum, an 
overview of social robots, the importance of such robots and the different skills robots use to 
interact with people.    
In the next chapter, I discuss how existing social robots are being used in various 
interactive studies, and I then discuss the proposed solution to the issues I have raised.    
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Chapter 3 
Introduction to Cognitive Biases 
in the Social Robots 
3.1 Interactions between human and social robots 
Chapter has discussed the definition and importance of the social robots, along with the various 
social skills used in such robots and how such social skills help robots to interact and relate 
with people. I presented various examples and studies based on such human–robot interactions, 
where robots use human-like skills and social cues to interact with people. In this chapter, I 
further illustrate human–robot interactions with examples, parsing each of the examples. I then 
justify why considering cognitive bias in robots could be beneficial, after which I construct the 
hypothesis for the present study. I close by discussing the set of cognitive biases investigated 
in my study.  
With the increase of robots in houses and the workplace, and with an aging population, 
it will become necessary to interact with and work alongside robots. Robots are already present 
in households in different forms to assist people in various tasks; for example, cleaning robots 
such as Roomba (iRobot, n.d.); lawn mowing robots such as Bosch’ Indego (Bosch, n.d.); pet-
care robots such as Litter Robot (Litter Robot, n.d.); personal companion robots such as Buddy 
(Blue Frog Robotics, n.d.); butler bots used in luxury hotels, such as Charley (Dormehl, 2016); 
mopping bots which mop floors, like Bimby (Super Kitchen Machine, n.d.); kitchen robots that 
help with cooking, like Moly (Moly, n.d.); and assistive and care robots such as Paro (PARO, 
n.d.) that help the elderly and children. Although such robots for helping humans in domestic 
areas are not meant for social interaction, if such domestics robots could have meaningful social 
interactions, working side by side with them for long periods of time would be much easier for 
both parties (Breazeal, 2003). For example, an elderly care system called Gecko CareBot has 
been performing in-home trials as an elderly-care personal assistant since 2002. As Gecko 
claims, ‘trials have made a valuable contribution to the development and design of the CareBot’ 
 25 
 
(Gecko Systems, n.d.-a). Such elderly-care robots may make very useful companions, as they 
are capable of taking care of their uses. As the Gecko website state, ‘The CareBot™ home care 
robot is capable of assisting in senior care in a variety of real-life situations, such as frequent 
welfare checks, on-time medication reminders and virtual visits by family members that give 
a sense of safety, security and most of all, being reminded that they are a loved and cherished 
member of the family’ (Gecko Systems, n.d.-b). This statement suggests that the robot can be 
an important part of the lives of elderly people. As the GeckoSystem website claims, such care-
giving robots not only help in medical emergencies, but also take care of patients’ 
psychological comforts (Gecko Systems, n.d.-b ).  
However, caring for the elderly with modern technology such as robots may be 
complex, because of elderly people’s health issues (e.g. poor eyesight, hearing problems or 
memory issues), so communicating with robots may be difficult for them. In these situations, 
robots need to feature easy-to-understand interfaces and anthropomorphic behaviours to 
provide physical and psychological comfort for the elderly. I investigate how it is possible to 
make social robot’s behaviours more human-like, to provide such psychological comfort.  
For instance, in the field of elderly care, one of the popular robots, Paro, interacts based 
on touch, sound, eye contact and memory of users’ interaction choices. The robot serves as a 
low-maintenance alternative to cats and dogs, and studies (Jøranson , Pedersen, Rokstad & 
Ihlebæk, 2015) have found that Paro could effectively help dementia patients reduce agitation 
and depression. Robinson, MacDonald, Kerse and Broadbent (2013) found that robotic pet 
companions could be helpful in decreasing the loneliness of elderly people in hospitals and 
rest-homes. They compared the psychological effects of interactions with the robot pet Paro 
and a resident dog and analysed the behaviours of the elderly while they were communicating 
with the robot and the dog. Their study concluded that Paro was a positive addition to the 
hospital environment and also that it had benefits for older people in nursing homes, as the 
robot was able to address some of the unmet needs of older people, particularly relating to 
loneliness, a need which the resident animal could not meet (Robinson et al., 2013). However, 
Turkle, Taggart, Kidd, and Dasté (2006) have argued that such robot pets create an illusory 
relationship in order to develop companionship for the elderly and those who find human 
relationships challenging, which raise ethical problems. In their review of the literature, Shibata 
and Wada (2011) have argued that the organisations conducting the study with Paro were 
subject to ethical committees and had participants and their relatives agree to join. They 
focussed on the benefits of using robots in therapy and concluded that Paro could be a social 
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mediator for the elderly and that interacting with it could improve their quality of life and 
reduce loneliness (Shibata & Wada 2011).  
The above examples show that the social robots can help the elderly to reduce their 
feelings of loneliness using various skills and abilities. It is understandable that in the field of 
healthcare, robots should exhibit many recognisable human-like behaviours, so that relating to 
the robots becomes easy for elderly people. The research described in this thesis studies 
existing skills and human-like behaviours in social robots and investigates how they can be 
improved further.  
Many studies support the argument that social robots may be helpful as pets and 
companions not only for the elderly, but also for people of all ages. Barlett, Estivill-Castro, and 
Seymon (2004) found that children saw AIBO as a robotic pet rather than a machine. This robot 
pet interacts based on dog-like barking, jumping, running and tail wagging. It also follows users 
around the room. Bartlett et al. (2004) note that such behaviours in this robot pet helped 
children to quickly become attached in a way similar to how they become attached to living 
dogs. Melson et al. (2009) investigated the difference in the behaviour of children towards 
robotic and living dogs. Their study found that children compared the live dog to AIBO; 
however, a surprising majority of children conceptualised and interacted with AIBO as if it 
were a living dog. This study suggests that it is possible that a robot dog could be 
conceptualised as living dog if it can show such pet-like behaviours. Using a robot pet as a 
companion has gained popularity in recent years, and Turkle et al. (2006) have reported that 
elderly people accepted the robots more than others: ‘Seniors felt social “permission” with the 
robots presented as a highly valued and “grown up” activity’ (pp. 7). Turkle  (2006) mentioned 
a woman’s comment on Sony’s household entertainment robot dog AIBO, which supports the 
concept of having household robotic pets: ‘[AIBO] is better than a real dog … It won't do 
dangerous things, and it won’t betray you … Also, it won't die suddenly and make you feel 
very sad’ (pp. 9). It is considered that a robotic pet could achieve popularity among some 
people, as robots possess a type of immortality, so can therefore live with the family for a long 
time. Robotic pets do not have the issues of feeding and regular defecation and urination. Such 
robotic companions can therefore be used in the home with children and the elderly for a long 
period of time without the stresses of regular care. Such studies suggest that robotic systems 
have may be used as pets in houses and care homes. In this research, I investigate more common 
human behaviours (e.g. forgetfulness, bragging, misunderstanding emotions, etc.) in robots to 
uncover their effects in human–robot interactions.    
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As discussed earlier, researchers have developed different skills and abilities (e.g. 
emotions expressions, traits, anthropomorphic behaviours) in robots to make them much more 
understandable to people in order to make them acceptable in society. In 2000, there was a 
famous ‘baby’ robot called My Real Baby (Hafner, 2000), which used the emotive expressions 
of children to interact with users. This robot was described as an ‘interactive emotionally 
responsive doll’. It could manifest many facial expressions such as, happy, sad, angry etc. and 
could also blink and suck its thumb or a bottle. This robot can change its emotive expressions 
depending on how it is treated. In an interview, Dr Brooks (the founder of iRobot) described 
the robot as ‘… a toy which can enhance fantasy’ (Hafner, 2000). The robot can cry, but is able 
to stop if the user bounces it on a knee, and if the user rocks it to sleep, its eyes grow heavy. 
Such abilities helped people to anthropomorphise the robot. It basically imitates the behaviours 
of a child, and that made this robot very popular among children, and even adults. My Real 
Baby is one of the classic examples of diverse human attributes developed in a robot. This 
robot’s anthropomorphic behaviours made acceptable by children and adults in 1990s 
households. This robot made it evident that human-like abilities could make the robot more 
anthropomorphic, which could lead to better interactions between humans and robots, even the 
development of companionship. This thesis investigates further human-like behaviours and 
skills to develop in robots, so that people can easily anthropomorphise and relate with the 
robots.  
The idea of interacting and developing companionship between humans and machine 
is far older than My Real Baby, however. Previously, a computer program called ELIZA was 
developed by Weizenbaum (1976), which could engage people in dialogue-based conversation 
similar to that of a Rogerian psychotherapist. For example, a user saying, ‘My mother is making 
me angry’, might make the program respond with, ‘Tell me more about your mother’, or ‘Why 
do you feel so negatively about your mother?’ Turkle (2006) states that Weizenbaum was 
disturbed that his students fully knew that they were talking with a computer program and 
wanted to chat with it, and indeed, wanted to be alone with it. It is surprising that ELIZA, 
without having any embodiment, could secure such intimate interaction among students. This 
observation opened the idea of development companionship with artificial objects, along with 
its associated benefits.  
To make people more accepting of a machine or robot and more willing to interact, in 
this study I put imbue the robots with certain attributes, which should be familiar and easy to 
understand. Thus, I investigate human attributes never before explored before in robots (e.g. 
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cognitive biases), but common and natural among humans. I expect that such behaviours (e.g. 
misattribution, empathy gap) in robots make their behaviours more familiar and easy to 
understand for people.    
Various studies have proven the usefulness of using robotic companions as helpers. In 
the US, an experimental robot has been used within public places to help tourists. For example, 
Gockley et al. (2005) examined a robot receptionist called Valerie, used to provide useful 
information to visitors; Valerie even had a story for its character. Frequent visitors were 
encouraged to repeatedly interact with the robot, so that the changes made in the robot’s voices, 
emotions and appearances could be recognised and used in such interactions. Initially, the robot 
interacted with the visitors for only few seconds, without any expressions, but in a later version, 
Valerie could display a positive, negative or neutral mood, which people were able to 
accurately distinguish. Researchers then developed mood-based emotional interactions in 
Valerie to make it more appealing to tourists. Such positive, negative and neutral moods trigger 
different dialogues and emotions, which helped the robot to present itself in a more human-like 
way. Gockley et al. (2005) determined that the mood, emotions and other anthropomorphic 
behaviours were important factors in such human–robot interactions. In the research described 
in this thesis, I investigate what other anthropocentric factors may be important in human–
robot social interactions, so that the robot can present itself as more human-like. 
Another HRI project Adaptive Strategies for Sustainable Long-Term Social Interaction 
(ALIZ-E) investigated child-robot companionship in hospitals. This project had the specific 
goal of supporting children engaged in a residential diabetes-management course (Baroni et 
al., 2014). Their study found out that the robot could play an important role in healthcare 
communication in terms of supporting and educating diabetic children (Nalin, Baroni & Sanna, 
2012; Blanson-Henkemans et al., 2012; Hiolle, Cañamero, Ross & Bard, 2012). Baroni et al. 
(2014) used an Aldebarn Nao robot which communicated with children by making 
conversation and playing games. This example shows that it is possible for robots to educate 
and help children by playing games and acting as their friends. The researchers in that project, 
however, pointed out a memory issue with the robot: ‘the robot required the ability to support 
long-term interactions over multiple distinct episodes’ (Baxter et al., 2011). In a long-term 
companionship fields, as in this case, a robot should be able to recall previous interactions with 
its users. However, it is also true that forgetting previous information and misattributing past 
events are also pervasive human behaviours (Schacter, Guerin & Jacques, 2011; Schacter & 
Dodson, 2001; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005); yet, people usually accepts these 
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flaws in others and form relationships regardless. In the current, I develop such behaviours in 
robots analyse their impacts in human–robot interactions.  
Human-like skills and behaviours in robots can help to reduce uncanny valley effects. 
When a humanoid robot closely resembles to human but not that convincing realistic then 
people feels uneasy to interact with it and this phenomenon is called uncanny valley 
(Zlotowski, Proudfoot, Yogeeswaran & Bartneck, 2015). Walters et al. (2008) investigated the 
typical links between human personalities and attributed robot personalities and how these 
links can be used in reducing uncanny valley. Their research showed that participants tended 
to prefer robots with more human-like appearances and attributes. They also found out that 
individual differences in the appearance of the robot were not consistent for all participants. In 
their experiments, introverted participants with less emotional stability tended to prefer 
mechanical appearances more than other participants did. This research shows that human-like 
attributes may be used in robots effectively to reduce uncanny valley effects. Therefore, other 
human-like attributes such as cognitive biases may also be used in human–robot interactions 
and may help to reduce such effects.  
From the above discussion, it can be said that there are various situations in which 
human–robot interactions are possible, so it is also possible to develop companionship with 
social robots based on their skills and attributes. The examples of studies showed that emotions, 
traits and other anthropomorphic behaviours in robots make robots more appealing and 
improve their relations with people. The computer program ELIZA, for instance, showed an 
‘interest’ in knowing participant’s problems; the receptionist Valerie expressed emotions, 
showed anthropomorphic behaviours and helped in collecting information for the tourists; 
AIBO showed adapted behaviours from dogs and played with its users accordingly. These 
examples show how the robots use different known and common behaviours (e.g. AIBO 
jumping around the user, or Valerie smiling while talking based on human-like attributes such 
as moods, emotions, and traits that users could easily recognise). Therefore, it can be said that 
expressive emotions, personality traits and anthropomorphic behaviours in robots are being 
used to make them more cognitive in interactions, so that the users can recognise and relate to 
them more easily (Duffy, 2003; Gockley et al., 2005; Lee, 2006). From the previous examples 
of studies in Chapter 2, we have seen that researchers studied various interactions methods 
where the social robots anthropomorphized and mimicked human actions, expressed emotions, 
used speech, made sounds and performed other human-like cognitive tasks. From this 
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discussion, it can be concluded that human-like different cognitive behaviours are important to 
have in social robots in order to make HRI more familiar to people.  
In this thesis, the aim is to make robot behaviours more familiar to users by creating a 
relatively new method of interaction which has not before been studied in detail. I propose to 
introduce the application of cognitive biases in the interaction process between a robot and 
human. To this point, when researchers have discussed robots with natural human-like 
behaviours, they have tended to ignore one of the most common and natural human 
‘behaviours’: biased behaviours such as forgetting, misattributing, inability to understand 
other’s emotions, bragging, blaming and others. Everyone makes mistakes, forgets things and 
shows biased behaviours; this is human nature. Social roboticists study traits, emotions and 
other human-like skills in robots, but the common attribute of biased behaviour has never been 
implemented in social robots. The work presented in this thesis addressed this important lapse. 
Cognitive biases are expected to make robots’ behaviours more familiar to humans, helping to 
improve the human–robot interaction.   
 
3.2 Why consider cognitive biases?  
I aim to develop different cognitive biases in robots for human–robot interactions. To explain 
why I chose to develop cognitive bias in robots, this section explains the effects of cognitive 
biases have in humans. I discuss the importance of cognitive biases and explain their 
application to the research presented in this thesis, identifying their importance in developing 
more ‘acceptable’ social robots.  
A cognitive bias is a type of error in thinking that occurs when people are processing 
and interpreting information in the world around them. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
(1974) introduced the term ‘cognitive bias’ to describe people’s systematic but purportedly 
flawed patterns of responses to judgement and decision problems. They were inspired by 
Herbert Simon in the late 1950s (Kahneman, 2002). According to these two scientists, human 
judgements and rational choices depend on the decision makers and the factors associated with 
them. Tversky & Kahneman (1981) explained such features of decision making:  
A decision problem is defined by the acts or options among which one must choose, 
the possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or 
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conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts. We use the term “decision frame” 
to refer to the decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice. The frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled 
partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker. (pp. 453)  
The above statement suggests that the decisions people make can be partly influenced 
by their habits, characteristics and social norms and therefore such decisions are biased. 
Cognitive biases are often a result of an attempt to simplify information processing, which can 
help one to make sense of the world and reach decisions with relative speed (Bless et al., 2004). 
As such, people create cognitive ‘short-cuts’ to process information faster and with less effort. 
Such approaches to information processing are known as schemas and heuristics (Judea, 1983). 
Heuristics help to simplify the social worlds and, as such, can have a detrimental effect on an 
individual’s thinking and consequent behaviour (Ippoliti, 2015). Such behaviours are common 
and can be seen in others regularly, but the effects of such behaviours in social robots for 
human–robot interactions have yet not been explored. I have therefore aimed to study such 
cognitive biases and their effects in humans and develop some of the biases (e.g. misattribution, 
empathy gap, etc.) in robots for human–robot interactions.  
Cognitive biases can arise from various processes such as social influence (Wang, 
Simons & Brédart, 2001), information-processing shortcuts, distortions in the mental process 
which is result of ‘storing and subsequently retrieving objective evidence in memory’ (Hilbert, 
2012, pp. 6), limited brain capacity for information processing (Simon, 1955; Marois & Ivanov, 
2005), and emotional and moral motivation (Pfister & Böhm, 2008).  
In sum, cognitive biases may lead individuals to behave irrationally. The above research 
suggests that individuals create their own social realities from their perceptions of inputs, but 
that construction of the real world is not objective, and therefore such subjective states of 
thinking can lead to incorrect understandings of reality, inaccurate judgments and illogical 
interpretations. For example, a student receives an A+ on an essay and attributes it to his or her 
hard work and skill (this is called internal attribution). Next week, when he or she receives a 
C- on an essay and blames that grade on the teacher, claiming that the teacher did not explain 
the topic well enough (this is called external attribution). In reality however, it could be the 
student who might have rushed through the assignment. This tendency in people is called self-
serving bias effects (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder & Elliot, 2000). Self-serving bias is common 
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among students, employers and in relationships. The research I undertake here develops such 
biases in robots for human–robot interactions and studies their effects in interactions.  
Biases, however, can sometimes lead to a more effective set of actions, yielding positive 
outcomes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). For example, framing effects, where people react 
to a choice depending on how it is presented; for example, a student feels more incentive to 
register for class when threatened with a late fee than she feels enticed by an early-bird 
registration discount. It can be said that the biases help us to reach decisions more quickly (e.g. 
heuristics biases, which are different strategies derived from experience with similar problems, 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This efficiency can be vital to processing information more 
efficiently in certain situations, such dangerous or threatening ones, where making a quick 
decision is more important than careful consideration. Biases such as humour effects (e.g. 
people tends to remember humours events more than non-humours) can also help people to 
remember information (Martin et al., 2003). Such a bias may be useful in social robots, for 
example, if the robot adds humour to its behaviour and conversation, which could help people 
to remember the interaction for longer, and it is possible that the person would want to interact 
with the robot again.  
Cognitive biases can be defined as mental shortcuts which influence people’s thoughts, 
judgements, and behaviours. Damaging behaviours are sometimes the result of people’s 
erroneous decisions, which are influenced by behavioural biases (Chira I, Adams M and 
Thornton B, 2016). Behavioural bias is closely related to economics because the investor’s 
thinking and feeling while making major investment decisions can cause behavioural changes 
(Duxbury, 2015). There are several biases which can be classified as behavioural biases, for 
example, cognitive dissonance (i.e. a mental state when a person experiences mental discomfort 
for having inconsistent thoughts and beliefs which are related to their behaviours), 
conservatism (i.e. holding traditional ideas which oppose the welcoming of new innovation or 
values), confirmation (i.e. the tendency to look for information which confirms someone’s own 
existing beliefs), representativeness (i.e. the tendency to make decisions based on patterns of 
events), illusion of control (i.e. the tendency to overestimate one’s own ability to control an 
event), hindsight (i.e. a psychological phenomenon where, after an event, people think they 
knew the result all along).  
Social bias refers to a group of biases which are related to society and how people 
perceive others in society. Examples of such biases include stereotyping, which is when an 
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individual holds a perception of another individual based on his or her age, gender, location, 
race, skin colour, etc., but without any factual knowledge (Fiske,2010); the halo effect, which 
is the tendency to perceive others based on a single trait or their previous positive or negative 
actions; or system justification, which is a psychological theory that suggests people hold 
positive views of themselves and the group they belong. 
Traits can be defined as qualities or characteristics which produce particular types of 
behaviour, and traits are typically discussed as belonging to people. Traits can be inherited 
from one’s parents and also shaped by environmental factors and life experiences (Ali I, 2018). 
For example, eye and skin colours come from parents, while height can be shaped by nutrition 
from the environment.   
In recent years, social biases have shown importance, as they can be seen in many 
places. Due to the rise of social media and the Internet, people are able to better communicate 
with others in the world and more easily express their opinions. On popular social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, it can be seen that people express their opinions on different 
matters like politics, news, sports, movies, and more, though such opinions are often not based 
on facts. In such cases, the posting person tries hard to prove his or her opinion based on limited 
knowledge or incorrect sources, which is a clear instance of Dunning-Kruger effects. Social 
media and popular search engines display advertisements to users based on their choices and 
Internet searches, which is an example of using the effects of decision-making biases, such as 
attentional bias. In this age of information, many people are victims of information bias, where 
we always seek information regardless of necessity. In our personal lives, we regularly 
experience various social biases. People tend to prefer themselves over others in matters of 
success but usually blame failures on others. This phenomenon is known as the self-serving 
bias, which can affect close relations, workplace dynamics, classrooms, and other situations. 
In relationships, people tends to favour their relatives, friends, and family members over to 
strangers (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998). People sometimes overestimate 
others’ positive qualities while underestimating their negatives traits, which is known as 
illusory superiority or the better-than-average effect (Hoorens, 1993). Conversely, people tend 
to believe themselves to be worse than others at performing difficult tasks, which is known as 
below-average effects (Kruger, 1999). There are several other biases which affect people’s 
judgements and behaviours in different social situations (a list is provided in Appendix G, page 
285). Since individuals’ characteristics and traits can be shaped from their environments and 
life experiences (Ali I, 2018), it is possible that traits can be affected by biases as well. 
 34 
 
Environments influence people based on their thinking, and we discussed that human thoughts 
are usually affected by various biases. Therefore, it can be said that cognitive biases are 
important for shaping individuals’ characteristics and traits, as well as their behaviours in 
society.  
Many studies have been done on the effects of the biases, and based on how biases 
arise, affect and motivate humans, scientists categorized those biases. Haselton, Nettle and 
Andrews (2000) propose a taxonomy of cognitive biases based on how those arise: 
1. Heuristic – where the biases are caused by decision-making process, e.g., uses of 
stereotypes (Haselton, Nettle & Andrews, 2000) 
2. Error management biases – when a biased based solution for a problem resulted in 
less error than the unbiased solution, e.g. sexual over perception by men (Haselton, 
Nettle & Andrews, 2000) 
3. Artifact – when the mind is not prepared for the targeted task, e.g., base-rate neglect 
in statistical prediction (Haselton, Nettle & Andrews, 2000) 
Scientists have suggested that cognitive biases can arise from emotional and moral 
motivations (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, Welch, & Ned, 2001; Pfister & Böhm, 2008), social 
influences (Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001; Yechiam, Druyan, & Ert, 2008), and ‘noisy’ 
information processing (Hilbart M, 2012). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) produced a list of 
heuristics and biases on human judgement and decision making. He describes three heuristics 
related to decision making: representativeness (e.g., insensitivity of predictability, illusion of 
validity, etc.), availability (e.g., biases of imaginability, illusory correlation, etc.) and 
adjustment and anchoring (e.g., insufficient adjustment etc.) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Many studies have been done on specific biases in psychology, based on their effects and 
importance, but in it is still unknown how many biases there are, exactly. In the current thesis, 
I study only the biases which may be important and relevant in the current study. Here, I list 
few of the most studied and discussed biases as examples in Table 3.1. I provide another 
exhaustive list of cognitive biases in the Appendix G.  
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Table 3.1: Commonly studied cognitive biases 
Name Description 
Empathy gap 
The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, attitudes, 
preferences, and behaviours, in either oneself or others (Van Boven et al., 
2013) 
Misattribution 
When individual fails to recall source details retained in memory and 
erroneously attributes a recollection or idea to the wrong source (Schacter & 
Dodson, 2001) 
Self-serving bias 
The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures; also 
manifests as a tendency among people to evaluate ambiguous information in 
a way that is beneficial to their interests (Forsyth, 2008) 
The lack of 
knowledge/ 
ideocracy  effects 
The tendency for unskilled people to overestimate their own ability and 
experts to underestimate theirs (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) 
Framing Using a too-narrow approach and description of the situation or issue 
Humours effects 
The tendency to remember humorous items more easily than non-humorous 
ones (Schmidt, 2002)  
Hindsight bias 
Sometimes called the ‘I-knew-it-all-along’ effect, the inclination to see past 
events as predictable (Roedigger & McDermott, 1995) 
 
Some cognitive biases can influence interpersonal relationships, such as in-group bias. 
People favour others in their groups more than people other groups. This bias helps illuminate 
the origins of prejudice and discrimination (Aronson, Wilson & Akert, 2010). Attribution bias, 
according to Heider and Simmel (1944), represents the systematic errors made by individuals 
when they try to evaluate their personal behaviour. For example, if a mother gives instructions 
to some children, the children might think that mother considers them stupid and feel attacked, 
becoming irritated in consequence. Alternatively, if the children think that the mother is trying 
to be helpful, then they feel caring and appreciative. The empathy gap can influence 
relationships, for example, if someone is happy, that person may have difficulty imagining why 
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people would be unhappy, creating conflicts in relationships. Understanding such biases could 
be useful in human–robot interactions, so it would be interesting to find out how people react 
to such biases (e.g. empathy gap) in interactions with a robot which is unable to understand 
people’s emotions. Thus in the Chapter 4, I develop the empathy gap and other related biases 
in robots to study their effects in human–robot interactions.  
To understand the effect cognitive bias plays on an individual, the famous example of 
the ‘bandwagon effect’ can be discussed (Goidel & Todd, 1994). This bias is closely related to 
the herd mentality, which describes how people are influenced by their peers to adopt certain 
behaviours, follow trends and purchase items. Individuals experience the bandwagon effect in 
that they place much greater value on decisions that are likely to conform to current trends or 
please individuals within their existing (or desired) peer group. This effect may be interesting 
to study in social robots when the robot and user parsing same or opposite product of interest, 
and in making robots that ‘conform to society or peers’. From a consumer’s perspective, this 
effect can be summarised as making ‘purchasing decisions’ out of a desire to have and be seen 
with ‘the next big thing’, or to increase perceived social status by owning a particular product. 
Such bias effects are so common because of people’s deep-seated need to conform and fit in. 
Many consumers’ devotion to Apple products is a great example of the bandwagon effect in 
action.  
From discussions so far, it can be said that cognitive biases exist in humans and have 
major influences on decision making and behavioural actions. Biases refer to ways of thinking 
or thought processes that produce errors in judgment or decision making, or at least depart from 
normative standards (Hahn & Harris, 2014). Biases however, can lead to good decisions in 
many situations, and it is possible that in some situations they can lead to better decisions than 
the regular approaches (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Some biased forms of reasoning (e.g. 
belief bias) are often assumed to happen quickly and automatically, without working memory 
resources and independent of contemplative activities (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). It seems 
reasonable to agree that biases are indeed an important factor in developing an individual’s 
character and are partially responsible for one’s behaviours, as they affect thinking and 
reasoning (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
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3.3 Why consider cognitive biases for social robots? 
3.4  Biases are common in people  
Figure 3.1 shows the general differences of perceptions between people and robots, suggesting 
that humans perceive and process information from their surroundings using all attributes (e.g. 
traits, emotions, moods, and biases) but although social robots can be programmed to show 
traits and emotions, they sometimes lack to show human-like behavioural biases (e.g. 
forgetfulness, blaming others etc.). It can be agreed that robots are far from perfect, and the 
scientists always research to update the robot so that it could help human in many ways. The 
study described in this thesis does not consider the mechanics or the control systems of the 
robot, but discusses the sociable behaviours of a social robot. Terms such as ‘perfect’, 
‘imperfectness’ are used to compare and differentiate between two set of behaviours in this 
 
Figure:3.1 Comparative diagram of the differences between people and robots, how humans process 
information and robots lack the ability to represent certain types of personality characteristics, which 
might be key to interactions between the humans and robots 
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Figure 3.1: Comparative diagram of the differences between people and robots, how humans process 
information and robots lack the ability to represent certain types of personality characteristics, which might be 
key to interactions between the humans and robots. 
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thesis. This is notable that the cognitive biases do not make the human behaviours perfect and 
I do not claim that such behaviours can make the robot’s social behaviours perfect, but this 
study investigates the effects of such biased behaviours in human-robot interactions.  
We can agree on that humans have characteristics flaws, biases in thinking (e.g. 
mistake-making, forgetfulness, miscalculation, the empathy gap, self-serving bias, etc.). Such 
behaviours generally do not become the barrier between humans in making relationships. It is 
possible for individuals to relate to others in natural ways. Sometimes people forget 
information, or people attribute certain outcomes to the wrong causes, brag and pass blame on 
to others. It can be said that people are not uniform or perfect, yet people can make friendships 
with others, although they differ. It is usual for people to find all sorts of different imperfect 
behaviours in themselves and in the people around them. But these sorts of behaviours are not 
found in the social robots yet, it is very unusual that a robot would forget the information or 
blame people if lost in game. But forgetting information, blaming others are very common 
human behaviours. So the current research seeks answers to the question that if it is possible to 
develop such imperfect behaviours in the social robots, similar to those of humans, where a 
robot may forget information, misattribute certain outcomes, or brag, certain questions arise: 
How would the user perceive the robot? What influences would such behaviours in robots have 
in human–robot interactions? Will people like and accept the robot or reject it? It is common 
for people to notice all sorts of different imperfect behaviours in themselves and in the people 
around them. However, these sorts of behaviours are not found in social robots yet, so it is very 
unusual that a robot would forget information or blame people if it lost in a game; forgetting 
information and blaming others are very common human behaviours. Flaws and imperfections 
are characteristics of people, and even with flaws, people can relate to one another as socially 
accepted beings. Therefore, such flaws and imperfections should be investigated in social 
robot-human interactions to determine whether their effects can help people to better relate 
with the robot. 
Sometimes, it is hard to relate to someone who is almost flawless and acts without 
mistakes. For example, the ‘Mary Sue’ characters created by Paula Smith in 1973 in ‘A 
Trekkie's Tale’ were illustrated as flawless (Smith, 1973). They are attractive and smart, and 
something convenient always happens to their advantage; in the end, it is almost a given that 
they will get what they want. Audiences grow tiresome reading about these flawless characters, 
which seem unreal (Verba, 2003). Audiences would rather hear about what happens to realistic 
characters and how they overcome their adversities; otherwise, characters like Mary Sue seem 
 39 
 
very mechanical, unrealistic and tough to relate to. This example is associated with the subject 
of the current thesis: social robots that do not exhibit human-like flaws (e.g. forgetfulness, 
blaming, bragging, etc.) in interactions seem very mechanical and distant, and the expectation 
is that if cognitive biases can be introduced in the robot, then the interactions between robot 
and human could be more enjoyable and easily relatable. 
  
3.4.1 The concept of lacking ‘bias’ and ‘imperfect’ behaviours in social 
robot  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the current social robots are able to mimic human actions, but their 
actions might be limited and may not provide the behavioural realism present in humans, 
thereby preventing people from creating and maintaining social relationships with them. In 
Chapter 1, the following question was raised: ‘What happens in human–human interactions 
that is absent in human–robot interactions, thus preventing a social relationship forming 
between the human and the robot?’ At this point, it can be said that social robots usually lack 
such behavioural realism in human–robot interactions (e.g. mistake making, forgetfulness, 
blaming, bragging etc.). Such variation in the cognitive nature of individuals might make 
human–robot interactions unique, natural and human-like. It can be said that the shortcomings 
of humans in their characteristics, including faults, mistakes, and other common human-like 
characteristics are needed, whereas robots are too mechanical and artificial. In existing social 
robotics, the robots imitate human social queues, like eye contact, human-like walk, talk and 
body movements, and so forth. The previously discussed human traits (e.g. faults, unintentional 
mistakes, task imperfectness, etc.) are not intentionally present in these current social robots, 
so this thesis is focusses on different common cognitive biases (e.g. misattribution, empathic 
gap, the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects, etc.), which can influence human thoughts in 
an illogical fashion.  
Hayoun (2014) raised an important question, ‘How can we interact with something 
“more perfect” than we are?’ By acknowledging that robots are far from perfect in terms of 
development, functionalities, control systems and comparability to any living being, the current 
thesis addresses the issue of the lack of human-like cognitively biased behaviours in social 
robot behaviours in human-robot interactions. As has already been shown, faults and 
misjudgements are common human characteristics which create openings for new 
conversations or interactions based on particular individuals and their situations. As discussed 
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earlier, research has shown that human-like trait-based personalities and emotive expressions 
can make human-robot interactions more enjoyable for humans (Lee et al., 2006; Walters, 
2008). Similar to such characteristic traits and personalities, cognitive biases are important 
components in human characters, and biases are widely present in all humans. Developing 
cognitive biases in robots may allow robots to make common mistakes, like humans do, which 
is an idea that has not been properly tested yet. If the robot exhibits fatigue and stress after 
repeated tasks and complains to its owner, what will the owners do? Will they get annoyed and 
replace the robot, or accept it and console it in a human-like manner? Either way, this behaviour 
gives the user ideas to ponder over, which may lead to a certain type of relationship. Therefore, 
the notion of how such cognitive bias behaviours can affect human-robot interactions needs to 
be investigated.   
Research (Lee et al., 2006) shows that developing personalities and trait attributes in 
robots can make them more acceptable to humans. Also, expressing emotions and moods in 
interactions can help to make the attachments stronger between users and robots (Dautenhahn 
et al., 2009). The reason could be human-like personality traits; emotional expressions help 
people to anthropomorphise the robot, and as a result, people can relate with the robot. 
Similarly, cognitive bias behaviours like forgetfulness, bragging, blaming, and telling jokes in 
conversation are common human characteristics which could help people to anthropomorphise 
the robot even more. 
As discussed in the sections 3.1, 3.2, cognitive biases effect on human thinking 
processes which leads to making mistakes, misjudgements and fallible activities (Baron, 2008). 
Such misjudgements, mistakes and fallible activities could be important factors in creating 
individual’s social behaviours. McKay and Dennett (2009) have shown that ‘misbelief’ could 
be adaptive in human behaviours and may be expressed by the people daily. The current 
research investigates such cognitive biases in social robots in the context of human–robot 
interactions, studying the responses from the participants. It is expected that cognitive biases 
will make robots’ behaviours more anthropocentrically fallible, and thus more recognisable to 
humans. These familiarly biased behaviours presented by robots during the interaction could 
help humans to understand and relate to robots. The experiments investigating this possibility 
are detailed in Chapter 4.  
Haselton et al. (2005) has suggested that humans construct objective images of social 
realities as they perceive them. The human brain is both remarkable and powerful, but subject 
 41 
 
to limitations (Kanwisher, 2010). The human mind translates the properties from the world and 
draws its own conclusions in an illogical manner. Haselton et al. (2005) describes such 
fundamental limitations onto human thinking as cognitive bias. Cognitive biases represent an 
individual’s own sense of reality, not the objective input, which sometimes lead to perceptual 
distortion, inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). 
When people make judgments and decisions about the world around them, they like to think 
that they are objective, logical and able to evaluate all the available information (Gutnik et al., 
2006). The reality is, however, that an individual’s judgments and decisions are often riddled 
with errors and influenced by a wide variety of biases (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Haselton 
et al., 2005). This point is articulated by Ariely (2008):  
We usually think of ourselves as sitting in the driver's seat, with ultimate control over 
the decisions we made and the direction our life takes; but, alas, this perception has 
more to do with our desires—with how we want to view ourselves—than with reality. 
(pp. 243)  
According to Ariely (2008), cognitive biases can affect a range of thoughts in the human 
brain, such as its effects on thinking to about how to handle money, how to relate to other 
people, to even how memories of the past are formed.  
Many studies have proven that cognitive biases have considerable effects in the fields 
of investments, business and marketing. The cognitive bias of ‘loss aversion’, for example, 
makes people strongly prefer to avoid losses over acquiring gains, which sometimes causes 
people to make the wrong economic decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Another bias, 
‘hindsight bias’, occurs when an individual gives a much higher estimation of the predictability 
of a newly learned outcome than the individual who can predict the outcome without advanced 
knowledge (Pohl, 2007; Yudkowsky, 2008). Because of the availability of various technologies 
and mediums for advertisement, studies of cognitive biases are now an essential part of 
business and marketing (Bolton et al., 2013).  
Cognitive biases, such as misattribution, can affect the ability to recall past events from 
memory. As the result of misattribution of memory bias, people can recall past events but 
usually forget and state the wrong source of that event. Schacter and Dodson (2001) identified 
three kinds of misattributions which could happen in people: source confusion, cryptomnesia 
and false recognition. Misattribution is very common in people, and I discuss this bias in much 
detail in Section 3.5.1. It is common in society that people forget names and past events or 
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unintentionally make mistakes influenced by misattribution bias. In the current thesis, I 
investigate the forgetfulness effects of this bias in the robot such that the robot could not recall 
previous interactions with the participants.   
In many cases, cognitive biases such as ‘self-serving bias’ allow people to protect their 
self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989); for example, people sometimes get a boost in confidence 
by attributing positive events to personal characteristics, and they protect their self-esteem and 
absolve themselves from personal responsibility by blaming outside forces for failures. Biases 
like the ‘halo effect’ influence the human mind to create an overall impression of another 
person, depending on how that individual feels and thinks about that person. Standing (2004) 
defines the halo effect as follows: ‘Also known as the physical attractiveness stereotype and 
the “what is beautiful is good” principle, the halo effect, at the most specific level, refers to the 
habitual tendency of people to rate attractive individuals more favourably for their personality 
traits or characteristics than those who are less attractive. Halo effect is also used in a more 
general sense to describe the global impact of likeable personality, or some specific desirable 
trait, in creating biased judgments of the target person on any dimension. Thus, feelings 
generally overcome cognitions when we appraise others.’ At this point, it can be said that biases 
are common in all humans and, knowingly or unknowingly, we are expressing them in many 
ways. 
 
3.4.2 Biases and imperfectness in modern technologies  
Even in the development of new technologies, people find different biases; for example, Siri, 
the personal assistant software developed by Apple (n.d.), was accused of having a bias called 
‘abortion bias’. In a website blogpost of Abortioneers (abortioneers.blogspot.co.uk 2011), 
many users found such bias while interacting with Siri, and they presented various phone 
screenshots and videos as proof. This news was reported in many online medias including The 
Guardian (Rushe D, 2011).   
This bias was described as Siri could not find anything when they asked it to direct 
them to an abortion clinic, despite the facts that abortion is legal in the US and UK, but the 
program has no problem finding pregnancy crisis centres, ‘which often are run by churches and 
right-wing groups that are very clearly against abortion’, as one user complained (Wilson, 
2011). According to BBC (BBC, 2011), Apple denied such accusation and issued an apology 
statement: ‘These are not intentional omissions meant to offend anyone, it simply means that 
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as we bring Siri from beta to a final product, we find places where we can do better and we 
will in the coming weeks’. In our recent technologies, most of the voice-command assistants 
can be considered biased; for instance, Amazon’s Alexa comes with only a female voice option. 
Even Siri was initially available only with a female voice, and coincidently, the name Siri 
means ‘beautiful woman who leads you to victory’ in Norse (The Week, 2012). Similar to the 
voice assistant programs, the computer systems are not free from the biases as well. Friedman 
& Nissenbaum (1996) studied 17 computer systems which are from different fields such as 
education, banking, science, medicine, law and others and categorized biases as technical, pre-
existing and emergent. They found out that the pre-existing biases come from society, practices 
and attitudes; technical biases arise from technical consideration and emergent biases happen 
when the systems are used by the real users (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996).  They concluded 
that it is difficult to minimise the biases in practice in the computer design but not impossible 
(Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996). It is possible that in near future in the case of technological 
personifications, people will want their technologies to be based on specific traits and 
behaviours, which might introduce certain biases in the technological devices people desire. 
For example, Google and Facebook extract individuals’ information in the form of preferences 
to create user profiles; based on such profiles, selected advertisements appear (Esteve, 2017). 
In my understanding, the choices to show such advertisements can be called bias because the 
choices and information the individual put on the pages might not be accurate, and overall an 
individual might not like those ads at all.  
Modern personal voice assistants such as Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana, Amazon’s Alexa 
can be more advanced than the early automated computer chat program Eliza, which was 
created by Weizenbaum (1976), but these voice assistants are still considered as weak artificial 
intelligence (AI). Weak AI is focused on a specific task without having any consciousness, 
skill or learning ability, and it is performed based on how it has been programmed. For 
example, if I ask Siri to find nearby restaurants, Siri can respond by searching the Internet using 
my Wi-Fi location and is able to list a range of places using the pre-programmed algorithm in 
the software. Most modern technologies that include voice assistants, computers, robots and 
automated machines are considered as having weak AI.  
Strong AI, on the other hand, is when a machine can understand and be conscious like 
brain. Hypothetically, a machine with strong AI can think, learn and solve problem like 
humans. For example, a personal robot that can reason with its user, understand problems and 
its user’s mental state, and knows what to suggest – just like having a close companion – 
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exemplifies strong AI. Strong AI still exists only in movies and science fiction, such as A.I. 
Artificial Intelligence directed by Steven Spielberg (2001) or Ex Machina directed by Alex 
Garland (2015). Searle (1980) argued about strong AI in machine in his famous the ‘Chinese 
Room Argument’, in which he showed that AI systems only can act as if it has a mind or 
consciousness without knowing that it originally does not.  
There are concerns regarding both strong and weak AIs. The former CEO of Microsoft, 
Bill Gates, wrote in a Reddit ‘Ask Me Anything’ interview (2015) in response to a question 
regarding the threats of ‘machine superintelligence’:  
I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do 
a lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it 
well. A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. 
I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don't understand why some people 
are not concerned. (Reddit)  
Such concerns exist not only for strong AI, as there are many concern regarding weak 
AI as well in recent years and people express their concern in online articles. In an article 
called, “How much Longer before our first catastrophe?” in iO9, the writer George Dvorsky 
(2013), concerned about the growing uses of weak AI in society, mentioned, “Our 
infrastructure is becoming increasingly digital and interconnected – and by consequence, 
increasingly vulnerable”. He further mentioned that weak or narrow AI could damage electric 
grids, nuclear power plants and even cause economic crises on the global level. The automated 
voices of the customer care services in banks and other organisations, spy cameras, computer 
visions, major websites’ algorithms (YouTube, Facebook etc.) and many other automated 
programs assess different situations and process the data to choose where the reward is 
maximised (Saenz, 2010). In our everyday life, when someone call to a bank, phone company 
or any other customer care service, the customer usually talks to an automated voice service 
which suggests a set of instructions to the caller. These voice services are usually very 
insentient, unconscious and lifeless – where the current research might prove useful. If it is 
possible to make such automated voices more empathic, emotionally precise and tonally 
accurate, then people may find those services more helpful and feel less concerned about the 
systems.  
Studies have found various biases and errors in Satellite Navigation systems as well. 
Sardon, Rius, and Zarraoa (1999) showed that there is stable receiver bias in global positioning 
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systems (GPSs) which causes delay between two frequencies. Cornely (2013) indicates that 
such a delay could be introduced either by the sender or the receiver, but it should be removed 
in order to resolve the total electron content (TEC) accurately. In technologically advanced 
satellite navigation systems, there are other errors and biases; for example, the GPS ephemeris 
error, selective availability, satellite and receiver clock errors, the multipath error, antenna-
phase-centre variation, receiver measurement noise, ionospheric delay and others (Tiwari, 
Arora & Kumar, 2010). As the current experiment focusses on people’s cognitive biases, I go 
into no further details about such errors of the satellite navigation system, but it can be 
understood that even such modern technology is not free from errors and bias.  
However, both careful and careless people show their cognitive biases in interactions. 
Individuals interact with their own cognitively imperfect characteristics, presented by 
maintaining social norms and following social cues. Common social norms and humans’ 
generally imperfect behaviours make the interactions natural. Society is an example of each 
person’s behaviour differing, and each having unique characteristics. Myriad human 
characteristics and behaviours are found within any society, and sometimes they result in the 
formation of relationships. My research suggests these cognitive biases may have a role to play 
in social robots, examining how they can affect human–robot interaction, for better or worse. 
It is possible that the robot would get its very own individual set of behaviours with human-
like faults and mistakes which would be familiar to humans, and that familiarity might help 
humans to relate to it or to reject it. It is expected that cognitive biases will make the robots 
cognitively imperfect, which would allow the robots to make mistakes, like humans do. Using 
specific cognitive biases in social and companion robots could therefore prove very useful in 
social interactions between robots and humans. 
 
3.5 Hypothesis and research questions 
As it is evident that various biases can affect humans in different ways, such as in decision 
making, social interaction, memory, brain function, emotional response and so on, it is 
reasonable to find out the effects of such biases in social robots. Social robot–human 
interactions are actually based on the human–human interactions discussed in Chapter 2. From 
the discussions in this chapter, it is concluded that various cognitive biases have a reasonable 
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level of influence on humans, and such biases might be proven useful in robots for human–
robot interaction. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis to examine this matter:  
If a robot can exhibit behaviours that include selected cognitive biases when interacting 
with humans, then humans will have increased fondness for the robot. 
The current research seeks answers to the following questions: 
• Despite a robot’s appearance, functions and features, can it interact with humans 
in ways similar to human-human interaction by engaging with humans in both 
the long term and the short term and drawing on cognitively biased behaviours? 
• With cognitive biases introduced in a robot, is it possible to develop 
anthropomorphically biased behaviours in robots to influence human-robot 
interactions? 
• Will cognitive biases help humans to develop human-robot interactions in the 
long term? 
To study the hypothesis and seek answers to the research questions, two sets of 
behaviours were developed for robots: non-biased or baseline behaviours and biased 
behaviours based on selected cognitive biases. As the main aim of this study is to determine 
the effects of cognitive biases in robots’ behaviours in human-robot interactions, comparing 
these two sets of behaviours seems reasonable in order to distinguish the effects of the biases.  
In the current study, robots interacted with the participants in conversational and game-
playing interactions, where the robot showed developed biased or non-biased behaviours 
throughout the interactions. To exhibit each of the selected biased and non-biased behaviours 
effectively so that participants can recognise and understand the differences between the two 
behaviours, the interactions were divided into several stages according to the mode of the 
interaction: that is, conversational interactions over three stages (meet and greet, topic-based 
discussion and farewell), and interactions in game playing over five stages (meet and greet, 
rules, gameplay, results and farewell). In the interactions, biased and non-biased behaviours 
were shown in each of the stages through speech and actions. The specific behaviours of the 
robots were chosen after several mock experiments and, after consulting with my supervisor, I 
ensured sure that the targeted biased behaviours were positively shown by using speech and 
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actions from the robot which could be easily understood by people. I discuss this topic further 
in Chapter 4.  
In terms of data collection, I considered measuring the participants’ preferences of 
interactions with the robot, where the robot’s behaviours were developed based on the biased 
and non-biased algorithms. Mainly because I compare two sets of interactions (i.e. biased and 
non-biased) to find out which the participants prefer, data were collected based on mainly four 
factors:  
• how much the participants like the interaction with the robot (i.e. likeability); 
• whether the participants were comfortable during the biased interactions (i.e. 
comfort); 
• whether the participants were pleased during interactions with the robot (i.e. 
pleasure); and 
• The developed rapport between the participant and robot (i.e. rapport).  
The four dimensions above are reasonable, as the experiments are based on 
comparisons between two sets of behaviours (e.g. biased and non-biased) and discovering 
participants’ preferred versions of the interactions; in understanding such preferences, the four 
above factors are the most crucial. It is further possible to know participants’ preferred 
interactions at a certain time and over time based on these four such factors. I collected data in 
the form of rating-based questionnaires. In the next chapter, I detail the experimental methods, 
questionnaires and algorithms.  
 
3.6 The cognitive biases used in the research 
In the previous section, the importance of using cognitive biases in social robots was discussed. 
I also formed a hypothesis interrogate biases and imperfectness in robot behaviours and 
determine their effects in human–robot interactions. To explore the hypothesis, five cognitive 
biases were chosen to develop on three different robots for use in human–robot interactions in 
short-term scenarios. This section describes the five cognitive biases that have been used in our 
experiments.  
 48 
 
As I have mentioned previously, to this point, more than 200 cognitive biases have been 
listed, each with different effects on humans in different situations. Some lists of biases are 
offered on various websites (see appendix G). However, in my research, I introduce the novel 
idea of developing the effects of cognitive biases in robots for human–robot interactions. Based 
on their effects on human’s, the chosen cognitive biases are categorised as follows: 
1. Decision-making, belief, and behavioural biases;  
2. Social biases; and  
3. Memory error and biases.  
For my experiment, I chose from each category to test in human-robot interactions to 
find out people’s reactions to such different bias groups when developed in a robot. For 
example, from the memory error and biases group, the misattribution and humour effects were 
selected; the self-serving effect was chosen from the social bias group, and from the decision-
making groups, the empathy gap and idiocrasy (influenced by Dunning-Kruger bias) were 
selected.  
In terms of selecting the biases from each group, I firstly planned to reject any that 
provoked racial hatred, violence or other harmful biases to consider in the experiments such as 
implicit social cognition or aversive racism. Then, the biases were selected mainly based on 
their importance, frequency, impact of the effects, understandability and suitability in the 
experiments. The detailed selection criteria are given below:  
o Importance – how important is that bias in the group. ‘Importance’ here 
suggests both commonness and impact of the bias on people.     
o Frequency – how frequently such a bias can be noticed in people. 
o Impact of effects – how such a bias can influence people and how often such 
influences can be noticed. 
o Understandability – How easily such bias effects can be noticed and 
understood by others, and also how long it takes to understand such effects. 
Some of the bias effects could take time to realise (e.g. availability cascade, 
backfire effect, childhood amnesia), but in the experiment, I wanted to show 
bias effects quickly so that the effects could be easily recognised.  
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o How a certain bias fits in the experiment – this point can be divided into 
several other issues, for example, 
▪ The bias can be easily developed in the robot’s behaviours, 
▪ The bias must be suitable for conversational and game-playing 
interactions, 
▪ The bias’s effects can be easily and quickly spotted,  
▪ The bias is not so offensive so that participant do not feel 
comfortable during interactions, 
▪ The bias must be experienced by individuals on a daily basis so that 
effects are known to participants, and 
▪ The effects of such a bias can be measured using a questionnaire.  
The cognitive biases such as misattribution, empathy gap, lack of knowledge or 
ideocracy (based on Dunning-Kruger effects), self-serving and humour effects all satisfy the 
above criteria and thus were selected for the experiments. There are other biases which satisfy 
such criteria and have been researched extensively in psychology, for example, actor-observer 
bias, halo effect, group attribution and others. However, to implement these in human-robot 
interactions would require careful development and more complex methodologies to test rather 
than a comparison between two behaviours. Those biases are recommended to be researched 
in the future, but for this first experiment with cognitive biases, I chose the five aforementioned 
cognitive biases to compare with non-biased interactions to uncover the participants’ reactions. 
 
3.6.1 Misattribution bias 
Misattribution bias arises when someone incorrectly attributes an effect to something with 
which that person has no connection or association. Misattributions can be divided into two 
categories: misattribution of arousal and misattribution of memory.  
Misattribution of arousal is psychological situation in which people make a mistake in 
assuming what is causing them to feel aroused (White, Fishbein & Rutsein 1981). In my study, 
however, the focus is on the misattribution of memory, which involves the details retained in 
memory but attributed to the wrong source (Schacter & Dodson, 2001). For example, person 
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A tells a joke to person B, but person B tells person A that person B was the one who told that 
joke to A in the first place. Schacter and Dodson (2001) have described misattribution as a type 
of memory distortion or inaccuracy. Misattributions can be a daily occurrence in people where 
they forget meeting time, names and other common information. Some examples of 
misattribution that have been studied are as follows:  
a. Misattributing the source of memories: This is commonly happens when a person says 
something they read in newspaper, but in reality it was a friend who told them or they 
saw it in an advert or another source. Schacter (1999) has shown that participants with 
‘normal’ memories regularly make similar mistake of thinking they acquired a trivial 
fact from newspaper, when in reality the experimenters had actually supplied it. This 
type of misattribution is very common and fairly important at this time and also can be 
tested in human–robot interactions. 
b. Misattributing a face to the wrong context: Studies have shown that memories can 
become blended together, so that faces and circumstances are merged (Harris et al., 
2008; Galton, 1879). For example, people may claim that they saw a face in one context 
when they actually encountered it in another. In the experiments in this thesis, this 
misattribution was tested several times with the participants, where the robot was made 
to forget the face of the participants it previously interacted with; therefore, in the 
second interaction with the same participant, the robot confuses the participants face 
and struggles to remember. I discuss the method further in the next chapter.  
c. Misattributing an imagined event to reality: Goff and Roediger (1998) demonstrate 
how easily the memory can transform fantasy into reality. In their experiment, 
participants were asked either to imagine performing an action or to actually perform 
the action, for example, to break a toothpick. The participants participated in three 
sessions for approximately three hours over two weeks period where in the first session 
they had to listen to 72 action statements (encoding session), in the 2nd session they had 
to imagine performing action statements from previous session and with some new 
statements (imagining session) and in the 3rd session the participants had to recognise 
and monitor the sources for the encoding session; and they were asked whether they 
had performed that action or just imagined it (Goff and Roediger, 1998). Those who 
imagined the actions more frequently were more likely to think they had actually 
performed the actions. This experiment suggests that imagined events could 
 51 
 
misattributed in memory. Similarly, in the current experiments, the robot states some 
imaginary events which never took place and tries to convince the participants that they 
happened. The robot creates different topics based on this type of misattribution; for 
example, it says ‘I remember when you came last time, you sang for me’, ‘Do you 
remember last time when we played card games and I won?’ and similar.  
d. Unintentional plagiarism: Schacter (1999) identified this type of misattribution, when 
an individual attributes an idea or memory to themselves that really belongs to someone 
else. Such misattribution helps to explain why there is so much unintentional repetition 
across many different areas of human culture, such as between musicians, writers and 
artists. In the current experiment, the robot often quotes famous lines and claims that it 
made them it up, and if the participant opposes, then the robot admits the misattribution 
and apologises for its confusion.  
The above examples span the three main components of memory misattribution: 
cryptomnesia, false memory and source confusion.  
Cryptomnesia happens when individuals strongly believe that they are the original 
source of a thought. Some individuals fail to establish memories with enough detail to generate 
a source attribution, causing a misattribution of memory to the wrong source (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). People often truly believe that the information they plagiarised 
was in fact, their own. In this study, such components of misattribution were experimented 
upon with the robots ERWIN (Emotional Robot with Intelligent Network) and MARC (Multi-
Actuated Robotic Companion) (Figure 3.2). Both robots made misattributed arguments about 
various pieces of information in conversation with participants. These robots were used in the 
research currently described in this thesis, and the experiments are part of this thesis as well. 
The experiments are described in the Chapter 4.  
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Figure 3.2: From left to right: ERWIN and MARC 
False memories occur when a person's identity and interpersonal relationships are 
strongly centred on a memory of an experience that did not actually take place (McHugh, 
2008). Roediger and McDermott (1995) have studied this subject and proved that people could 
provide false recall without noticing their errors.  
Source confusion is another type of misattribution where an individual misattributes or 
forgets the source of a memory. For example, suppose the parents tell stories about their own 
childhood incidents to the children at bedtime every night but when the children grow up, they 
forgot the sources of such stories and thought such story incidents were from their own 
childhood.  Memories arise both from perceptual experiences and from an individual’s 
thoughts, feelings, inferences and imagination (Henkel & Coffman 2004). Source confusion, 
however, is also common in people and can be encountered in daily life. In my research, I 
wanted to find out how people would react if a robot showed this source confusion behaviour 
in human–robot interactions.   
There are many studies on the misattribution of memories which suggests that 
memories can easily become confused and distorted. As psychologist William James (1984) 
points out, ’Most people, probably, are in doubt about certain matters ascribed to their past. 
They may have seen them, may have said them, done them, or they may only have dreamed or 
imagined they did so.’ The misattribution bias is very common in people, and many studies 
have been done on this subject. Also, the effects of this bias can be developed in the robot, and 
it is expected that participants would understand the misattributed behaviours of the robot.  
Misattribution is one of the most researched and important biases in the memory bias 
group. The various effects of this bias can be frequently found in people. People are easily 
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influenced by this bias which often can be noticed by others as well. This bias fits into my 
experiment as it can be developed easily in a robot in a conversational interaction where the 
robot can show its forgetfulness to the participants; therefore, I selected this bias.   
 
3.6.2 Empathy gap 
The empathy gap is a cognitive bias which influences people to misunderstand the power over 
their behaviour that urges and feelings have, such as pain (Nordgren, Banas & MacDonald, 
2010), hunger (Nordgren, Van der Pligt & Van Harreveld,  2009), sexual arousal (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2006), fatigue (Nordgren, Van der Pligt & Van Harreveld, 2006) and cravings 
(Sayette et al., 2008). For example, when someone is angry, it is difficult to understand what it 
is like for one to be happy, and vice versa; when someone is blindly in love with another, it is 
difficult to understand what it is like for one not to be (as well as to imagine the possibility of 
not being blindly in love in the future). It is possible that, in the medical settings and the 
workplace environment, empathy gap bias can cause serious damage, for example, when a 
doctor needs to accurately diagnose the physical pain of a patient (Loewenstein, 2005) or when 
an employer needs to assess the need for an employee’s bereavement leave (Nordgren et al. 
2011). These examples of medical and workplace settings are known as the effects of the hot-
cold empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996). Loewenstein (1996) has stated that when an urge is 
activated, individuals cannot evoke the visceral experience of this urge. For example, 
individuals cannot invoke a feeling of pain that they had earlier experienced. When one’s 
hunger is excessive, one cannot readily elicit the visceral experiences of hunger—the mild 
throbbing around the stomach region or tightness around the chest. As the other individuals 
cannot readily invoke these visceral experiences, they underestimate the intensity of these 
urges, and another individual thinks such urges in others can be easily suppressed or retrained. 
Therefore. It can be said that empathy gap bias may influence myriad areas of life, from 
decision making to bullying, smoking, marketing and more.  
Over the last decade, the empathy gap bias gained interest among psychologists. 
Nordgren et al. (2009) have studied how physical pain could be underestimated by other 
individuals if they have not experienced the same kind of pain. Later, Nordgren et al. (2010) 
showed that because of the empathy gap, individuals tend to underestimate the pain that other 
people felt when they are not in such pain. They demonstrated the empathy gap bias in social 
exclusion situations in a series of studies where some participants were either excluded or not 
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excluded in a social setting. Next, in that setting, they rated the degree to which other people 
were likely to feel negative emotions when excluded. Relative to participants who were 
excluded, participants who were not excluded underestimated the negative emotions that other 
people would feel when shunned. In this study, participants who felt included now 
underestimated the pain they experienced when they were previously excluded. In another 
experiment, Loewenstein (1999) explored visceral factors related to addictions like smoking, 
which are associated with states essential for living (e.g. fatigue and hunger). Their findings 
yielded new discoveries about the hot-cold empathy gap and its important role in drug 
addictions.  
A hot-cold empathy gap occurs when people are unable to understand others’ emotions 
under the influence of anger, pain, sorrow or hunger in their own behaviours. This bias can 
affect people’s judgement in various fields, such as medical decisions, bullying in schools, 
addictions, etc. On the other hand, empathy is the capability to understand what others feel; 
namely, the capability of projecting oneself into another’s position (Bellet & Maloney, 1991). 
People with empathetic understanding can usually process many factors of decision making 
and problem solving. Past experiences such as childhood trauma, lack of parenting or accidents 
can influence such decision-making and problem-solving skills to differ from most individuals, 
who would respond with a seemingly obvious response (Dietrich, 2017). With the influence of 
empathy gap bias, however, people are unable to understand other’s true emotions, but if the 
other individual has true empathic understanding, then he or she might recognize the gap in the 
other’s lack of understanding. So, it is arguable that the empathy gap occurs when one objects 
is genuinely capable of empathy but the other is not because the ‘other’ in this scenario is 
always influenced by the bias but unaware of that influence. Meanwhile, the empathic 
individual might understand the ‘other’ individual’s situation, as it is possible for empathic 
people to project themselves in others and understand why they act in that certain way. 
Therefore, the empathy gap might not refer to the one who is truly capable of empathy, but the 
empathy gap bias affects the other subject who is not empathic.       
In the current experiment, I tested this effect of the empathy gap bias in robots by setting 
up its behaviours in hot or cold state at the beginning of the conversational and game-playing 
interactions. I allowed the responses based on this set bias for the whole interaction to find out 
how the participants reacted.  
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It can be seen that the empathy gap is a well-studied cognitive bias, which is also very 
common in humans, and it is possible that the effects of such bias can be developed in robots. 
It is usually expected that the robots are machines, and thus they do not feel pain or emotions 
and can perform tirelessly. As I have discussed earlier, however, such feelings of pain, urges 
and misunderstandings are common human behaviours and can be seen in daily life; therefore, 
they should be tested in social robots’ interactions with humans. More specifically, some 
investigation of the user-impacts of a robot expressing behaviours such as tiredness, sadness 
or excessive happiness, or exhibiting differences from the user’s emotions.. To evaluate 
conditions, I used hot-state and cold-state empathy gap biases in robots. These two types of 
empathy gaps were developed on two robots: MyKeepon (Figure 3.7) and MARC (Figure 3.3). 
MyKeepon expresses the behaviours of the hot and cold states of empathy gap biases 
by not behaving as the participant expects in a non-conversational interaction. The robot 
maintains a specific tone in interactions by expressing excessive happiness or remaining calm 
to show excessive sadness. The robot MARC has conversational interactions and shows the 
same level of excessive happiness or sadness in different interactions. Both of the robots show 
expressions as they misunderstand a participant’s current state of emotions and vice versa, and 
thus continue to interact based on their own mood states. The developed algorithms aim to 
deliver the impression of a robot with empathy gap bias, which fails to understand the 
participant’s state of emotions and does not try to understand at all. It was expected that the 
participants would understand such biased and non-biased behaviours of robots, and respond 
based on their experiences in the interactions.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: MyKeepon robot 
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3.6.3 The lack of knowledge, or the ideocracy effect  
The lack of knowledge, or the ideocracy effect, is another human imperfection, based on the 
Dunning-Kruger effects, where relatively unskilled individuals suffer from illusory superiority, 
mistakenly assessing their ability to be much greater than is accurate. Kruger and Dunning 
(1999) described this bias effect as follows: ‘…incompetent people do not recognize—scratch 
that, cannot recognize—just how incompetent they are’. Their research also suggested that 
highly skilled individuals may underestimate their relative competence, erroneously assuming 
that tasks which are easy for them are also easy for others, and they may incorrectly suppose 
that their competence in a particular field extends to other fields in which they are less 
competent. These two psychologists found four main components of this bias which, for a 
given skill, they proposed incompetent people would demonstrate (Lee, 2012):  
a. failure to recognise their own lack of skill, 
b. failure to recognise the extent of their inadequacy, 
c. failure to recognise genuine skill in others, and 
d. recognition and acknowledgement of their own lack of skill, after they are exposed 
to training for that skill. 
Dunning (2005) drew an analogy—‘the anosognosia of everyday life’—in which he 
showed that a physical condition in a person who experiences a disability because of brain 
injury seems unaware of that disability, even with dramatic impairments such as blindness or 
paralysis: ‘If you're incompetent, you can’t know you’re incompetent.… The skills you need 
to produce a right answer are exactly the skills you need to recognize what a right answer is’ 
(Morris, 2010). 
The Dunning-Kruger effect touches on a critical aspect of the default mode of human 
thought and a major flaw in human thinking, and it also applies to everyone (i.e. all human 
beings at various places on that curve with respect to different areas of knowledge) (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999). People may be an expert in some things and competent in others, but will also 
be near the bottom of the curve in some areas of knowledge (Novella, 2014).  
The effects of Dunning-Kruger bias can be explained in many ways. Novella (2014) on 
the Theness’s Neurologica blog explains such effects, suggesting that when an individual tries 
to make sense of the world where he or she works with existing knowledge and paradigms, the 
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individual also reconstructs ideas, then systematically seeks information that confirms those 
ideas. Usually, they dismiss contrary information as exceptions in the process and interpret 
ambiguous experiences in line with their own theories. They then remember their memories 
and tweak any experience that seems to confirm what they believe.  
The results of the Dunning-Kruger effect show intelligent people falsely assume that 
others have equal understanding, which is why being smart or talented can actually result in 
lower self-confidence. The outcome of all of this insight is that less fortunate people feel more 
confident about their abilities than those who actually excel in those areas. A famous quote 
from Charles Darwin perfectly describes this situation: ‘Ignorance more frequently begets 
confidence than does knowledge’ (Charles Darwin Quotes, n.d.). A real-world example may 
be a situation in a bar: Two guys in a bar are both looking at the same girl. The smarter guy 
doubts his ability to talk to women, despite his eloquence. Meanwhile, the less gifted guy gives 
no second thought to his ability and walks straight over to the girl. Ignorance wins in this 
situation. In general, people with higher level of intellectual tend to over-think everything, and 
usually those thoughts are more critical than uplifting. Instead of logically accepting that he or 
she is more skilful than others at a certain task, the high intellectual person’s overthinking only 
sometimes leads to a decrease in confidence. As Dunning and Kruger (1999) concluded, ‘the 
miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others.’  
The Dunning-Kruger effects is a recently discovered cognitive bias that is very common 
among people. The experiments described in Section 5.3, the lack of knowledge or idiocrasy 
effects, were created based on such Dunning-Kruger effects. These effects were developed in 
the robot MARC and subsequently observed in various conversational interactions. People who 
are influenced by this bias can often be noticed in daily life, social media, television, work 
places etc. This bias can be developed in a robot’s behaviours as it can be easily expressed and 
is understandable by participants. 
The lack of knowledge or the ideocracy effect were developed based on three main 
components, where the robot fails to recognise its own lack of knowledge of a given subject, 
fails to recognise true knowledge of the participants on that given subject, and in the end 
realises and admits its incompetence. The lack of knowledge or ideocracy behaviours algorithm 
was developed for the robot to express stupidity, lack of knowledge on a conversational subject, 
falsely confidence and ignorance. However, at the end of the interaction MARC realises its 
mistakes and acknowledges them appropriately.  
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3.6.4 Self-serving bias 
The self-serving bias is another commonly found cognitive bias in people, which relates to 
attribution for their personal outcomes. Self-serving bias happens when people make internal 
attributions of responsibility for desired outcomes and external attributions for undesired 
outcomes (Shepperd, Malone & Sweeny, 2008). A classic example of self-serving bias is a 
student taking an exam. If the student does well on the test, he or she is more likely to believe 
that his or her own ability and effort (i.e. things under the student’s control) were the reasons 
for her success. However, if he or she receives a poor grade on the test, the blame falls on 
external factors such as luck, the difficulty of the task, or the lack of cooperation of others 
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). The student might claim that the professor made up an unfair 
test, or that the lighting in the room was too dim, so the student could not focus.  
In the workplace, workers attribute their promotions to their own hard work and 
exceptional skill, but they usually attribute denial of promotions to unfair bosses or other 
external causes. Athletes sometimes credit themselves for performing well in the sports arena, 
but when they perform poorly, they blame external causes (DeMichele et al., 1998). It is even 
evidenced in drivers who attribute accidents to external factors, such as the weather, the 
condition of their car, and other drivers, yet attribute the narrow avoidance of an accident to 
their alertness and finely honed driving skills (Stewart, 2005). It has also been noted that self-
serving biases critically affect interpersonal relationships, where both parties in relationships 
blame each other (Campbell et al., 2000). Shepperd et al. (2008) have shown that people’s 
motivational processes and cognitive processes can be influenced by the effects of the self-
serving bias. 
The concept of the self-serving bias was introduced in late 1960s (Miller & Ross, 1975), 
and since then its effects have been observed in many studies. Scientists argue that some of the 
most noticeable and major differences in components include roles (actor or observer), task 
importance, outcome expectations, self-esteem, achievement motivation, self-focussed 
attention, task choice, perceived task difficulty, interpersonal orientation, status, affect, locus 
of control, gender and task type (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Campbell and Sedikides (1999) 
examine the above factors and in 13 of 14 categories, the condition that was hypothesised to 
give a greater sense of self-threat caused a self-serving bias of a greater magnitude. Self-serving 
bias is triggers prevalently when people feel that their concept of self is under threat. Some 
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people, however, are less susceptible to this bias than others. Individuals who are depressed or 
suffer from chronically low self-esteem usually tend to take the blame for their failures but 
deny responsibility for their successes (Rotter, 1966). Rotter (1966) noticed that individuals 
with an external locus of control consider both positive and negative outcomes to be caused by 
factors beyond their control, and those with an internal locus of control assume that they, 
personally, are responsible for their outcomes. Miller and Ross (1975) have suggested that 
people who blame others for failures and attributing their successes to themselves are usually 
very optimistic when predicting the outcomes and experiences. Piehlmaier (2014) has 
suggested that people usually optimistic in nature (e.g. who expect to pass tests, get good jobs 
and have good relationships rather than failures) get fired from jobs or divorced, and that the 
reason may be that negative experiences are generally unexpected, but on the other hand, it is 
also true that people who tend to attribute negative experiences  to external factors are rather 
unstable and are more depressed than others.  
Self-serving bias may depend on interpersonal closeness and relationships in a social 
context. Campbell et al. (2000) have investigated groups working in pairs to complete 
interdependent outcome tasks and found out that the relationally close pairs usually do not 
show a self-serving bias, but relationally distant pairs do. Sedikides et al. (1998) arrived at 
similar results, and suggested that the reason could be that close relationships place limits on 
an individual’s self-enhancement tendencies. Campbell et al. (2000) investigated pairs who 
performed an interdependent-outcomes creativity test and were then given a bogus pipeline for 
success or failure outcome. Strangers exhibited the self-serving bias in responsibility 
attributions, but friends tended to make joint attributions for both success and failure. 
Researchers have taken this as evidence of ‘boundaries on self-enhancement’ (Campbell et al. 
2000).  
From the discussion, it can be said that evidence of this bias is well studied, and the 
behaviours are easily recognisable in people. This bias can easily influence people and affect 
relations between friends and family members. Self-serving bias can be easily developed in 
robots to express its effects in game-playing scenarios and then be compared with a non-biased 
game playing interactions. Therefore, I chose the self-serving biases to be used in the 
experiments on game-playing interactions with the robot MARC. The self-serving algorithm 
was created based on the bias’s general principles (i.e. the robot does not like to lose in games 
against participants). The robot takes full credit for winning a game and happily brags about 
the win; however, if it loses, it then makes several excuses and even accuses the opponent of 
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cheating. The algorithm’s development and other experiment details are described in the next 
chapter. 
  
3.6.5 Humour effect 
Humour effect bias is a known cognitive bias of memory. It has been studied that humorous 
items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones. This tendency could be explained 
by the distinctive effects of humour on the human brain, the increased time to process and 
understand the humour’s contents, and the emotional arousal caused by the humour (Seymour, 
n.d.). The beneficial effect of humour on experienced emotions may be based on the 
mechanism that processing humour requires cognitive resources, so that people are distracted 
from negative stimuli (Strick et al., 2009).  
Humour is a part of everyday life. Humans inherit their desire to laugh, and that 
motivates various social actions, such as sharing funny YouTube videos or responding to text 
messages with a ‘LOL’ or emoticons. People even choose to get their daily news in comedic 
form from outlets like The Daily Show, The Colbert Report or The Onion (Jasheway, 2016).  
Various studies have suggested the benefit of humour: For example, people who are 
associated humour in relationships are usually in satisfying and healthy interpersonal 
relationships (Salovey & Mayer 1990; Salovey, Mayer & Caruso, 2002). Other studies found 
that humour can be associated with social competence (Levine & Zigler, 1976), intimacy 
(Mutthaya, 1987; Hampes, 1992), trust (Hampes, 1999) and strong interpersonal relationship 
in marriages (Ziv 1988; Rust & Goldstein, 1989; Ziv & Gadish, 1989, Lauer, Lauer & Kerr, 
1990; Kuiper, Martin & Olinger, 1993; Kuiper, McKenzie & Belanger, 1995)found that more 
humorous individuals are more likely to perceive potentially threatening events in a positive 
manner than less humorous ones. This trend has been used in this study’s experiments to 
represent instil humour in the MARC robot (Chapter 5.4.5).  
Martin et al. (2003) found that an interpersonal form of humour, called affiliative 
humour, involves telling jokes, saying funny things, or witty banter, to put others at ease as 
well as to amuse and to improve relationships. Self-enhancing humour ‘involves a generally 
humorous outlook on life, a tendency to be frequently amused by the incongruities of life, and 
to maintain a humorous perspective even in the face of stress or of adversity’ (Martin et al., 
 61 
 
2003). Both affiliative and self-enhancing humour are positively correlated with intimacy, 
extraversion and openness to experience (Martin et al., 2003; Saraglou & Scariot, 2002).  
Weinberger and Gulas (1992) studied how humour can attract attention. In a practical 
example within a classroom, a student tends to pay more attention to the lectures when 
professors use humour in their talks than when they do not. This tendency could be helpful to 
remember in certain lectures, since a range of humour can be used in the classroom, such as 
satire, irony and sarcasm. Humour comes in many forms, though, such as in misunderstanding, 
mocking, puns, wordplay, surrealism, black humour and more.  
Overall, the effect of humour is a popular area of research, and these effects are 
common in people’s lives. This thesis used bias associated with humour to points the 
participants’ attention to the robot. The initial goal of choosing this bias was to explore whether 
participants could remember such light interactions with the robot, in which the robot made 
several jokes throughout the entire interaction. The humour effects algorithm was developed 
in the robot MARC for game-playing interactions against participants. To show the effects of 
humours, MARC does not care if it loses or wins the game; instead, it makes several funny 
comments on both situations of winning and losing, so that if a participant loses, they don’t 
feel bad about it. Such ‘funny comments’ (e.g. small jokes) were gathered based on situations, 
such as if the robot wins, the jokes are based on self-defeating humour where the robot tries to 
amuse the participant by showing that the win does not matter; similarly, if it loses a game, it 
makes a comment based on affiliative humour and self-enhancing humour, which shows that 
the robot is amused by the participant’s wins. All the comments and jokes were made to be 
light and short; therefore, the participants were expected to pay more attention and enjoy the 
game-playing interaction. The robot poses its humour such that it can create the impression of 
a positive outcome for the game even when the robot loses. The development of this algorithm 
is discussed in the next chapters (Chapter 4 and 5).  
 
3.7 Summary 
In the first section of this chapter, I mainly described important and relative studies on human–
robot interactions in different fields and using different ranges of social skills. The main aim 
of this section has been to give readers an idea of social-robot interaction, how it differs from 
other kinds of interaction, and most importantly, how people understand interactions with 
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machines where the machines show various social behaviours. I discussed the reasons for 
considering cognitive biases in my experiments to develop in robot’s interactive behaviours, 
and to do that I explained how cognitive biases play important roles in human nature and such 
biases’ effects on the human brain, decision making and social relations. I posed my arguments 
as a hypothesis and in research questions, and I stated briefly how I study biases in social 
robots. I then discussed the cognitive biases I selected for my study and stated why I choose 
such biases. This chapter offers, in sum, information on different application areas for social 
robots, the role and importance of cognitive biases in humans, and my argument on developing 
some of these biases in the social robots.   
The next chapter discusses the procedures I followed to develop such biases as 
algorithms in the robots, the experimental methods, data collection metrics and methods, and 
participants. 
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Chapter 4:  
Methodology and Setup 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe how different cognitive biases were developed in the robots and the 
methods used to set up the interaction experiments between the robots and participants.  
All the described experiments have structural similarity, where biased version of robot 
interaction with participants are compared non-biased interactions. Both of such biased and 
non-biased algorithms were programmed and developed in robots separately to compare both 
types of interactions and find the participant’s preferences between biased and non-biased 
algorithms. 
In the next section I briefly discuss the pre-experimental setups, considering the details 
of the robots, how the algorithms were made, how the experiments were performed, the data 
collection methods and other related procedures.  
 
4.2 Pre-experimental setup 
To experiment the research hypothesis, I needed to develop the effects of the selected cognitive 
biases in the robot and prepare human-robot interactions where participants would experience 
such biases in the robot. To determine the effects of the biases, I needed to differentiate such 
bias effects with another interaction where participants experience an interaction without the 
selected biases. At the end, if it is possible to compare their experiences between biased based 
interactions and non-biased interactions, then it would be possible to find out the effects of the 
cognitive biases in the robot in human-robot interactions.  
It is important to mention that in the current experiment, the focus was not on the robot’s 
performance in human-robot interactions. Rather, I aimed to investigate the effects of cognitive 
bias in a robot’s behaviours in human-robot interactions. Therefore, the most important aspect 
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of the experiment is to measure the users’ experiences with the robot (Kim & Mutlu, 2014), 
such as how the participants felt in interaction. The manipulation of the robot’s behaviours was 
performed by the ‘Wizard’ during the experiments, and therefore, the same human error is 
possible in all of the experiments. Consequently, I did not determine a need to measure human 
error in the current experimental scenarios. If any human error occurred during manipulation 
of the robot’s behaviours, the same error was common for all of the biased and non-biased 
interactions and therefore had very little influence on the participants. To measure the user 
experience with the robot, various questions were asked, including the scale to measure the 
aforementioned factors such as likeability, comfort, pleasure and rapport. For the likeability 
scale, a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 12 questions were asked, and the number varied based 
on the procedure of the experiment. For the comfort, pleasure and rapport scales, 6, 8 and 25 
questions were asked, respectively. The likeability scale questioned, “Was the game easy to 
play?” and “How easy was the conversation with the robot?”, for which the participant 
answered with a rating from 1 (did not it like at all) to 7 (liked it very much) to measure the 
‘likeability’ of conversational and game-playing interactions (Hone & Graham, 2000). The 
pleasure scale asked the participant to rate phrases such as, “Playing the game with robot is 
enjoyable to me” on a scale from 1 to 7, which measured how satisfied the participants were 
with their experience in hedonic (Hassenzahl, 2003) and emotional terms (Norman, 2004). In 
the comfort scale, participants were given statements such as, “Playing the game with the robot 
is uncomfortable for me.” The answers used a similar rating system from 1 to 7 to understand 
participants' level of cognitive comfort in playing the game with the robot.  
In addition to the above three scales, another important scale was added to measure the 
level of rapport which participants experienced with the robot. The questions for this scale were 
developed with the help of a previous study on human-robot proxemics (Mumm and Mutlu, 
2011). The questions for this scale were statements to be rated and included, “The robot has a 
great deal of influence over my behaviour” and “The robot and I are very close to each other”. 
Participants rated these ideas on a scale from 1 to 7. All of the scales and questions are provided 
in Appendix B, page 263.   
To accomplish the abovementioned task, I planned all of the experiment methodologies 
based on a comparison of two sets of interactions such that it is possible to compare an 
interaction based on selected biased and non-biased behaviours in the robot. As I am comparing 
biased and non-biased behaviours in interactions, it was therefore important that the selected 
biases can be thoroughly expressed by the robot so they can be easily understood by 
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participants. Some of the selected biases can be expressed better through conversation or by 
game playing, or by a mix of both conversational and game-playing interactions.  
1. Misattribution: To show this bias effects the robot should display forgetfulness, 
which can be expressed in conversational interactions, but there should be multiple 
interactions to gather information so that the robot can forget.  
2. Empathy gap: The robot could express this bias effect in both game playing and 
conversation. So, in the first experiment, the robot showed empathy gap expressions in 
game playing interactions, but in the second experiment, the robot expressed the effects 
in conversational interactions.  
3. Lack of knowledge (based on Dunning-Kruger): In this case, the effects of the 
biases can be expressed in a conversational interaction where the robot shows its lack 
of knowledge of different subjects.  
4. Self-serving bias: The effects of self-service can be better expressed in a game-
playing situation where the robot refuses to lose a game or brags for winning a game.  
5. Humour effects: This bias can be expressed by robot in a game-playing and 
conversational experiment in which the robot tells a joke after a game, regardless of 
winning or losing, so that the interaction can have an impact on the participant and the 
bias effects can be established properly. 
To examine the chosen biases in robots I needed to set up experiments where people 
could interact with the robots and give feedback. I needed to prepare the robots for the 
interactions, plan the interactions between robots and participants, configure the algorithms 
based on biases and the lack thereof and choose the appropriate measurements so that 
participant feedback could be measured, advertise the study, and select the participants. 
Therefore, to examine the effects of the biases and imperfectness in robot in human–robot 
interactions, I had to consider the following pre-experimental standards for each of the 
experiments:  
1. preparation of the robots,  
2. interaction designs,  
3. algorithms,  
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4. participants and groupings, and  
5. data collection and measurements. 
 
4.2.1 Preparing the robots 
To test ‘social robots’, as per the hypothesis, I set up interactions between people and different 
kind of robots are able to interact following social rules. In the experiments, three robots were 
used: ERWIN, MyKeepon and MARC (Figure 4.1). The first, ERWIN, is a robot head capable 
of expressing five basic emotions. MyKeepon is a small, toy-like robot, and MARC is 
humanoid and interacts similar to humans. The robots differ in appearance, as well, enabling 
me to investigate the effects of biases in interactions between people and robots with different 
appearances.   
 
Figure 4.1: ERWIN, MyKeepon and MARC (from left to right). 
 
As the robots have different functionalities, the design of the interactions could be 
different for the robots. For example, MARC can interact based on verbal abilities and gestures, 
while ERWIN interacts based on verbal and emotional expressions, and MyKeepon interacts 
based on different noises, jumping, and dancing. However, the design of the interactions 
followed two basic principles:  
a. The interactions should allow the robot to engage with the participants in 
conversation, game playing or both. 
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b. In the interaction scenarios, the robot should be able to express its biased or non-
biased behaviours by using its own functionalities (e.g. speech, noises, gesture, 
emotions, etc.).  
In the following sections, the different algorithms that robots followed in interactions are 
discussed. 
Control system was not affected 
It is important to understand that the biased and non-biased algorithms are a set of scripted 
behaviours created depending on the functionalities of the robots (e.g. verbal or non-verbal 
abilities, gestures performing abilities, emotions expressions abilities etc.) and the main 
components of the selected biases. In the experiments, the developed algorithms did not change 
the control systems of the robots; rather, they manipulated the behaviours so the robot could 
show a set of selected behaviours based on cognitive bias. For example, the ERWIN (Figure 
4.1 far left) robot which I used in my first experiment can express five prototypical emotions 
and can speak; therefore, the developed misattribution-biased behaviours were expressed by 
misattributed speech, followed by emotional expressions. Therefore, it can be said that the 
cognitive biased behaviours I used in the robots did not modify the robot’s control systems, but 
were programmed using software based on the robot’s own functionalities, and in the 
experiment I controlled the robots by giving various inputs through the software to the robots 
to enact various behaviours during the interactions. 
Assessing robot’s behaviours 
In the current research, I chose to study five cognitive biases: misattribution, empathy gap, 
idiocrasy effect, self-serving bias and humour effect. The reason for the choice of these biases 
has been stated earlier (Chapter 3.5, page 60). Before starting the main experiments, all of the 
biased behaviours were checked in several mock interactions. To verify if the behaviours 
shown by the robot were understandable and appropriate according to the selected bias, several 
mock interactions were performed between the robot and my supervisor, graduate students and 
lab colleagues. After ensuring that the robot expressed the correct behaviours and the 
participants could understand what the robot showed, then the actual experiments were carried 
out.  Based on the received feedbacks and suggestions from those mock interactions several 
changes were made for the actual interactions such as focusing on developing main components 
of the biased behaviours (e.g. for the misattribution bias, the dialogues were designed based on 
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three main components false memory, source confusion and total forgetfulness), interactions 
has divided into several stages (e.g. stages for conversational interaction are meet and greet, 
conversation, and farewell). 
It should be noted that the behaviours (biased and non-biased) were designed in the 
robots without considering the robot’s own existing functional faults and biases (if any). The 
reason of not considering the robot’s own faults and biases is that both of the types of 
behaviours (i.e. biased and non-biased) were developed in the same robot, so in both 
interactions, such functional faults and biases (if any) are present, therefore not making any 
difference in terms of the findings of the experiments. 
  
4.2.1.1 ERWIN 
The Emotional Robot with Intelligent Network (ERWIN) was used in the first experiment to 
test misattribution bias, and ERWIN is a robot head placed on a metal base. The robot is around 
40 cm tall, including the height of the base. 
Hardware modification 
ERWIN (Figure 4.2) has a total of four servos, two for the jaws and another two for the 
eyebrows. Two cameras of 2.0 MP are placed in its eyes, so that it can record user expressions 
face to face. Two lips and adjacent motors are connected in a metal plate, and similarly, the 
eyes and eyebrows are placed and connected by another metal plate. These two plates are 
vertically connected with a rod, placed on a metal base. The whole hardware system looks like 
a mechanical face with prototype expressions. Motors are controlled by a Pololu 
microcontroller placed on the back of the head. The robot can rotate 90 degrees on its base.  
Software used 
ERWIN was programmed using C. Its voice was made using text to speech software called 
‘Speakonia’, for the following reasons: 
i. more real time than typing the robot’s speech and selecting from the different 
voices to speak on the spot, 
ii. different tones and voices to choose from, and 
iii. ability to overcome the delay between participants’ and ERWIN’s responses.  
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Speakonia has eight different voices, and it can also make prosodic sounds in longer sentences.  
Function and features 
The robot can move its jaws and eyebrows, which show five basic expressions. Such 
expressions are happy, sad, surprised, angry and shocked or afraid. Figure 4.3 shows the 
different emotions of ERWIN. 
 
Figure 4.2: Different emotions expressions of ERWIN (from left to right: happy, surprised, angry, shocked 
and sad). 
 
In this experiment, the emotive expressions were used as a tool for interacting with the 
participants, but the main goal was to discover the effects of the misattribution bias and 
forgetfulness in the robot’s interactions and how hey effects the participant’s fondness or 
likability of the robot. 
 
4.2.1.2 MyKeepon 
MyKeepon is a small, yellow robot which I used in the second experiment to test the empathy 
gap bias. Kozima et al. (2009) designed and developed the robot at the National Institute of 
Information and Communications Technology (NICT) in Kyoto, Japan. The robot’s simple 
appearance and behaviour are suitable to aid children with developmental disorders such as 
autism to understand attentive and emotive actions. 
Keepon, which is shown in Figure 4.3, is a small toy-like robot containing two yellow 
blobs on a black cylindrical base. It has two interactive modes: touch and dance. The robot has 
limited vocal ability but can make noises representing various moods and emotions. If the user 
touches the robot or taps on its head, Keepon usually responds by circling around towards its 
touch side and making noises. The robot is able to detect music and sounds and responds by 
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dancing or jumping. Because of the robot’s shape, size, colour and interactions, it is very 
popular among children, and it has been used in many human–robot interaction experiments in 
recent years. 
 
Figure 4-3: The robot Keepon showing different positions. 
 
Hardware modification 
MyKeepon is the beta version of the robot Keepon Pro, and it can do almost everything the Pro 
version could. It has a touch mode and dance mode, which are activated by two buttons located 
at the front of its platform (Figure 4.5). In the experiment, I modified MyKeepon using Arduino 
Uno (Figure 4.4) and in this modified version, MyKeepon is fully functional and can be used 
and controlled remotely using a laptop.  
As soon as it is active, MyKeepon tries to attract the participant’s attention. Similar to 
the original, MyKeepon responds to squeezes, tickles and taps and also has own noises to attract 
attention and expressing emotions. 
 
Figure 4.4: Arduino Uno. 
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In its dance mode, a sensitive microphone allows it to hear the music being played, and 
it dances to it. The microphone is located on its nose so that it can hear be better.   
 
Figure 4.5: Music mode and touch mode buttons of MyKeepon. The music note symbol is for dance mode 
and finger symbol is for touch mode. 
 
In the touch mode, MyKeepon responds to any touch, poke or tap on its body and head, 
by jumping, dancing and moving in the direction of the stimulus. 
Software used:
 
Figure 4.6: The ViKeepon interface. 
 
An open source software interface called ViKeepon (Figure 4.6) was used to control 
the robot remotely during the interactions. ViKeepon allows the creation of custom movements 
and sounds, which can be used remotely just by clicking on the buttons. As seen in Figure 4.6, 
each button represents a set of movements to perform a particular task, such as ‘Greetings1’, 
which has three movements and two sounds to perform a warm welcome to the participant. 
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ViKeepon supports a minimum of 15 different sounds, including wake up, yawn, sleep, chimp, 
sneeze and others. In the experiment, it was possible to make different create different 
expressions by combining such custom moves and sounds together, for example greetings, 
sadness, great sadness, joy, concentration and others.  
 
4.2.1.3 MARC 
A 3D-printed humanoid robot, MARC was used in the third and fourth experiments to find the 
effects of the misattribution, empathy gap, self-serving and humour-related cognitive biases, 
as well as certain idiotic behaviours showed by the robots. Much research suggests that the 
human-like body of a humanoid robot helps its users to understand the robot’s gestures 
intuitively (Hayashi et al., 2005). A recent study suggests that human brain can equally well 
perceive the actions of non-humans and humans (Wykowska et al., 2015). The reason for this 
ability could be that the actions of general gestures which evolved in socio-cultural context of 
human–human interaction allow also for intuitive human–robot interactions. Such actions 
might include the specific speech and gestures with arms and hands and body language to 
perform some specific expressions. These expressions are easy to interpret by the human 
sensory system, because it has been practiced since childhood. In the same way, the humanoid 
robot with anthropomorphic abilities can express human-like gestures, which can be known to 
its users and also easy to understand. Such gestures can be helpful to develop companion robots 
even for everyday social uses, as humans have a specific shape and size and have built the 
home environment accordingly, and a humanoid robot can easily fit into our houses. Humanoid 
robots are an important part of robotics, and they are very popular as entertainment; for 
example, Titan the robot (Titan The Robot, n.d.) is a giant, remotely controlled robot that can 
sing, dance, make conversation and entertain people. In the current experiments using MARC, 
the robot was controlled remotely and interacted based on speech and gestures using its hands, 
head, and neck. 
The version of MARC used in this study (Figure 4.7) was fully 3D-printed based on the 
open source project called InMoov created by Gael Langevn (InMoov, n.d.). It was built from 
head to torso, and it can perform various human-like gestures using hand, head and neck 
movements. One of the important reasons MARC was chosen over other humanoid robots was 
the cost efficiency. The expenses of making MARC were minimal compared to other available 
humanoid robots. Each part of MARC was completely built with a 3D printer, and the total 
 73 
 
cost was approximately £700.00–£1000.00 to make this life-sized humanoid robot. The robot 
is around 170 cm tall and weighs nearly 12 kg.  
 
Figure 4.7 The back and front of MARC the humanoid robot. 
 
Hardware modification 
The various parts of MARC were designed using Google Sketch and then printed using a 3D 
printer. In total, nearly 200 parts were printed, and it took nearly three months to print them all. 
Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS) plastic was used to print the different body parts 
because of its high melting point and the fact that it is sturdier and harder than other printing 
plastics on the market. To print the forearms, approximately 3 kg of variously coloured natural 
ABS filament was used. Most of the body-part sketches were downloaded from InMoov, but 
some were created independently. Body parts were assembled after the printing of each of the 
body parts was complete. There are nearly 30 servos in MARC’s body which help the robot to 
perform gestures, and MARC has two cameras in its eyes which help to watch and record the 
interactions. The robot can move its wrist rotationally, and both hands are able to move up, 
down, front and back. Its head can move up and down and sideways, and can tilt frontwards 
and backwards, which helps it to look up at the user to make eye contacts within the range.  
Software used 
MARC’s firmware was programmed using Raspberry Pi. The Pololu microcontroller was used 
to control all servos. Servos and microcontrollers were programmed using C. An interface was 
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created using C++ to use in the experiments; Figure 4.8 shows the software interface where 
different inputs can be given for MARC to perform various actions. The voice of the robot was 
created using software called Audacity. At first the sample voice files were created using an 
online text-to-speech editor. Then, the voice files were edited using Audacity to make changes 
in pitch, increases in tempo and to make the voice sound bit robotic. As MARC looks like a 
male robot, the voice was chosen to be a masculine robotic voice. MARC can move its jaws, 
so with the robotic voice it looks like the robot is talking.  
 
Figure 4.8: Control interface of the robot command prompt. 
 
4.2.2 Interaction design 
The design of the experiments allowed a comparison between two interactions: an interaction 
where the robot interacted based on the effects of the developed cognitive bias, and one in 
which the robot interacted without the effects of such bias (this latter is referred to as non-
biased, as unbiased or as the baseline).  
Based on the selected biases, different algorithms were developed where the 
interactions were set for either conversation or playing games (e.g. rock-paper-scissors, tap-
on-head) between the robot and participants. The conversational engagements were based on 
common topics often discussed between two people at an early stage of their friendship (e.g. 
favourite colour, favourite food, favourite sports etc.). Such conversational interactions were 
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used to test biases related to memory or those which were most suited to conversation. For 
example, to show the effects of misattribution bias, I chose conversation between the robot and 
participants. To show the effects of lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects and empathy gap 
biases, conversational interactions were used. However, selection of conversational 
interactions depended partly on the robot as well. For example, empathy gap bias was tested in 
game-playing interaction with MyKeepon (tap-on-head), but also in a conversational 
interaction with MARC. I used a game (rock-paper-scissors) as a mode of interaction for the 
self-serving and humour biases with MARC, because to express the effects of such biases the 
results of a game are necessary (details in Chapter 5).  
To show the cognitive bias-based behaviours effectively, so that the participant could 
recognise and understand, the interactions were divided into several stages. For example, 
conversational experiments were divided into three stages (e.g. meet and greet, topic-based 
conversation and farewell), and game playing experiments were divided into five stages (e.g. 
meet and greet, explaining rules, playing games, overall score and farewell). Based on the 
selected biases, the conversational dialogues change in different stages; for example, with the 
misattribution-biased algorithm, the robot would forgets the participant’s name and therefore 
greets the participant with pseudo names, but in the empathy gap algorithm, the robot does not 
need to forget the participant’s names in order to express the bias, therefore robot remembers, 
and the effects of the bias are shown in later stages.  
Table 4.1: The stages of the conversational and game-playing interactions 
Conversational Interactions Game-Playing Interactions 
Meet and greet Meet and greet 
Topic-based conversation Game rules explain 
Farewell Game play 
 Result 
 Farewell 
 
As seen in the Table 4.1, each of the conversational interactions were divided into three 
stages, such as when the participant and robot meet and begin conversing, the middle of the 
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conversation where they discuss various topics, and the end, when the participant leaves. For 
example, the interaction was divided into three stages to test the misattribution cognitive bias: 
a. meet and greet, where participants meet with the robot; 
b. topic-based conversation, where both parties make conversation on various 
topics; and  
c. farewell, where interaction ends and the participant leaves. 
Such three stages are present in both misattribution and non-misattribution 
conversational interactions.  
As seen in the Table 4.1, the gameplay interaction was divided into five stages:  
a. meet and greet, 
b. rule explanation, 
c. game playing, 
d. final result, and  
e. farewell.  
These stages are meant to differentiate between biased and non-biased interactions and 
to effectively show the biased behaviours so that participants can understand the differences 
between interactions throughout the exchange (see Figure 4.9). 
After meeting and greeting the participant, the robot requested that the participant play 
rock-paper scissor and explained the rules and. If the participants wanted to know the rules 
again, the robot would respond based on the developed bias. In the game play, one of three 
outcomes would result from a single round of gameplay: 
i. robot wins, 
ii. robot loses, and 
iii. draw.  
Based on such outcomes the robot responds differently, and such different responses 
are the key to making the interactions centre on the developed bias. The ‘final result’ is a state 
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where the robot calculates results based on all rounds played and declares the winner. MARC’s 
dialogues would be different in this stage, depending on the algorithm.  
For the self-serving algorithm, the robot praises itself for winning, but blames other 
causes for losing. For humour effects, the robot offers various kinds of humour in the event of 
losing or winning. The game hands were drawn at random, so the outcomes were not fixed, 
because the goal of the experiments was to measure participant’s responses to the biased or 
non-biased behaviours from the robot, not to measure win rates.  
 
 
Figure 4-9: Theoretical stages in an interaction. 
 
In the next section, I discuss the design of baseline, self-serving and humour effects 
algorithms, explaining the differences between the three algorithms and how they were 
performed by the robots in the interactions. 
 
4.2.2.1 Conversation design 
The conversational design for each topic was simple and question-answer based. In the 
experiment, the dialogue design of the general conversation was based on four steps (Figure 
4.10), as follows:  
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i. robot asks a question or says something, 
ii. participant responds, 
iii. robot states its own opinion, and  
iv. robot waits for participant’s response or moves to next dialogue. 
For example, MARC asks, ‘Do you like football?’ The participant can respond, ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’, and can extend their responses, but whatever the participant’s responses, the robot 
would say something after that response based on the algorithm (e.g. biased or non-biased). 
The robot would then wait for few moments to check whether the participant wants to say 
something, otherwise it moves to the next line of dialogue. The differences in biased and 
baseline conversations arise in the third step, where the robot says something after the 
participant responds. In the baseline condition, the robot mainly says ‘Okay’ or ‘That is great’, 
which represents the end of that particular discussion and movement to the next topic, but in 
the biased interaction, the robot’s dialogue reflects the bias effects, and the topic of 
conversation may be further pursued, depending on the participant’s responses (See Figure 
4.10).  
 
Figure 4.10: Conversation design: Left side diagram for biased conversation and right for the non-biased 
 
An example can be given to show the differences between non-biased and biased 
dialogues: in the meet-and-greet stage, there could be only three lines of speech from the robot 
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for the baseline algorithm: (1) ‘Hello,’ (2) ‘My name is MARC, what is your name?’ and (3) 
‘Nice to meet you.’ In the case of the biased algorithm, however, the robot’s dialogues changed 
based on the bias; with the empathy gap, for example, the robot may be overly joyous or overly 
sad to show the bias effects (hot-cold empathy). The lines of speech can therefore be, (1) ‘Hello 
my friend! I am very happy to see you today. It’s such a beautiful day. I hope you are feeling 
great today’, or (2) ‘Hi. Today I am not feeling very good.’ In the next section, the development 
of each of the algorithms is discussed. 
 
4.2.3 Algorithms 
The algorithms were designed based on the main components of the selected cognitive biases; 
for example, to develop the robot’s lack of knowledge or ideocracy (similar to the Dunning-
Kruger effects bias) three main behaviours were selected for the robot: unable to understand 
own lack of knowledge, unable to understand other’s true knowledge, and understand and 
acknowledge own lack of knowledge. Lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects were developed 
in MARC to test them in topics-based conversational interaction. Therefore, MARC asks 
various questions to participant on different topics and makes arguments based on false facts, 
at the end acknowledging its stupidity.  
The algorithms consist of lines of dialogue and actions performed by the robots. The 
dialogue was created based on the main components and effects of the selected cognitive 
biases, and the actions were created based on the robot’s functions and features, as shown at 
the beginning and at end of the conversation. For example, the misattribution algorithm was 
developed in ERWIN, and the algorithm included dialogue and emotional expressions. In 
general, the dialogue and actions cues were as presented in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Speech and Action cues of ERWIN used in experiments 
 
From the above Table (4.2), it can be seen that the robot performs an action while 
speaking. Also, the robot shows an appropriate action after each line of dialogue finishes. For 
example, to ask a question to the participant, the process involves action (i.e. expression), 
dialogue (i.e. question) and action (i.e. expression); these expressions were chosen to be 
relevant to the conversation, to indicate that the robot wants to know the answer from the 
participants.  
 
4.2.3.1 Dialogue Design 
In both conversational and game-playing interactions, the robot interacts verbally based on the 
different biases or baseline, so dialogue had major impacts in each of the interactions. In the 
conversational interactions, dialogue was created based on the topics and with the effects of 
the chosen biases in our experiments (e.g. misattribution, self-serving, humours effects etc.). 
The conversational interactions were question-answer based, where the robot asks questions 
based on pre-selected topics. In this case, lines of speech came in two types:  
a. questions, and  
b. statements.  
In most cases, questions were made direct and to the point, expecting a direct answer 
from the participants (e.g. Do you like football?), so that the robot could express the statements 
containing the selected bias’s effects. The bias effects were designed in the statement, usually 
in response to the participant’s answer (e.g. ‘A Canadian invented football on ice, and it’s 
called Rugby’, showcasing the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effect). However, such design 
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also depends on the selected bias, which sometimes changes the form of questions and 
statement; for instance, in the misattribution-biased algorithm, robot asks question 
misattributing previous information (e.g. ‘Last time you said you love to study medical 
journals, am I correct?’). However, in the case of non-biased algorithms, statements were made 
very simple so as not to show any effects of the selected biases (e.g. ‘Okay, I understand’).  
In the game-playing algorithms, dialogues were based on the effects of the selected 
biases. In these interactions, the questions enquire about the different conditions of the game 
playing (e.g. ‘Do you understand the rule?’ and ‘Are you ready?’) In such algorithms, the robot 
expresses the biased effects through the statements delivered after the game and depending on 
the results of the games (e.g. ‘Sorry, I was not ready, I did not lose’, demonstrating the self-
serving bias). 
Now will I discuss each of the algorithms developed for the experiments.  
 
4.2.3.2 Misattribution algorithm 
The misattribution-biased algorithm was designed based on the main characteristics of the bias, 
misattributing and forgetting previously collected information. To reflect the effects of such 
biased characteristics in conversation, the algorithm was designed based on three main 
components of the bias, including false memory, source confusion and total forgetfulness 
(Figure 4.11). In the conversation, the robot expresses its misattribution bias effects in dialogue 
based on these three components.  
 
Figure 4.11: Misattribution algorithm was created based on three components of the bias. 
The effects of these components were expressed in all three stages of an interaction. 
For example, in the meet-and-greet stage, ERWIN forgets the participant’s name, becomes 
confused about the participant’s address, and erroneously states the participant’s previous 
wellbeing. These statements were made in dialogue (see Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Examples of dialogues with misattribution bias. 
 
 
The robot forgets the participant’s name and misattributes someone else’s in its first 
dialogue. Then, the second dialogue shows the robot’s false memory, where it misattributes 
what participant said in a previous interaction. In the third dialogue, the robot gets confused 
about the source of the name ‘Dave’. All these three dialogues show the robot’s misattribution 
behaviours in conversation. In the following sections, the three stages of misattribution 
interactions are shown. The Robot waits for participant’s responses after each line of dialogue, 
and at the end of the third statement it moves to the next topic. However, if the participant does 
not respond after the robot delivers its second line of dialogue, then the robot moves to the next 
topic. 
Meet and greet 
In the misattributed interaction, the robot starts misattributing previously collected information 
such as names, address. In this stage, the robot misattributes information such as the 
participant’s name, address and previous state of wellbeing. Figure 4.12 outlines this stage.   
Examples of dialogue Misattribution 
components used 
Actions 
1 ‘Hello Dave. It is nice to see you 
again.’ 
Forgetfulness Wait for response 
2 
 
‘I remember that last time you 
said your name is Dave.’ 
False memory Wait for response 
3 
 
‘It must be someone else who 
looks like 
you.’ 
Source of confusion End of topic ‘name’, on to 
the next topic 
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Figure 4.12: Meet and greet stage for misattribution interactions 
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Topic-based conversation 
In the misattribution interaction, the robot continues misattributing information following the 
misattribution algorithm. The robot starts the conversation by enquiring about previous topics 
and misattributes the participant’s information; for example, ‘Last time you said you love 
Beethoven, am I correct?’, but the participant did not say that he or she loved Beethoven in the 
first place. In this case, the robot expresses sad emotions for incorrectly remembering 
information. Figure 4.13 shows the outline of this stage for the misattribution algorithm.  
 
Figure 4.13: Topic-based conversation stage for misattribution algorithm 
 
Farewell 
At this stage of the misattribution interaction, the robot thanks the participants for coming and 
chatting. The robot also requests that participants to fill out the questionnaires, similar to the 
introductory and non-misattributed interactions. Between each of the dialogues the robot waits 
for responses from the participant. Figure 4.14 shows the outline of the farewell stage of the 
misattribution interaction.  
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Figure 4.14: Farewell stage for misattribution algorithm 
 
4.2.3.3 Developing the empathy gap algorithm 
The empathy gap opens when someone is unable to understand another’s emotional state. In 
the experiments, I followed the principle of the empathy gap bias to develop a game-playing 
and a conversational algorithm for the robots. The game-playing algorithm was created for 
non-conversational interaction between the robot MyKeepon and participants, and the 
conversational algorithm was developed for the robot MARC.  
As the interactions in my experiments lasted 10–12 minutes, at the beginning it was 
challenging to show the such differences in the emotional states of the robots. After several test 
interactions between the robot and my colleagues and after discussing the matter with my 
supervisor, I developed the algorithms based on two types of robot behaviours: showing excess 
happiness (i.e. hot-sate of empathy) and excess sadness (cold-state of empathy). The 
behaviours shown by the robots in the experiments to express such exaggerated expressions 
are particular to the robots. For example, in the game-playing interaction with MyKeepon, the 
robot shows hot and cold states of empathy gaps as recorded in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Empathy gap algorithm for the MyKeepon interactions experiment 
 
 
 
 
MyKeepon 
 Actions Noises 
Hot state of 
empathy 
Maximum responses by 
frequently jumping, dancing, 
body moves, gazing 
Happy noises, even if the 
participant is quiet  
Cold state of 
empathy 
Minimum responses by less 
jumps, not dancing, less body 
movement and not making 
eye contact or by looking to 
the sides and sometimes being 
totally unresponsive 
Sad noises, very quiet 
 
Similarly, the conversational algorithm was designed based on hot states and cold states 
of empathy gaps. In these cases, the robot makes differences of emotional understanding with 
participant by expressing overly joyous or overly sad behaviours, with related dialogue. In the 
hot state interaction, the robot responds more actively than in the cold state. Lines of dialogue 
were also created to express the two components of the bias (see Table 4.5).   
Table 4.5: Empathy gap algorithm for MARC interactions experiment 
 
 
MARC 
 Actions Dialogue 
Hot state of 
empathy 
Faster responses, and happy 
and much friendlier 
approaches 
‘Hello! It is great to see you 
again. I am very happy that 
you have come to chat with 
me.’ 
Cold state of 
empathy 
Minimum responses and 
slower movements, sometime 
no movement at all  
‘Hi.’ 
 
The conversational structure follows the overall biased algorithm’s conversation, as 
shown in Figure 4.10, where the participants had the option to reply to the robot’s statement, 
and the robot could respond to that as well.  
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In the experiments, for the ‘hot’ state of the empathy, MARC starts to show great 
excitement from the beginning of interaction, when the participant enters in the room, and it 
responds to participants cheerfully. In the cold state, the robot itself exhibits sadness and does 
not talk much. In the experiment, such stages were randomly chosen for the participants. 
Hot state of empathy gap 
In the ‘hot’ state of the empathy gap, MARC remains happy at all times, and its responses are 
very cheerful, regardless of the participant’s responses. If the participant asks the reason for 
this happiness, the robot doesn’t specify any reason, which indicates that the robot does not 
care about what participant says, and it is busy to expressing its own emotions. Taking the 
baseline interaction as an outline, the differences among the stages of the hot state of empathy 
gap bias behaviour are shown in the Figure 4.15. 
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Figure 4.15. Differences in stages in empathy gap algorithm compared to baseline 
 
Cold state of empathy gap 
In the cold state of the empathy gap, MARC interacts with the opposite behaviours to exhibited 
in the hot state interaction. Throughout the interaction, it stays quiet, giving brief answers and 
remaining unwilling to talk much or express the differences in emotion to the participant.  
Based on the non-biased interactions, the differences with the cold state of empathy gap 
bias are shown in the Figure 4.16.  
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The robot here just initiates the conversation and usually waits for the participants to 
respond, and then continues. If the participant says nothing, the robot moves to a later line of 
dialogue. Although the interaction structure is similar to other interactions, which means the 
robot talks about all topics, but it does not offer much in the way of response.  
 
Figure 4.16. Differences of ‘cold’ state of empathy gap compared to baseline 
 
4.2.3.4 Development of lack of knowledge (ideocracy effects) algorithm 
As discussed earlier, the lack of knowledge (i.e. ideocracy) effect was developed based on the 
three main components of the Dunning-Kruger effect bias: the robot fails to recognise its own 
lack of knowledge, fails to recognise genuine skill or knowledge in others, and recognises and 
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acknowledges its own lack of skill after being exposed. Such components were developed 
individually in each of the interactions, as shown in the Figure 4.15.  
 
Figure 4.17. Three interactions of lack of knowledge or ideocracy algorithms 
 
In these interactions, the dialogue structure is the same as the others biased dialogue 
(Figure 4.10), where the robot gets to respond after the participant’s answers. In the interactions 
based on lack of knowledge or ideocracy behaviours, the robot always tries to convince the 
participants that whatever it says is correct and the participant is wrong. If the participant does 
not argue with the robot, then it moves to the next line of dialogue. An example of the dialogue 
in this interaction is shown in the Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6: Example of dialogue from the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects interaction 
 
Examples of dialogue Lack of knowledge/ideocracy 
(based on Dunning-Kruger 
effects) components used 
Actions 
1 ‘What type of music is your 
favourite?’ 
 Waits for response 
1 ‘Oh yes! I have listen to them. They 
are rock band from 60s.’ 
Unable to understand other’s 
true knowledge 
Wait for response 
2 
 
‘No, you are wrong. They are 
actually from 40s as I remember.’ 
Unable to understand own lack 
of knowledge 
Wait for response and 
participant reply, then move to 
the 3rd 
3. ‘Okay. May be I am wrong.’  Move to the next topic 
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Figure 4.18: The topic-based conversation stage of the Lack of knowledge/ideocracy effects biased 
interaction 
 
The robot asks a question, waits for a response, and whatever response participants gives, the 
robot states an incorrect opinion and begins arguing with participants. After few arguments, 
the robot gives up and acknowledges its mistakes.  
Meet and greet 
Similar to the other algorithm’s meet-and-greet stage, in this stage robot greets the participant 
and asks about the participant’s name and wellbeing. This is the initial stage where robot and 
participant get acquainted. The robot initiates the biased effects in the next stage of the 
interaction.  
Topic-based conversation 
In this stage, the participant and MARC discuss various topics. The robot idiotically states 
wrong information about the topic, and furthermore tries to convince the participant that its 
information is correct. In this case, the robot does not necessarily correct the participant, but it 
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says that the participant is wrong. If the participant tries to correct the robot, the robot first 
denies its mistake, but in the end understands it. 
For every topic the robot states its own choice and idiotically claims it is the best. 
Farewell 
In the final stage of the interaction, the robot understands its mistakes and acknowledges them 
to the participant. The robot even apologies, if necessary. An outline of the farewell stage of 
the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects biased interaction is shown in the Figure 4.19. The 
interaction ends with a request from robot to the participant to fill out the questionnaire and an 
invitation for the next interaction.  
 
Figure 4.19. The third interaction of in the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effect algorithm, compared to 
the baseline 
 
4.2.3.5 Development of self-serving bias algorithm 
As discussed in the previous chapter, self-serving bias causes people to attribute 
positive events to themselves but negative events to other external factors. In this experiment, 
the key differences between the self-serving algorithm and other algorithms is that the robot 
credits itself for winning a round of the game against the participants but blames other factors 
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for losing. In this case, such supposed external causes include that the robot was not ready, the 
robot was not looking at the game play or something got into the robot’s eyes. If the participant 
does not agree with the robot, it tries to convince the participant to play again. In such cases, 
the robot sometimes blames the participants for cheating in games.  
As this bias was tested in game-playing interaction, the interaction was divided into 
five stages. In the meet-and-greet stage, the robot welcomes the participant, asks about the 
participant’s wellbeing and explains the meaning of its name.  
Meet and greet 
In this stage, the robot meets the participant, enquires about the participant’s name and 
wellbeing, and explains its own name, as usual. No biased effect occurs in this stage.  
 
Figure: 4.20. Structural diagram of the meet and greet stage 
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The robot takes the initiative in the communication, so that the participant can be comfortable 
for the rest of the interaction. Based on the interaction number, the conversation proceeds to 
the next stage, where the robot explains the game’s rules.  
Rules explanation 
In case of self-serving bias, the robot explains the rule, but if the participant asks the robot to 
repeat the rules, it then triggers its biased algorithm, which results in repeating the rules in such 
way that encourages the participant to think the robot is claiming to be more intelligent than 
the participant (Figure 4.21). In this case, the steps are as follows: 
a. Tell the name of the game and ask participant if he or she is familiar with it.  
b. Explain the rules, and ask if the participant understands the rules. 
c. If the participants id not understand the first time, repeat the rules.  
I. Asks the participant why he or she did not understand the first time (stating 
that it was loud and clear enough). 
II. States that it can repeat the statement endless times and in endless ways, 
whatever the participant prefers.   
 
Figure 4.21. Structural diagram of the rule-explanation stage for biased algorithms 
Game playing 
In this stage, the robot responds differently for different outcomes in games. The outline of this 
stage is shown in Figure 4.22.  
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Robot wins 
For the self-serving bias, if the robot wins a hand, it expresses its joy in such a way that it won 
the hand due to its own skills, so that it knew that the participant was going to play that 
particular option, and it is not a matter of chance, but the robot solved it through its own 
intelligence. As it is a friendly robot, it gives few tips to the participant for winning the next 
hand. Giving the tips and related actions expresses its over-confidence and self-serving 
intelligence, and as such, it acts as if it is going to win all the remaining hands against 
participants.  
 
Figure 4.22. Structural diagram of the game-playing stage 
 
In this case, the steps are as follows: 
i. Ask participant if he or she is ready to play. 
ii. Draw a hand. 
iii. Get excited about winning.  
a. Brags about winning. 
b. Gives tips for winning to the participant. 
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iv. Request participant play more. 
Robot loses 
For the self-serving bias, the robot does not easily accept losing the games. It tries to find 
reasons to blame the other for losing, such as the surroundings and even the participant. Rather 
than simply admitting the fact it lost the round, the robot makes excuses and lays false blame:, 
‘I was not ready’ or ‘You must have cheated’. As it is a friendly robot, such arguments are 
limited and mostly end up with a challenge to win the next hand. Such interaction steps confirm 
that despite the robot being the victim of self-serving bias, it still wants to keep playing with 
the participant. For this biased interaction, the steps are as follows: 
i. Ask participant if he or she is ready. 
ii. Draw a hand.  
iii. Show sad expressions after losing.  
a. Give excuses. 
b. Blame various factors.  
c. Ultimately blame the participant. 
iv. Challenge the participant to play more. 
v. If losing continuously, give up the game by blaming others and showing various 
excuses 
Draws  
The robot tries to deny draws as well, asking the participant to play again. An outline of the 
game-playing structure is shown in Figure 4.23. 
Final results 
The self-serving robot expresses its over-confidence in winning and blames others for losing, 
and does not accept its defeat. In this case, the modified steps would be as follows: 
i. Calculate the results. 
ii. Congratulate participant if they won. 
a. States that it let the participant win, or 
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b. blames others, give excuses, or 
c. ultimately, blames participant for cheating. 
d. Challenge for the next time 
iii. Congratulates itself if the robot won. 
a. States its over confidence and superiority.  
b. Challenges for next time. 
. 
 
Figure 4.23. Outline of the game playing stage with outcomes for the self-serving algorithm 
 
Farewell 
The self-serving biased robot thanks participants for coming and invites them for future 
interactions, if the robot wins the games. In case the robot lost the game, it poses a friendly 
challenge for the next game. In both cases however, it thanks the participants for playing the 
game. In this case, the steps would be as follows: 
i. Thank participant for coming. 
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a. State that playing was a nice experience (if robot wins the game). 
b. State that playing was not a very good experience (if it loses the game). 
ii. Shake hands. 
iii. Invite participant for another interaction. 
a. Happily invites participant for this interaction (if won). 
b. Challenge participant to play again in another interaction (if loses). 
 The Figure 4.24 outlines the entire self-serving-bias interaction, step by step. 
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Figure 4.24. Outline diagram of all stages in self-serving biased algorithm 
4.2.3.6 Development of humour effect bias algorithm 
In the case of the humour effect, the robot’s main goal is to humorously interact with 
participants, so that the memory of the interactions remains with the participants for a long 
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period of time. There are, however, several types of humour, and understanding of humour can 
depend on an individual’s perception. In our case, the robot delivered subjective jokes on losing 
and winning games. Some of the dialogue was taken from online funny speech bots (e.g. 
A.L.I.C.E (Shawar B A, Atwell E, 2015); Elbot, n.d.).  
Meet and greet 
The first stage of the interaction is similar, with all biased and baseline algorithms. In case of 
humour effect bias, the robot follows actions similar to those of previous interactions. For the 
first interaction, the robot asks for the name and wellbeing of the participant, but in the 
following interactions, the robot skips the name-asking part. Figure 4.25 shows a structural 
diagram of the meet-and-greet stage. 
 
Figure 4.25. Structural diagram of the meet-and-greet stage 
Game explanations 
Game explanations to the participants can be done in three steps:  
a. Tell the name of the game and ask whether the participant is familiar with it.  
b. Explain the rules and ask whether the participant has understood the rules.  
c. If the participants did not understand the first time, repeat the rules.   
 101 
 
In case of the humour effect, the robot completes the first step according to the baseline 
interaction, but for the second step, it adds funny elements in speech processing, so that the 
participant can remember the rules. If it needs to go for the third step, it repeats the rule, but 
adds more funny elements. Figure 4.26 shows an outline diagram of the rule explanation stage.  
 
Figure 4.26. Structural diagram of the rule explanation stage 
Game playing 
The outline of this stage is shown in Figure 4.27. As with the other two game-playing 
algorithms, in this case the robot could win, lose and or draw in each round.  
 
Figure 4.27. Structural diagram of game-playing stage in the humour effects algorithm. 
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Robot wins a hand 
There are four steps in this phase: 
i. Ask participant if he or she is ready. 
ii. Draw a hand.  
iii. Express excitement about winning and make a joke. 
iv. Request that participant to play more. 
In this scenario, winning is fun for the robot, and it expresses its joy in a friendly way. 
It also gives encouragement to the participant for the next hand. If the participant continuously 
loses, however, and does not want to play anymore, the robot tells funny stories of 
encouragement so that the participant keeps playing. 
In this case, the steps are as follows: 
i. Ask the participant whether he or she is ready to play. 
ii. Draw a hand. 
iii. Express happiness about winning.  
a. Gives tips for winning to the participant in funny ways. 
iv. Requests that the participant play more. 
Robot loses a game hand 
The steps for this phase are supposed to be as before: 
i. Ask a participant whether he or she is ready. 
ii. Draw a hand.  
iii. Show sadness and state a joke.  
iv. Ask the participant to play more. 
For the humour effect, losing is not very bad for the robot, and it expresses its defeat in 
a friendly way. The robot is trying to make the participants remember various moments of the 
interaction with the help of humour, so its winning or losing does not matter in this interaction. 
Also, it keeps encouraging the participant to play the next hand, but if the participant 
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continuously wins and does not want to play anymore, the robot tells funny stories of 
encouragement so that the participant keeps playing. For the humour effect bias, the steps are 
as follows: 
i. Ask participant whether he or she is ready. 
ii. Draw a hand.  
iii. Do not show sadness for losing, but  
a. States that it is happy that the participant won. 
b. States its determination to win the next hand. 
iv. Ask participant to play more. 
v. If losing continues, state its happiness about participant’s wins, and  
vi. keep expressing determination to the win next hand (keep playing). 
If the robot and participant end up in a draw, then the robot tries to motivate the 
participant to play. In all the cases, the robot’s responses are laced with humour.  
Conclusion of the game 
The games can conclude with the robot determining the overall winner. In this case, despite 
the result, the robot would try to continue its friendship with the participant. In this stage, the 
steps are as follows: 
i. Calculate the results. 
ii. Congratulate participants if they won, or 
iii. congratulate itself if it won. 
An outline with the three outcomes in the game-playing stage is shown in the Figure 
4.28. 
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Figure 4.28. Structural diagram of the game playing stage with three outcomes in the humour effect 
algorithm 
The humorous robot makes fun of both winning and losing, but greets and encourages 
participants for their winning and losing. In this case, the steps are as follows: 
i. Calculate the results. 
ii. Congratulate participants if they won. 
a. Say it let them win (in a funny way). 
b. Make joke of it. 
c. Claim to give the participant more of a challenge next time. 
iii. Congratulate itself if the robot won. 
a. Make joke of it. 
b. Say that the participant let it win.  
c. Ask the participant to play again in another interaction. 
In practice, the situation could go in any direction, but the robot is prepared for each 
possible moment with its humour. 
End of the interactions 
The end of the interaction is usually performed by the robot ending the dialogue, shaking hands 
and offering an invitation to subsequent experiments. In this case, the steps are as follows: 
i. Thank participant for coming. 
ii. Shake hands. 
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iii. Invite the participant for another interaction. 
The humorous robot thanks the participants for coming and for playing, and it invites 
them for another interactions in a humorous way. It also promises the participants to say more 
funny things next time. The steps are the same as the baseline steps, only with the addition of 
funny speech.  
The humour effect biased interaction is straightforward and similar to the baseline 
interaction, but with humour added to the conversation. The goal is discover whether the 
participant likes and prefers such friendly and humorous interaction with a robot.  
The diagram of the humour effects algorithm is shown in Figure 4.29.  
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Figure 4.29. Structural diagram of all stages of humours effects algorithm. 
 
4.2.3.7 Baseline algorithms 
All the biased interactions were compared against a neutral interaction developed without the 
effects of the selected biases in the consecutive experiments. For example, to compare 
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misattribution bias, a baseline algorithm was created by which the robot does not forget, and 
to compare empathy gap bias another baseline was created by which the robot shows 
appropriate expressions. Such baseline algorithms were developed for each experiment, 
followed by similar patterns of conversational and game-playing interactions.  
Table 4.7: Examples of the non-misattribution dialogues 
Examples of dialogues Changes 
1 ‘Hello **. It is nice to see you again.’ ** states the name correctly 
2 
 
‘I correctly remember your name.’  
3 
 
 
No need of the 3rd dialogue on name; robot 
moves to the 2nd topic 
 
Table 4.7 demonstrates that the robot states the name correctly in the 1st dialogue. If 
the robot states the name correctly, then there is no need for the second or third dialogue on the 
‘name’ topic, so the robot moves to the next topic. Below I show the baselines for each 
category. 
Conversational baseline algorithm 
As stated earlier, a single interaction has three stages, which are meet and greet, topic-based 
conversation and farewell. Below, I discuss each of the stages of the non-misattribution 
algorithm.  
Meet and greet 
In the baseline (i.e. non-biased) interaction, the robot states all information (e.g. name, address) 
correctly from the collected information from the first introductory interaction. Figure 4.30 
shows the outline of this stage.  
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Figure 4.30: Meet and greet stage for non-biased interactions 
Topic-based conversation 
In the non-biased topic-based conversation, the robot states all information (e.g. information 
about music choice, food choices, etc.) in a very straight forward manner. The dialogue design 
is based on Figure 4.9 where the robot ends the topic by stating ‘Okay’ or ‘I understand’, and 
moves on to the next topic.  
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Figure 4.31: Topic-based conversation algorithm outline for the non-misattribution interaction. 
Farewell 
In this stage, the robot thanks the participant for joining in the conversation extends an 
invitation to the next interaction. Figure 4.32 shows the outline of the farewell stage for the 
non-biased interaction. At the end of the interaction, all participants were asked to answer a set 
of questionnaires.  
The conversational baseline (i.e. non-biased) interactions were made to be 
straightforward and mostly question-answer structured. The dialogue was developed carefully 
so that the corresponding bias would not be in effect. Such lines of dialogue were made by 
carrying out several mock interactions between colleagues, friends, students and the robot, and 
they were finalised by consulting with my supervisors so that the dialogues would be fit for the 
interactions.  
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Figure 4.32: Interaction outline for the farewell stage of the non-misattribution interaction. 
Game-playing baseline algorithm 
The structural similarities between conversational and game-playing baseline algorithms were 
in the design of the dialogue, based on Figure 4.9. In both cases, the robot usually ends the 
current topic by answering ‘Okay’, ‘I understand’, ‘That’s good’ or something similar, and 
starts the next topic. In the game-playing baseline algorithms, there were five stages, including 
rule explanation and game playing, which were carefully designed so that the corresponding 
biases could not affect the baseline interactions. Similar to the other dialogue design, game-
playing baseline dialogue was also designed vis a vis several mock interactions between 
colleagues, friends, students and the robot, and was finalised by consulting with my supervisors 
so that the dialogue would be fit for the interactions.  
The meet and greet stage was similar to the previous conversational experiment. In the 
rule-explanation stage, the robot first explains the game’s rules (Figure 4.33), then asks the 
participant he or she has understood; if so, the robot proceeds to the game, and otherwise it 
repeats the rules. 
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Figure 4.33. General structural diagram of game-rules explanation stage. 
In the game playing, the robot maintains same conversational structure (Figure 4.34). 
The robot acts differently for each of the three possible outcomes of the game (Figure 4.34). 
As seen in Figure 4.34, the robot and participant both draw a game hand, and if the 
robot wins, it says that it won; if the robot loses, it says that it lost and then asks the participant 
if he or she wants to play more. If the participant wants to continue, the robot starts the game 
again; otherwise, it proceeds to calculate the final results. The dialogue was made without the 
effects of the selected biases in this baseline interaction, despite the outcomes of the game. For 
example, the diagram below (Figure 4.35) describes MARC’s dialogue in the different 
outcomes.  
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Figure 4.34. General structural diagram for game-playing stage. 
 
Figure 4.35. The structural diagram of game-playing with different outcomes. 
 
The game ends with the robot saying who won the most rounds played. In the baseline 
interaction, the robot simply calculates who won the most and says it. As it is the Wizard of 
Oz experiment and as the examiner, I controlled the robot and the experiment, therefore it was 
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easy to calculate the winner, and it was possible not to draw all hands. In this brief stage, the 
robot declares the winner and proceeds to the farewell.  
At the end of the interaction, the robot thanks the participant for coming and playing 
games. It invites the participant for the next interaction as well.  
 
4.2.4 Participants and grouping   
Participants were recruited several times for the experiments. As the dialogues and actions for 
each algorithm are one of the most important parts of this experiment, I needed some 
participants to test and run the mock interactions, where it could be possible to test the initial 
dialogue and actions of the robot for appropriately biased and non-biased interactions and to 
finalise the experiments. For such mock experiments, mainly graduate students, colleagues, 
and friends from different working backgrounds were selected, and the final version of the 
dialogues and actions were set after running such mock interactions and consulting with my 
supervisor. For this mock interactions samples were called using contacts, mails and phones.   
In all of the main experiments, participants were invited by advertisement and selected 
at a 50:50 ratio of men to women. As the goal of the experiments was to determine the 
preferences of the general population, the race, ethnicity, age ranges and backgrounds of 
participants were kept as heterogeneous as possible.  
The interaction language was English, so it was necessary to make sure that all 
participants understood spoken English. However, one experiment did not require any verbal 
engagement (i.e. the MyKeepon experiment, Section 5.2), but the feedback form was designed 
in English.  
Most of the experiments required multiple engagements between the robot and 
participants, followed by one to two weeks of time between. Therefore, participant availability 
for the specific dates and times were required. In some cases, a few of the participants had to 
be removed from the results due to their unavailability for all interactions.  
To test the different biases and compare the results between biased and non-biased 
interactions, I had to divide the participants into several groups. This grouping was done after 
the participants filled in the consent forms. After ascertaining the participant’s gender, age and 
race, I assigned them to different groups, maintaining similar ratios of gender, age and race. In 
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most cases, the data were not analysed based on gender, ages and race; rather the data that was 
analysed in comparison to the overall trends among participants, so that a clear view of all 
participants could be secured. The grouping of the participants was based on the methodology 
of that particular experiment and, the details of the grouping in each case are described in the 
following experiment sections, in the next chapter.  
Awareness of the participants 
At the beginning of the experiments, the information given to the participants was limited to a 
description of the process of the experiment. An introduction was given in which I discussed 
the tasks to be performed between the participants and robot (i.e. conversational and game 
playing interactions). I also discussed how many times the participants needed to interact with 
the robot and the data collection procedure, which was that the paper questionnaire would be 
supplied after the experiments. I discussed the game rules and how to play, but any information 
such as the developed biases or how the robot would behave in the experiments was not 
discussed, as those idea could affect the judgement of the participants.  
 
4.2.5 Metrics and data collection 
The current hypothesis refers to a comparison between two interactions – one interaction with 
the robot which shows the behaviours based on selected cognitive biases and participants, and 
the other one is the robot without such biased behaviours with the same participants. Therefore, 
two sets of behaviours were developed in the robot: biased behaviours based on selected 
cognitive bias and non-biased behaviours. The hypothesis also indicates a comparison of the 
participants’ fondness towards these two interactions to determine which one the participant 
liked the most. As per the hypothesis, it was necessary to compare the biased and non-biased 
robot-participant interactions. Therefore, comparing between two sets of responses from 
participants after the interactions with robots is reasonable, so that the effects of the biases can 
be distinguished and the differences in participants’ responses are assuredly the results of the 
changes in the robot’s behaviours due to the presence and absence of the cognitive biases.  
Consequently, to measure the responses of the participants, I considered four 
conditions, which are as follows:  
o How much the participants liked the interaction with the robot; 
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o Whether the participants were comfortable during the biased and non-biased 
interactions; 
o Whether the participants were pleased by interacting with the robot; and 
o The developed rapport between each participant and the robot.  
To measure these four conditions, I chose four metrics, namely likeability, comfort, 
pleasure and rapport:  
Likeability. This category was to measure the likeability of the overall interactions for the 
participants, determining to what degree the participants liked the overall interaction and how 
much they liked it. In similar studies, researchers have used categories such as ‘likeability’ as 
a common variable in experiments to find out participant’s fondness of interactions (e.g. Kim 
& Mutlu, 2014).  
Comfort. This category was to measure the feeling of relaxation among the participants when 
they were interacting with the robot. In our experiments, participants interacted with different 
algorithms, by which the robot could brag, lie, call the participant a cheater, forget things and 
exhibit many biased behaviours. Such behaviours are common in humans, but could come as 
surprise in robots. Therefore, I wanted to find out how comfortable participants felt 
experiencing such biased and imperfect behaviours in robots during the interactions.  
Pleasure. This category was to measure the enjoyment or happiness—in other words, the 
overall satisfaction—the participant felt in the interactions with the robot. The interactions were 
based on cognitive biases which caused the robot showed various imperfect behaviours, usually 
uncommon in human–robot interactions; therefore, it is important to know whether the 
participants were pleased or satisfied in experiencing such behaviours from the robots during 
their interactions. Therefore, I wanted to find out whether the participants were pleased or 
displeased by experiencing the selected biased and imperfect behaviours from the robot (e.g. 
idiocy or forgetfulness).   
Rapport. This category was supposed to measure the level of understanding between the two 
parties (i.e. participant and robot) and their ability to communicate well with to another. It was 
chosen to find out how close participants felt to the robot, how easily participants thought they 
could understood the responses from the robot, and whether they saw the interaction as 
meaningful. It is important to understand the level of such mutual closeness between the robot 
and participants, as the robot in the experiments showed biased and imperfect behaviours 
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common in people but uncommon in the social robots. Therefore, I chose this ‘rapport’ variable 
to measure such closeness between the robot and participants and to find out whether 
participants built such rapport with the robot in the interactions after seeing such human-like 
biased and imperfect behaviours from the robot.   
Each of these categories was analysed to measure one or both conditions of the 
experiments: 
1. the participant’s overall preferences to interact with the robot with the biased or 
non-biased algorithm, and  
2. changes in the participant’s preferences over a period of time.  
For each metric, a set of Likert-style questions were asked to the participants after the 
interactions so that participants could rate their experiences. The questions were crafted based 
on similar human-robot interaction experiments in which researchers used similar metrics for 
their experiments, so that the questionnaire for the current experiments was already validated 
for such metrics. In my earlier experiments, the questionnaires were created to measure how 
much participants enjoyed the interactions with biased and non-biased versions of the robots 
(i.e. to assess the likeability metric); as the experiments went further and I tested new biases 
with different methods, I needed more complex measures to get accurate analysis. The different 
measurements of the specific experiments are discussed in the corresponding experiments 
sections. 
I mentioned that data collection was carried out using different point Likert scale 
questionnaires. There are different scales used in the human-robot interactions studies. Nomura 
and Kanda (2003) developed and used a scale called Negative Attitudes towards Robots Scale 
(NARS) which measures negative attitudes towards robot based on Likert style questions. An 
overview of existing scales used in human-robot interactions studies was carried out by 
Bartneck et al (2009) which describes the scales, their acceptability and reliability. In the 
current study, different scales were used based on the type of biases chosen to develop and the 
robot used in experiments.  
Justification of using different point Likert scale 
As I mentioned in the first experiment that a cognitive bias called misattribution was used in 
robot for the first time and it was needed to investigate the participant’s responds thoroughly. 
Therefore a 10-scale response option was given to the participants so that they can express their 
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responses in detailed manner, and more measurement precision can be possible. A 10-scale 
response can provide better opportunity detect changes and more power to explain the point of 
view of the participants (Wittink DR & Bayer LR, 2003). In this experiment I used 10-scale 
Likert questions (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.927) to get participants feedbacks.  
For the experiment to investigate the effects of empathy gap bias developed in 
MyKeepon robot I used a 5-scale Likert questionnaire. Based on the literature a five-point scale 
appears to be less confusing and to increase response rate (Babakus and Mangold, 1992; Devlin 
et al., 1993; Hayes, 1992). Also, MyKeepon had limited movements abilities to express the 
differences between two set of behaviors, therefore I offered participants more specific choices 
to response using this 5-point Likert scale questionnaire (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.930).  
For investigating the effects of misattribution, empathy gap, ideocracy and lack of 
knowledge effects (influenced by Dunning-Kruger effect), self-serving and humors effects 
cognitive biases developed in the MARC robot I used seven-point scale Likert questionnaire. 
Studies suggested that seven-point scale might improve reliability and validity for the items 
(Churchill and Peter, 1984) and the response rate (Malhotra, 1993). Also, for these 
experiments, I used humanoid MARC robot which expressed different behaviors clearly by 
using speech and movements and so I didn’t need to limit participant’s response choices or to 
offer them excessive choices, and therefore a seven-point Likert scale questionnaire 
(Cronbach’s Alpha 0.996 and 0.993) was a perfect these experiments.  
The questions for these four factors were created based on various sources, for example, 
to understand the participant’s fondness or likability of the experiment, eight questions were 
selected from Hone and Graham (2000); the ‘comfort’ questions were drawn from Hassenzahl 
(2003); and the ‘rapport’ questions taken from Mutlu et al. (2012). Some of the questions were 
formulated based on the preliminary findings and methods of my experiments. All the 
questionnaires appear in the appendix B, page 244.  
Justification of using statistical methods 
In the first and second experiments, the same participants were interacting with two versions 
of the robots (i.e., biased and non-biased); I therefore needed to compare the means of two 
different samples coming from same groups participants interacting with two different versions 
of the robots. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether there is statistical evidence 
that the mean difference between paired observations on such interactions is significantly 
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different from zero, and thus the paired sample t-test was used to analyse the data collected 
from the first and the second experiments.  
For the third and fourth experiments, the means were calculated using SPSS and 
followed different procedures for the two groups: a one-way repeated measure ANOVA to 
analyse the first group’s data and a mixed ANOVA to analyse the second group’s data. In all 
measurements, the p value was <0.05 (i.e., a very small probability of this result occurring by 
chance). The Cronbach's alpha is 0.916, which indicates a high level of internal consistency for 
our scale. 
I chose the one-way repeated measures ANOVA for the first group (i.e., all participants 
interacted with all versions of the robot for three times) because it is an extension of the paired-
samples t-test and is used to determine whether there are any statistically significant differences 
between the means of three or more levels of a within-subject’s factors (i.e., independent 
variables). For the first group, participants interacted with all biased and non-bias conditions; 
that is, they were exposed to all conditions of the experiment, with each condition presented an 
equal number of times for the participants; a repeated measure ANOVA is therefore justified.  
I chose the mixed ANOVA for the second group (i.e., a group of participants interacted 
with only one version of the robot for three times) because it compares the mean differences 
between groups over two or more times, and all subjects have undergone two or more 
conditions, but the subjects were also assigned to two or more separate groups (i.e., individual 
algorithm interactions). 
 
4.2.6 Room setup 
All interactions were setup in a room which was approximately 16 m × 18 m.  
The diagram of the room (Figure 4.36) shows the setup for the interactions. 
a. Tables with pre-experiment and post-experiment questionnaires. 
b. The place where participants sit in front of the robot for the interaction. 
c. Place for someone to control the robot. 
The participant enters into the room through the door (indicated by an arrow). At first, 
the participant sits at Table 1 and are given the participant information form and consent form 
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to sign. The participant then goes to section ‘b’ and sits in front of the robot. The wizard (i.e. 
myself) starts controlling the robot from section ‘c’ and continues throughout the interaction. 
After the interaction, the participant is requested to go back to section ‘a’ and answer the final 
set of questionnaires. After completing the questionnaires, the participant leaves the room 
through the door.  
 
Figure 4.36. The experiment room setup 
 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter describes the important part of the study, where I planned and prepared for 
experiments using cognitive biases in social robots. The main outcomes and procedures are 
summarized as follows: 
a. Stages: 
i. conversational, 3 stages, 
ii. game playing, 5 stages; 
b. Dialogue design: 
i.  baseline dialogue, robot ends with ‘Okay’, ’I understand’, ’That’s great’ 
etc., 
ii. biased dialogues, robot continues with selected biased effects;  
c. Participants: 
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i. mock experiment—graduate students, friends and colleagues, 
ii. main experiment—mixed in gender, race and age;  
d. Measurement: 
i. participant’s overall preferences towards the various algorithms, in 
terms of 
1. likeability 
2. pleasure 
3. comfort, and 
4. rapport with the robot; and 
e. Room: 
i. a room with 3 partitions, 
ii. tables with pre-experiment and post-experiment questionnaires, 
iii. the place where participant sits in front of the robot for the interaction, 
and 
iv. the place for the wizard to control the robot. 
I expect that the reader can follow and understand my experiments, how I prepared the robots 
and developed five biases on robots, and how participants were selected. 
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Chapter 5: 
Analysis of the Experiments and Results 
5.1 Conversational interactions with ERWIN based on the 
misattribution bias  
5.1.1 Hypothesis and experiment goals 
The aim of this experiment was to uncover how the misattribution bias developed in the robot 
ERWIN affects human–robot interactions. A local hypothesis for this experiment was created 
based on the main hypothesis:  
If the misattribution bias is applied in social-robot interaction, then a participant’s 
preference towards the robot will increase due to the human-like behaviours the robot 
exhibits as a result. 
To determine the effects of misattribution bias, participants interacted with the robot 
with misattribution bias and scored its ‘likeability’ (μ1) and they interacted with the robot 
without misattribution bias and scored its ‘likeability’ (μ2).  
The null hypothesis is that the mean score of the participant’s responses in (μ1) is the 
same as the participant’s responses in (μ2): 
i.e. Hypothesis 0: μ1 = μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 0 = null hypothesis 
(μ1) = the means of the participant’s responses from biased robot interactions 
(μ2) = the means of the participant’s responses from non-biased robot interactions 
The alternate hypothesis is 
Hypothesis 2: μ1 > μ2 
where, 
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Hypothesis 2 = participant’s ‘likeability’ scores are greater in biased robot interactions. 
 
5.1.2 Experiment methodology 
As discussed earlier (chapter 3.5.1), misattribution is a memory bias which supposed to show 
that the robot forgot and misattributed information previously collected from users. Therefore, 
in this experiment, participants interacted with the robot ERWIN several times. As can be seen 
in Figure 5.1, in the first interaction, the robot collected information through the introductory 
conversation, and in the second interaction robot forgot and misattributed the collected 
information. In the non-misattributed interaction, the robot interacts with the participant 
without forgetting any previously collected information so that the biased and non-biased 
interactions can be compared. 
This was the first experiment in which I developed the misattribution-bias algorithm in 
ERWIN, and it was tested with 30 participants. Each of the participants had three interactions 
with the robot, followed by at least a week of time between the two interactions. Participants 
were given a set of ERWIN’s expression pictures at the beginning of the introductory 
interactions, which corresponded with the names of various emotions (see the appendix). 
Participants were asked to choose the correct emotion names from the list. At that point, 
participants had never seen ERWIN before, so such recognition could tell us about their skills 
in recognising ERWIN’s emotions in the interactions.  
The first interaction was common for all participants, however, after this first 
interaction, two differing interactions for each of the participants was given; one used the 
misattribution algorithm, and the other used the non-misattributed algorithm. In general, half 
of the participants went through the misattributed algorithm as their second interaction, and the 
other half went through the non-misattributed as their second interaction. The reason for this 
distribution was to make the comparison fair between biased and non-biased interactions by 
not determining any particular order for the interactions. 
The three interactions were done by maintaining a time interval of at least two weeks 
to allow long-term affectivity in the participants. Figure 5.1 shows three interactions for a 
participant.  
The first introductory experiment was to allow participants to familiarise themselves 
with the experimental environment and robot. The experiment was carried out in three steps: 
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The first step was identification, and the participants were asked to identify the different facial 
expressions of ERWIN from pictures to see whether they could disambiguate the different 
expressions without meeting with the robot; the second step was the conversational session 
with ERWIN, where the robot started friendly conversation, greeting the participant, asking 
various questions and asking some general questions on various subjects such as hobbies, 
favourite colours, sports and others. The conversation’s purpose was to allow the collection of 
basic information on the participants that would be used in the second and third experiments 
for ERWIN to misattribute. This initial conversation ended with a request from ERWIN to 
evaluate its performance. The participants were given a brief questionnaire on their experience 
with ERWIN.  
In the second experiment, the participants were divided into two groups, with ERWIN 
remembering and making general conversation with the first group and misremembering the 
collected information for the other group’s participants. In both cases, the participants were 
asked to answer questionnaires at the end of the experiment to find out which group of the 
participants was happier and had more satisfactory interactions with ERWIN.  
In the third experiment, the participants from the previous experiment’s ‘non-
misattributed group’ experienced misattribution bias in conversations, and vice versa. Figure 
4.5 shows the grouping process. At the end, all participants answered the same questionnaire 
as that given in the second experiment to determine what characteristics in ERWIN participants 
liked the most. All experiments were Wizard-of-Oz experiments, where the robot was 
controlled remotely, and participants were watched through ERWIN’s eye cameras. 
 
Figure 5.1. Each of the participants interacted with ERWIN three times 
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Figure 5.2. The group division in the experiments 
 
In all of the interactions, participants interacted one-on-one with ERWIN. The steps of the 
interactions were as follows: 
1. Participant enters the room. 
2. Participant sits in front of the robot (ERWIN).  
3. The robot greets the participant and waits for response. 
4. Participant replies. 
5. Robot asks name, address and wellbeing, and waits for response.  
a. In the introductory interaction, robot asks name, address and wellbeing.  
b. In the unbiased interaction robot states correct name, address and wellbeing. 
c. In the biased (misattribution) interaction robot misattributes, forgetting 
information about name, address and wellbeing. 
6. Participant replies.  
7. Robot then moves to the topic-based conversation and discusses four topics (e.g. sports, 
music, food and book) and waits for response. 
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8. Participant replies. 
a. In the introductory interaction, robot replies with ‘okay’ and ‘thank you’ and 
moves to the next topic. 
b. In the unbiased interaction, robot states correct information in all topics. 
c. In the biased (misattribution) interaction, robot forgets and misattributes 
information about all topics.  
9. Robot then moves to the farewell conversation, thanks participant for coming and waits 
for response. 
10. Participant replies. 
11. Robot invites participant for the next interaction and waits for response. 
12. Participant replies. 
13. Robot requests participants to complete questionnaires and waits for response. 
14. End of the interaction.  
 
5.1.3 Participants and grouping 
Participants were recruited via advertising efforts. A total of 30 participants were selected. 
Participants were mixed in age, gender and background. As stated earlier, participants were 
divided into two groups to interact with the robot.  
A demographic of the participants is as follow: 
Table 5.1: Details of the participants 
Gender Age Occupation 
 18 -20 => 0   
Male 15 
 
21 – 35 => 15 Student => 10 
Female 12 36 – 60 => 15 Professionals => 15  
No answer 3  No answer 5 
30 30 30 
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5.1.4 Data collection and measurements  
Data were collected in the form of questionnaires. After each of the interactions, participants 
were given a set of questionnaires to answer. The questionnaires structured offered possible 
answers on a Likert scale, so that participants could rate their experiences. This was the first 
experiment where human-like cognitive bias was used in a robot, and I wanted participants to 
rate their experiences from a range of options. Therefore, the rating options ranged from ‘1’ 
and ‘10’, where 1 represented ‘least agreement’ and 10 represented ‘most agreement’. 
Questionnaires were the same for all of the interactions.  
The experiment was to determine the participant’s preferences for the algorithms. To 
find the participant’s preferences, I used likeability as the measurement factor. There was a 
total number of 11 Likert-scale questions and four ‘yes or no’ based questions. To analyse data 
in the next section, responses from the Likert questions were used.  
 
5.1.5 Experiment scenario 
An interaction scenario can be described for the further clarification. ‘Participant 1’ was a 
young women and a student from the university. She found it amusing when ERWIN forgot 
previous discussions with her. ERWIN said, ‘I remember that last time you said your favourite 
sport is wrestling. So please tell me what’s going on in there?’ ‘Participant 1’ never said that 
she like wrestling, but she laughed and replied, ‘No, I don’t like wrestling. I sometime watch 
football but that’s rare.’ ERWIN then apologized for the mistakes and started the next topic 
with another misattribution. 
In case of the non-biased interactions, however, participant’s responses were 
comparably limited, it could be because of their expectations of an interaction with a robot 
matched the reality, and they did not experience anything that could surprise them or made 
them think the robot’s behaviours unusual. For example, when ‘Participant 2’, a fulltime 
employed at the property agency, took part in our experiment. In the non-misattribution 
interaction, ERWIN asked her, ‘I remember that last time you said your favourite sport is 
cricket. So please tell me what’s going on in there?’ As the robot was correct by recalling her 
favourite sport, ‘Participant 2’ replied, ‘I could not find any spare time to watch since last time.’ 
Then ERWIN jumps to the next topic, asking, ‘Last time you said your favourite food is curry. 
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Am I correct?’ ‘Participant 1’ again generally answered, ‘Yes, you are correct.’; and the 
conversation continued with ERWIN jumping to the next topic. 
 
Figure 5.3. Different moments of the participant interacting with ERWIN 
Figure 5.3 shows different moments of participants interacting with ERWIN. The pictures were 
captured using the robot’s eye camera, so the robot could not be seen in the frame. 
 
5.1.6 Experimental results and statistical analysis 
A Shapiro-Wilk test was performed to check the normality (Yap & Sim, 2011) where the Sig. 
values came out as p>0.05, and therefore parametric test (t-test) was carried out to analyse data. 
As the participants interacted with all algorithms once, they each had the chance to compare 
the two interaction behaviours. Since the participants and questionnaires were same for both 
biased and non-biased interactions, I ran a descriptive analysis and a paired sample t tests to 
analyse and compare the data. In both cases, the Sig (p value) was <0.05 (i.e. a very small 
probability of this result occurring by chance, under the null hypothesis of no difference). 
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The reliability scores from the 11 questionnaires were 0.94 and 0.756 (Cronbach's 
alpha), which are very high. In this case, the high Cronbach’s alpha supports the ratings 
compared between the biased interaction and the non-biased interaction. I added the scores of 
all questions for each participant and ran a paired-sample t test to compare. 
In the introductory interaction, most of the participants recognised all emotions of 
ERWIN correctly; however, a few participants mixed up one or two emotions (e.g. joy with 
surprise). 
  
5.1.6.1 The justification of the crossover groups of participants 
This section describes the ratings analysis between the cross-over groups. As in this experiment 
participants were divided into two groups (e.g. A and B) to interact with the biased and non-
biased versions of the robot ERWIN, and at the end a crossover group’s interactions were 
performed between those A and B groups (Figure 5.2), it is reasonable to explain how summing 
up such collected data from crossover interactions are justifiable.  
I performed a t test between the biased condition group from the second interaction 
with the biased condition group from the third interaction to verify whether it is possible to 
combine the all biased groups for the final analysis, and the results are shown In Tables 5.2 and 
5.3.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics from t test between first two cross-over groups. 
Algorithms N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Total Biased (Group 1) 15 61.00 107.00 85.26 13.76 
Total Biased (Group 2) 15 77.00 100.00 90.6 6.68 
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Table 5.3: Results from t test between first two cross-over groups. 
Algorithms Paired Differences t df Sig. 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Difference 
Lower Upper 
Biased (G1) vs 
Biased (G2) 
-5.33 16.50 4.26 -14.47 3.8 -1.25 14 0.23 
 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 show that there was no difference in the mean score between the 
biased G1 and G2. Therefore, it is possible that the crossover of the biased groups did not affect 
the ratings of the participants and combining the two biased groups is justified.  
I also performed a t test for the non-biased condition group from the second interaction 
with the non-biased condition group from the third interaction to verify whether it was possible 
to combine the all unbiased groups for the final analysis, and the results are shown in Tables 
5.4 and 5.5. 
Table: 5.4: Descriptive statistics t test from between second two crossover groups. 
 
Table 5.5: Results of t test from between second two crossover groups 
 
From the table 5.4 and 5.5, there is no difference in in the mean score between the 
unbiased G1 and G2. Therefore, the crossover of the biased groups did not affect the ratings of 
the participants and combining the two biased groups is justified. 
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From the above tests, it can be said that combining the two biased and two non-biased 
groups for analysing the differences between biased and non-biased interactions is possible, as 
there are no significance differences in ratings. 
 
5.1.6.2  Statistics of non-biased interactions 
 
Table 5.6: The descriptive statistics and mean of the unbiased interactions. 
 
In Table 5.6, N represents the number of participants, 30, the minimum average of rating is 14 
and maximum average of rating is 71 with the mean value of 47.67. The standard deviation 
tells us that how much value differs from the mean value for the group, and for unbiased 
interactions it is 14.98.  
 
5.1.6.3  Statistics of misattribution biased interactions 
Table 5.7: The biased interactions and the descriptive chart. 
Algorithm N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Misattribution 
Biased 
30 63.7333 107.00 87.93 25.562 
 
In Table 5.7, N represents the number of participants, 30, the minimum average of 
rating is 63.7333 and maximum average of rating is 107 with the mean value of 87.93. From 
the standard deviation it can be said that data were spread both higher and lower from the mean 
by the value of 25.562.  
As mentioned earlier, I added the ratings of all question for each participant, so it can 
be said that the minimum total rating for biased algorithms was 61, and the maximum was 107. 
The mean here was calculated over the summed ratings. The standard deviations that data were 
distributed more closely for non-biased interaction than biased interaction. 
Algorithm N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Unbiased 30 14.00 71.00 47.67 14.98 
 131 
 
 
5.1.6.4 Pairwise statistics of the biased algorithms compared to baseline 
The pairwise statistics in Table 5.8 shows a comparison of misattributed and non-misattributed 
algorithms. 
Table 5.8: Comparison chart of biased and unbiased interactions 
Algorithms Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Misattributed 
vs Non-
Misattributed 
40.27 2.51 0.000 35.13 45.41 
 
As Table 5.8 shows, the biased algorithms scored at least 40 points higher in each question 
for each of the participants. Figure 5.4 was plotted using the mean differences to show the 
preferences of the participants by bias. 
 
Figure 5.4. Rating distributions of the biased and non-biased interactions. 
Figure 5.4 shows the distributions of the ratings from participants in biased and 
unbiased conversation. The graph shows that in the biased interactions, the participant’s ratings 
were distributed mainly between 70–110, but in the non-biased interactions, such distributions 
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were 15–70. However, the biased-interaction ratings are congested in the area between 85–95, 
whereas the non-biased ratings are between approximately 35–60.  
The mean is 40.27, which show that there is an average 40-point difference in ratings, 
expressing a preference for the biased interactions. In the questionnaires, the rating options 
were from 1–0, so in this case, the average of 40 points actually suggests that in each question, 
the participants rated biased interactions an average of 4 points higher. 
The means of biased and unbiased responses are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The mean 
for biased-interaction data is 87.93, approximately 40 points more than the mean for unbiased 
interactions (47.67), suggesting that for each question, the participant’s responses were an 
average of 40 points (in this rating, 4) higher for biased than unbiased. It can also be seen that 
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the ratings of biased responses lay between 60 and 110, whereas the 
unbiased responses lay between 20 and 70. The graph in the Figure 5.3 shows the participant’s 
preferences for the biased conversation over unbiased. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the descriptive 
analysis for the biased and non-biased interactions as well.  
From the Table 5.3, the 2-tailed sig (p value) from the paired sample t test came to 
<0.05, which indicates the significance of the collected data over a large population. From the 
above t value, t = 16.024 and p < 0.001 (i.e. indicating a very small probability of this result 
occurring by chance). As p < 0.001, there are significance differences between our null 
hypothesis and alternative hypothesises. The null hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, since 
p < 0.05.  
Therefore, the other alternative hypothesis H2 can be accepted, because μ1((87.93)) > 
μ2(47.67), where H2 = participant’s ‘likeability’ scores, which were greater for the biased robot 
interactions. 
In this experiment, from a total of 30 participants, 15 were male, 12 were female, and 
three did not specify their gender. As there is very little gender deviation, I did not show the 
results based on the gender. In this experiment, there was no participant younger than 21 and 
no participant older than 55. Although I divided age groups into two (21–35 and 36–55), the 
data are analysed based on all the participants, each considered an ‘adult’. Based on occupation, 
participants reported being either students (n = 10) or working full time jobs (n = 15), although 
five did not indicate their occupations. However, I did not analyse results based on occupations, 
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since only two occupations were available; rather I analysed data on overall participants and 
based on their responses on the questionnaire. 
Therefore, it can be said that, overall, the participants liked the biased interactions more 
than the non-biased. From the above statistical analysis, it can be concluded that misattribution 
bias affected the interaction, and overall, the participants liked the interactions using 
misattribution bias with ERWIN more than the non-biased versions of the robot. The 
experimental results support our global hypothesis, which states that using misattribution 
cognitive bias in social human–robot interactions can increase the participant’s likeability. In 
the next experiments, we will see the use of other cognitive biases in different robots and how 
participants reacted to such interactions.  
  
5.2 Game-playing interactions with MyKeepon based on the 
empathy gap bias  
In this experiment, I use the empathy gap bias in the robot MyKeepon to examine the effects 
of this bias in interactions between the robot and participants in game-playing interactions. The 
robot shows empathy-gap-biased behaviours created based on the hot-state and cold-state of 
the bias, and these states were randomly assigned to the participants. The robot plays ‘tap-on-
head’ with the participants, where the participants tap on the robot’s head, and the robot must 
jump as many times as it has been tapped. However, in this experiment, winning or losing the 
game was not a result of interest; rather, it was important to ascertain the participant’s reactions 
to the robot’s behaviours based on the biased algorithms. Therefore, the robot can win or lose 
all the game terms, but how much participants liked the robot’s behaviours during the 
interactions were measured based on Likert questionnaires.  
Similar to the previous experiment, a local hypothesis was made for this experiment 
based on the main hypothesis:  
If the empathy gap bias is applied in social-robot game-playing interaction, then a 
participant’s fondness or likability of the robot can be increased due to the personally 
relatable behaviours the robot exhibits as a result. 
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To check the effects of empathy gap bias, participants interacted with the robot with 
the empathy gap bias and scored their ‘preference’ (μ1), and participants interacted with the 
robot without the empathy gap bias and scored their ‘preferenc’ score (μ2).  
The null hypothesis is that the mean score of the participant’s responses in (μ1) is same as the 
participant’s responses in (μ2): 
i.e. Hypothesis0: μ1 = μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 0 = Null hypothesis 
(μ1) = the means of the participant’s responses from biased robot interactions 
(μ2) = the means of the participant’s responses from non-biased robot interactions 
The alternate hypothesises are: 
Hypothesis 2: μ1 > μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 2 = participant’s ‘likeness’ scores are greater in biased robot interactions. 
 
5.2.1 Experiment methodology 
I tested the empathy gap effects in both game-playing and conversational interactions. For this 
experiment with the MyKeepon robot, I used tap on head and clapping games to play with 
participants where the robot responded to the number of taps and claps. To find out the effects 
of the empathy gap bias, a comparison was needed only with non-biased interactions, and 
therefore only two interactions were made for each participant with the robot in this 
experiment. To express the hot state and cold state of empathy, the robot showed different 
movements and made different noises. In this experiment, the robot was set to randomly show 
a state of empathy gap for participants, and throughout the interaction, the robot maintained 
this such state. Therefore, winning or losing the game was not a factor of the interaction, but 
rather how the robot showed the state of the empathy gap was the important point of the 
interaction. The empathic state of the participants was not measured because the expressions 
of the state of robot and the participants’ reactions to that were the targets of this experiment. 
The experimental procedure is shown in the Figure 4.20. Participants were assigned to the non-
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biased interaction, after which they experienced the other algorithm in the second interaction, 
with at least a week in between. The participants were randomly assigned to the hot or cold 
states of the biased algorithms. The robot was controlled manually (Wizard of Oz) by me and 
therefore, so real time responses were produced.  
 
Figure 5.5.  Each participant interacted both versions of MyKeepon. 
As stated earlier, ViKeepon supports a different range of sounds, including wake up, yawn, 
sleep, chimp, sneeze and others. With custom moves and sounds, different interaction moments 
were created, such as different greetings, gestures, dance movements, and emotions such as 
happiness, sadness, joy and others. Each participant was allowed up to 10 minutes to interact 
with the MyKeepon. The interaction process included greetings, trying to establish eye contact 
with participants, responding to participant inputs by showing making movements, biased or 
non-biased, and different expressions. Participants could tap MyKeepon’s head, and they could 
clap to make MyKeepon dance. The game was, in general, that the robot would have to jump 
the same number of times the participant tapped its head. Based on the principal of the hot-
state empathy gap bias, the robot stays excited and shows excess happiness even if it loses, and 
in the cold state robot stays quiet and unresponsive even if it wins in games. In the non-biased 
interactions, the robot shows no overly excited or unresponsive behaviours; rather, it maintains 
a balance between over excitation and unresponsiveness by limiting its jumps, dances and 
noises.  
All participants were given a verbal and a written set of instructions about interacting 
with the robot at the beginning of the experiment. In all the interactions, participants interacted 
with the robot on a one-on-one basis. 
  
5.2.2 Participants and grouping  
A total of 28 participants were selected from the responses to the advertisement. Genders, 
background, races and ages were mixed in the participants. In this experiment, the 
 136 
 
advertisements were placed near bus stations, so most of the respondents were of the general 
public rather than being students.  
Table 5.9: Details of the participants 
Gender Age Occupation 
 18 -20 => 0   
Male 13 
 
21 – 35 => 16 Student => 13 
Female 12 36 – 55 => 12 Professionals => 13  
No answer 3  No answer 2 
28 28 28 
 
Each of the participants interacted two times with the robot (Figure 5.5), where in one 
interaction, participants interacted with MyKeepon without empathy gap behaviours, and in 
the next interaction interacted with a biased version of the robot.  
 
5.2.3 Data collection and measurements  
Participants were requested to complete a set of questions at the end of each interaction. The 
questionnaires used a Likert scale and were the same for both experiments, so that the 
differences of the participant’s preference could be compared in the two interactions. There 
was a total of 14 questions in the questionnaire. In addition, participants could leave their own 
comments about the interaction.  
Similar to the previous ERWIN experiment, in this case I wanted to find out the 
fondness of the participants to interaction with the biased or non-biased algorithms, so data 
were collected based to determine overall likeability. In this experiment, I used a 5-point Likert 
scale, because most of the invited participants were from the general public. Studies (e.g. 
Weijters, Cabooter & Schillewaert, 2010) show that a 5-point scale is useful when respondents 
are from the general public. The questions were the same for all the interactions, so that a 
comparison could be possible. For example, participants were asked whether they found the 
different behaviours of the robot meaningful, and they were asked to rate these behaviours. 
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5.2.4 Statistics of game-playing interactions based on empathy-gap bias in 
MyKeepon, the toy-like robot 
The test for Normality, examining standardized skewness and the Shapiro-Wilks test (Yap & 
Sim, 2011), indicated the data were statistically normal (p>0.05), and therefore parametric test 
(t-test) was carried out to analyse data.  In this experiment, 28 participants interacted with 
MyKeepon with empathy-gap-biased and non-biased algorithms.  
Participants were asked 14 questions. As in the previous ERWIN experiment, the 
measure of this experiment was preference for the algorithms. The questionnaires and 
participants were same for the both interactions; and paired sample t tests were used to analyse 
the data. In this statistical analysis, the Sig (p value) came out as <0.05 (i.e. a very small 
probability of this result occurring by chance) under the null hypothesis of no difference, so 
the results are statistically significant.  
The reliability scores from the 14 questionnaires for the biased and unbiased 
interactions are 0.987 and 0.83. Because in this experiment data were collected in ways similar 
to the ERWIN experiment, I used a similar method of adding the ratings from questionnaire 
answers for each of the participants, and used a paired sample t test to compare. 
  
5.2.4.1 Statistics of unbiased interactions 
Table 5.10 shows the descriptive statistics and the means of the unbiased interactions. 
Table 5.10: Statistics of unbiased MyKeepon interactions. 
Algorithm N Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation  
Unbiased 28 43 64 52.39 5.91 
 
In Table 5.10, N represents the number of participants, 28, minimum average of ratings 
is 43 and maximum is 64. The mean value is 52.39 and from the standard deviation value it 
can be said that the ratings were spread from mean value by 5.91.   
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5.2.4.2 Statistics of empathy gap biased interactions 
Table 5.11 presents the descriptive statistics of the empathy-gap-biased interactions. 
Table 5.11: Statistics of biased MyKeepon interactions. 
Algorithm N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Empathy Gap 
Biased 
28 47 64 55.35 4.99 
 
In Table 5.11, N represents the number of participants, 28, minimum average of ratings 
is 47 and maximum is 64. The mean value is 55.35 and from the standard deviation value it 
can be said that the ratings were spread from mean value by 4.91.  
  
5.2.4.3 Pairwise statistics of the biased algorithms compared to baseline  
The pairwise statistics in Table 5.12 show a comparison of misattributed and non-misattributed 
algorithms. 
Table 5.12: Pairwise comparison between empathy–gap-biased and non-biased interactions. 
Algorithms Paired Differences t df Sig. 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Upper 
Empathy Gap 
vs Non-
Empathy Gap 
2.97 1.95 0.37 2.20 3.72 8.03 27 0.000 
 
As Table 5.12 shows, the biased algorithms scored at least 2.97 points higher in each 
question. The difference in means between the empathy gap and non-empathy gap ratings is 
2.97, which indicates that there is an approximate 3-point difference in ratings in preference to 
empathy gap interactions. There are other statistical measures in Table 5.10 show standard 
deviation (1.95), error means (0.37) and the boundaries of ratings distributions (2.2–3.72).  
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A whisker plot (Figure 5.6) has been made using the mean differences between non-
biased and biased ratings. The figure shows the distribution of the ratings in average differences 
between the responses from participants in biased and unbiased conversation. The graph shows 
the number of participants who preferred the biased interaction over the unbiased interaction. 
 
Figure 5.6: Rating distributions of the biased and non-biased interactions. 
 
5.2.5 Statistical result discussion 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the mean ratings non-biased and biased algorithms, which are 52.39 
and 55.35. After comparing the two means, the biased mean is approximately 3.0 (2.96) points 
more than the unbiased mean, which indicates that for each question, the participant’s 
responses were on average rated 2 points higher for biased than for unbiased interactions. This 
result can be seen in Table 5.10, where the mean differences are calculated as 2.97. In this 
experiment, the questionnaire was designed based on a 5-point scale, so the means and 
differences are smaller in numbers. 
The correlation between the two sets of scores was calculated as 0.95. The pattern of 
change is consistent for each participant for each question. From the t value, t = 8.032 and p < 
0.001, which is a very small probability of this result occurring by chance, under null 
 140 
 
hypothesis of no difference. So, the null hypothesis is rejected, since p < 0.05. According to 
the above measurements, there is evidence (t = 8.032, p < 0.0001) of preference for the biased 
robot interactions over non-biased interactions. In these interactions, participants preferred the 
biased version of MyKeepon, on average, by approximately 2.97 points. With a 95% confident 
interval, the lower and upper limits are 2.20706 and 3.72151, respectively, which means a 
larger population would prefer the biased interaction by a mean of 2.97 and with a range 
between 2 and 3 points for each question. Therefore, from the above statistical analysis, it can 
be concluded that the development of cognitive biases does affect interactions between the 
robot and the participants, and overall the participant’s liked the interactions using empathy 
gap biases in the MyKeepon experiments.  
From Table 5.10, the 2-tailed sig (p value) from the paired-sample t test was <0.05, 
which indicates the significance of the collected data over a large population. From the above  
value, t = 8.03 and p < 0.001 (i.e. a very small probability of this result occurring by chance). 
As p < 0.001, there are significance differences between our null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesises. So, the null hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, since p < 0.05.  
As such, the alternative hypothesis H2 can be accepted, because μ1 ((55.35)) > μ2 
(52.39), where H2 = participant’s ‘preference’ scores being greater in biased robot interactions. 
In this experiment from total of 28 participants 13 were male and 13 were female, and 
two did not specify their gender. As there are very few numbers of gender deviation, I did not 
show the results based on the gender. In this experiment, there was no younger participant than 
21 and no older participant than 55. Although I separated age groups into two (21-35 and 36-
55) but data are analysed based on all the participants are in general ‘adult’ group. Based on 
the occupation, participants were only either students or doing full time jobs and two did not 
provide any answers. However I did not analyse results based on gender and occupations due 
to only 13 on each category were available, rather I analysed data on overall participants and 
based on their responses towards questionnaire.      
Therefore, it can be said that the participants overall liked the biased interactions more 
than non-biased. From the above statistical analysis, it can be concluded that the hot and cold 
empathy gap biases affected the interaction, and overall, the participants significantly liked and 
preferred the interactions using empathy gap bias with MyKeepon.  
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5.3 Conversational interactions with MARC based on the 
misattribution, empathy gap and lack of knowledge or 
ideocracy effects  
This was the third experiment of the series investigating cognitive biases in the robot for 
human–robot interaction. In this experiment, I used previously investigated misattribution and 
empathy gap biases and added some new behaviours, namely a lack of knowledge, or ideocracy 
(similar to the Dunning-Kruger effects), in a humanoid robot MARC. The reason for using 
previously investigated biases was to find out whether the positive responses received from the 
participants in the ERWIN and MyKeepon experiments were for the algorithm or the robot 
itself and to investigate the effects of such biases in a humanoid robot-participant interaction. 
In this experiment, I developed similar misattribution and similar empathy gap conversational 
algorithms in MARC, and I developed a conversational algorithm for the lack of knowledge or 
ideocracy effects bias as well. Similar to the previous experiments, in the end I compared the 
robot’s biased behaviours against its baseline behaviours in conversational interactions. 
To investigate the effects of the three biases and the imperfectness in the humanoid 
robot MARC, three local hypotheses were created, based on the main hypothesis of the 
research.  
For the interactions using misattribution cognitive bias, the first was as follows:  
If the misattribution bias is applied in social-robot interaction, then a participant’s 
fondness or likability of the robot can be increased due to the human-like behaviours 
the robot exhibits as a result. 
For the interaction using empathy gap bias, the second was, 
If the empathy gap cognitive bias is applied in social-robot interaction, then a 
participant’s fondness or likability of the robot can be increased due to the human 
understanding the behaviours the robot exhibits as a result. 
For the interactions using the lack of knowledge or the ideocracy bias, 
If the lack of knowledge, or the ideocracy, bias is applied in social-robot interaction, 
then a participant’s fondness or likability of the robot can be increased due to the 
human-like behaviours the robot exhibits as a result.  
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For all the cases, 
To ascertain the effects of the biases, participants interacted with the robot with a given 
bias and scored the robot’s ‘likeability’ (μ1), and the participants interacted with the 
robot without misattribution bias and scored its ‘likeability’ (μ2).  
The null hypothesis is that the mean score of the participant’s responses in (μ1) is same as the 
participant’s responses in (μ2): 
i.e. Hypothesis0: μ1 = μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 0 = Null hypothesis 
(μ1) = the means of the participant’s responses from biased robot interactions 
(μ2) = the means of the participant’s responses from non-biased robot interactions 
The alternate hypothesis is 
Hypothesis 2: μ1 > μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 2 = participant’s ‘preference’ scores are greater in biased robot interactions. 
Therefore, for the individual biased versus non-biased experiments, if the null 
hypothesis gets rejected, it can be proven that the participants liked and preferred to interact 
with the biased version of the robot.  
 
5.3.1 Experiment methodology 
In this experiment, three cognitive biases—misattribution, empathy gap and lack of knowledge 
or ideocracy effects—were compared with the non-biased behavioural algorithm. The 
interactions were one-on-one between the participant and the robot MARC, and the robot was 
controlled manually (Wizard of Oz) throughout the interactions.  
Similar to the previous misattribution experiment with ERWIN, in this experiment, the 
bias was expressed after collecting the basic information of the participants. The main 
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differences with the previous ERWIN experiment were the robots (e.g. ERWIN and MARC) 
and the way robot expressed the bias effects.   
Similar to the previous experiment with the empathy gap interaction, in this experiment, 
robot MARC expressed hot and cold states of the empathy gap in conversational interactions 
with the participants. When in the hot state, the robot expressed faster and more enthusiastic 
responses with a friendlier approach, but in the cold state, responses were minimal. Similar to 
the previous MyKeepon experiment, the participant’s emotions and mood were not measured, 
as only the robot’s behaviours were concerned in the experiment. As mentioned previously, we 
know that the person influenced by the empathy gap bias is not aware of his or her own effects 
and therefore does not care about others’ emotions at all. For this reason, in the experiment 
with empathy gap effects in robots, I developed the bias and showed such effects in interactions 
without acknowledging the participant’s true emotions at that time, so that the empathy gap 
bias could be truly justify. The differences between the MyKeepon and MARC empathy gap 
experiments are mainly about the way the robots expressed the effects of the bias and the 
interaction procedures, which were game playing and conversations.  
The lack of knowledge effect was tested using conversational interactions. As this bias 
was mainly developed based on Dunning-Kruger effects, in the interactions, the robot 
expressed its lack of knowledge by connecting incorrect thoughts to conversations on different 
topics.  
Similar to all three bias based interactions with the robot, participants interacted with 
the baseline or non-biased algorithm three times maintaining two-three weeks interval between 
two interactions. At the end, all data from the biased interactions were compared with the data 
from the baseline interactions (Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7. The experiment structures. 
Two different setups were chosen for this experiment: One group of participants interacted 
with all four algorithms (Figure 5.8), and the other group interacted with only one algorithm, 
three times (Figure 5.9). This setup was to aid determining the participant’s reactions in two 
different interaction scenarios over time.  
Three interactions were completed between the participant and the robot, spanning a two-
month time period, in order to observe long time interval effects and to allow the participant to 
reflect on their previous interactions. The interactions occurred on a one-on-one basis, where 
each participant interacted with MARC individually by making conversation for at least 8 
minutes. The conversation ended with the robot requesting that the participant complete the 
questionnaire.  
 
Figure 5.8: The first group: 30 participants interacting with all algorithms. 
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Figure 5.9: The second group: 40 participants interacting with one algorithm. 
 
The interaction steps were are as follows: 
1. Participant enters in the room. 
2. Participant sits in front of the robot (MARC).  
3. Robot greets the participant and waits for response. 
4. Participant replies. 
5. Robot asks name, address and wellbeing and waits for response.  
a. In the introductory interaction, robot asks names, address and wellbeing.  
b. In the unbiased interaction, robot states correct names, address and wellbeing. 
c. In the misattribution biased interaction, robot misattributes, forgets information 
about name, address and wellbeing. 
d. In the hot state of empathy, robot asks name, address and wellbeing very 
enthusiastically.  
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e. In the cold state of empathy, robot asks name, address and wellbeing in very 
minimalistic way.  
f. In the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects biased interaction, robot states 
name, address and wellbeing. 
6. Participant replies.  
7. Robot then moves to topic-based conversation and discusses four topics (e.g. sports, 
music, food and literature) and waits for a response. 
8. Participant replies. 
a. In the introductory interaction, robot replies with ‘okay’, ‘thank you’ and moves 
to the next topic. 
b. In the unbiased interaction, robot states correct information on all topics. 
c. In the biased (misattribution) interaction, robot forgets and misattributes 
information on all the topics.  
d. In the hot state of empathy, robot discuss each of the topics very enthusiastically 
by showing its excessive happiness.  
e. In the cold state of empathy, robot discusses each of the topics very calmly, 
almost unresponsively, showing its excessive sadness and unwillingness to 
interact.   
f. In the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects condition, robot express its own 
statements for each of the topics, and if participant disagree, then robot 
understands its mistakes.  
9. Robot then moves to the farewell conversation and thanks participant for coming and 
waits for response. 
10. Participant replies. 
11. Robot invites participant for the next interaction and waits for response. 
12. Participant replies. 
13. Robot requests participants complete questionnaires and waits for response. 
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14. End of the interaction.  
 
5.3.2 Participants and grouping  
A total of 70 participants were randomly chosen, from responses to advertisements. The 
number of different genders, races and age groups were maintained as equal for both groups.  
For the first group (shown in Figure 5.8), 30 participants were selected, and each 
participant interacted with all four behavioural algorithms (three biased and one unbiased). In 
the second group (shown in Figure 5.9), 10 participants from total 40 were selected to interact 
with each of the individual algorithms (individual biased or unbiased) three times. As with the 
first group, all 30 participants interacted with all biased and unbiased algorithms, so their 
responses would be based on the comparisons between the biased and unbiased interactions. 
Such responses would reflect a comparable outcome between those interactions involving the 
cognitive bias of the robot and those without, in developing human-robot interactions. In the 
second group, each of the 10 participants interacted with their selected individual algorithm 
three times. Such interactions could tell us the effects of each individual algorithm in 
developing human-robot interactions with maintain time intervals. 
A demographic of the participants are as follow: 
Table 5.13: Details of the participants 
Gender Age Occupation 
 18 -20 => 8  
Male 30 
 
21 – 35 => 33 Student => 33 
Female 34 36 – 60 => 19 Professionals => 28 
No answer 6 No answer 10 No answer 9 
70 70 70 
 
The entire experiment took a long time to complete, because of variations in the 
participants’ schedules.  
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5.3.3 Data collection and measurement  
As stated earlier, in this experiment, data were collected based on three factors: likeability, 
comfort and rapport. Participants were given a questionnaire after each of the interactions, to 
collect the data for later analysis. The questionnaires were made using a 7-point Likert scale, 
where ‘1’ represented ‘least agreeableness’ and ‘7’ represented ‘most agreeableness’. The 
questionnaires were the same for both groups, and in all three experiments.  
These three categories were used to measure two conditions:  
• Participant’s preference for the algorithms (i.e. how much they liked the interaction). 
• Changes in preference over an extended period (i.e. to find out whether  such 
preferences for the interactions changed over time).  
The three factors were chosen based on the findings of the experiment. The biased 
interactions were based on specific component of the selected bias. From such interactions 
between the participant and robot, I wanted to answer the following questions:  
• Are the participants feeling comfortable to interact with the robot with and without the 
effects of the selected biases and components?  
• Does the participant like interacting with the robot with and without such biases?  
• How do such interactions between participants and the robot with or without such biases 
affect the rapport between the participant and robot?  
Likeability, comfort and rapport are three of the most important measures of participant 
response in the current experiment, because to evaluate an interaction it is important to know 
the interlocutors’ mutual fondness, how comfortable they were and how strong the rapport 
between them becomes. Based on these three factors, I calculate the participants’ overall 
preferences and how they change over time period. The questionnaires were created from 
various sources, such as Hone and Graham (2000), Hassenzahl (2003) and Mutlu (2012), and 
are attached in the appendix section.  
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Figure 5.10. A participant is interacting with MARC. 
 
5.3.4 Statistics for conversational interactions based on misattribution, 
empathy gap and lack of knowledge or ideocracy effect biases in 
MARC the humanoid robot 
 
5.3.4.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier, data were collected on seven-point Likert questions to measure following 
three scales:  
1. comfort,  
2. likeability, and 
3. rapport. 
In this section, for each algorithm, I present the means of such factors from the 
statistical analysis and later compare these with the baseline.  
In all the graphs, the x-axis represents the factors and algorithms, and the y-axis 
represents the marginal means. 
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5.3.4.2 Statistics of baseline interactions 
First group 
Table 5.14 shows the calculated statistical means based on each of the factors in three 
interactions: 
Table 5.14: Means of the factors for first group in baseline interactions. 
Interactions Measurements Means 
 
1st Interaction 
Comfort 4.87 
Likeability 4.92 
Rapport 4.72 
 
2nd Interaction 
Comfort 3.96 
Likeability 4.18 
Rapport 3.97 
 
3rd Interaction 
Comfort 3.96 
Likeability 3.41 
Rapport 3.29 
 
Table 5.14 demonstrates that the highest mean for comfort is 4.87, in the 1st interaction; 
for likeability, it is 4.92, and for rapport it is 4.72, each for the first interaction. In the second 
and third interactions, such means values dropped for all three factors. 
Second group 
Due to the different style of analysis of the second group’s data, the overall means of the three 
factors from three interactions are calculated (Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15: Means of the factors for the second group in baseline interactions. 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Comfort 3.41 0.08 3.23 3.6 
Likeability 4.10 0.07 3.94 4.26 
Rapport 3.75 0.05 3.63 3.9 
 
In the second group, the average means for comfort in three interactions is 3.41, for 
likeability 4.10, and for rapport 3.75.  
 
5.3.4.3  Statistics of misattribution biased interactions  
First group   
Table 5.16 shows the statistical means based on each of the factors in three interactions. 
Table 5.16: Means of the factors for first group in misattribution interactions. 
Interactions Measurements Means 
 
1st Interaction 
Comfort 5.59 
Likeability 5.78 
Rapport 5.00 
 
2nd Interaction 
Comfort 5.37 
Likeability 5.59 
Rapport 4.94 
 
3rd Interaction 
Comfort 5.11 
Likeability 5.22 
Rapport 4.82 
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Participants gave higher ratings for misattribution interactions than for the baseline (Table 
5.16). 
Second group 
Due to the different style of analysis of the second group’s data, the overall means of the three 
factors from three interactions are calculated Table 5.17.  
Table 5.17: Means of the factors for the second group in misattribution interactions 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Comfort 5.42 0.08 5.25 5.6 
Likeability 5.17 0.07 5.01 5.32 
Rapport 5.34 0.05 5.22 5.46 
 
From this table, it can be said that the second group’s participants rated higher for the 
misattribution interactions than the baseline (Table 5.10).  
 
5.3.4.4  Statistics of empathy gap biased algorithm  
First group 
Table 5.18 shows the calculated statistical means based on each of the factors over three 
interactions. 
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Table 5.18: Means of the factors for first group in empathy gap interactions. 
Interactions Measurements Means 
 
1st Interaction 
Comfort 5.59 
Likeability 5.78 
Rapport 5.00 
 
2nd Interaction 
Comfort 5.37 
Likeability 5.59 
Rapport 4.94 
 
3rd Interaction 
Comfort 5.11 
Likeability 5.22 
Rapport 4.82 
 
Table 5.18 demonstrates that the first group’s participants rated empathy gap 
interactions higher than the baseline (Table 5.14) for each of the factors. 
Second group 
Due to the different style of analysis of the second group’s data, the overall means of the three 
factors from three interactions are calculated (Table 5.19).  
able 5.19: Means of the factors for the second group in empathy gap interactions 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Comfort 5.23 0.08 5.06 5.41 
Likeability 5.12 0.07 4.97 5.27 
Rapport 4.57 0.05 4.45 4.69 
 
Participants from the second group, overall, liked the empathy gap biased interactions 
more than the baseline (Table 5.15). 
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5.3.4.5  Statistics for lack of knowledge and ideocracy effects biased algorithm  
First group 
Table 5.20 shows the calculated statistical means based of each of the factors in three 
interactions. In most of the figures, this ‘ideocracy’ is denoted as ‘DK’.  
Table 5.20: Means of the factors for first group in lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects interactions 
Interactions Measurements Means 
 
1st Interaction 
Comfort 5.59 
Likeability 5.78 
Rapport 5.00 
 
2nd Interaction 
Comfort 5.37 
Likeability 5.59 
Rapport 4.94 
 
3rd Interaction 
Comfort 5.11 
Likeability 5.22 
Rapport 4.82 
 
The means calculated in Table (5.20) suggests that the first group’s participants overall 
liked the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects biases more than the baseline (Table 5.14).  
Second group 
The means from the second group’s data are shown in Table 5.21:  
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Table 5.21: Means of the factors for the second group in lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects 
interactions 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Comfort 5.58 0.08 5.4 5.76 
Likeability 5.14 0.07 4.99 5.29 
Rapport 5.00 0.05 4.88 5.12 
 
Similar to previous biased interactions, the second group’s participants liked the lack 
of knowledge or ideocracy effects biased interactions more than the baseline (Table 5.15).  
The means for the individual algorithm suggested that all biased interactions scored 
higher than the baseline interactions in the both groups. In the next sections, I offer a 
comparison based on overall ratings of the factors for the group with three interactions.  
 
5.3.4.6  Pairwise comparison of means based on overall ratings of three factors 
This section presents comparisons of the algorithms based on the three factors (i.e. comfort, 
likeability and rapport).  
First group 
Table 5.22 shows pairwise comparisons of the means between baseline and biased 
interactions.  
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Table 5.22: Pairwise comparisons between biased and non-biased algorithms in the first group. 
Algorithm Pairs Mean 
Differences 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
Baseline Misattribution -10.13 0.62 0.000 -11.88 -8.38 
Baseline Empathy gap -5.06 0.6 0.000 -6.77 -3.36 
Baseline Lack of 
knowledge/ideocracy 
-9.7 0.52 0.000 -11.17 -8.22 
 
The mean differences between the baseline and the biased algorithms was negative, 
indicating (as shown earlier) that the means of the biased algorithms were higher in all 
interactions compared to the baseline. The Sig. value was 0.000 (<0.05), which indicates the 
statistical significance of the data.  
A whisker plot (Figure 5.11) has been made using the mean differences between non-
biased and biased ratings. The whisker plot shows (5.11) the distribution of the ratings based 
on the overall means for each of the algorithms. In other words, it can be called the influence 
graph, as the differences in the overall means of the algorithms can be easily spotted, and 
therefore, the influences of the algorithms can be seen.  
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Figure 5.11: Rating distributions of the biased and non-biased interactions from the first group of 
participants 
Total_DK represents lack of knowledge, Total_E represents empathy gap, Total_M represents misattribution 
and Total_U represents non-biased algorithms   
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Second group 
Table 5.23: Pairwise comparisons between biased and non-biased algorithms in the second group. 
Algorithms Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval for Difference 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Baseline Misattribution -1.56 0.05 0.000 -1.7 -1.4 
Baseline Empathy gap -1.23 0.05 0.000 -1.38 -1.07 
Baseline Lack of 
knowledge/ideocracy 
-1.49 0.54 0.000 -1.63 -1.33 
 
In the Table 5.23, the mean differences of baseline compared to biased algorithms came 
as negative, which means and as shown earlier, the means of the biased algorithms were higher 
in all interactions compared to the baseline. The Sig. value came as 0.000 (<0.05) which 
indicate the statistical significance of data.  
A whisker plot (5.12) has made using the mean differences between non-biased and 
biased ratings. The whisker plot shows (5.12) the distribution of the ratings based on overall 
means for each of the algorithms. The Table 5.23 shows the overall means of three factors for 
each of the algorithms. In other words, it can be called the influence graph as the differences 
of overall means of algorithms can be easily spotted, and therefore, the influences of algorithms 
can be seen.  
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Figure 5.12: Rating distributions of the biased and non-biased interactions from the 2nd group 
participants. 
DK_Total represents lack of knowledge, E_Total represents empathy gap, M_Total represents misattribution 
and U_Total represents non-biased algorithms    
5.3.4.7  Pairwise comparison of means based on three interactions 
This section compares algorithms based on the three interactions. The purpose of this section 
is to understand the influence of the algorithms over a long period of time. 
First group 
Table 5.21 shows the means for each of the interactions. These means are from descriptive 
statistics, which are based on the means of each of the factors in corresponding interactions.  
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Table 5.24: Average means of algorithms in each of the interactions in the first group. 
Algorithms Interactions Means 
 
Baseline 
1st 14.51 
2nd 12.11 
3rd 10.67 
 
Misattribution 
1st 16.51 
2nd 15.89 
3rd 15.16 
 
Empathy Gap 
1st 15.37 
2nd 12.53 
3rd 14.47 
 
Lack of 
Knowledge/Ideocracy 
1st 16.04 
2nd 14.8 
3rd 16.16 
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Figure 5.13: Overall means of all algorithms in each interaction in the first group. 
DK represents lack of knowledge, Emp represents empathy gap, Mis represents misattribution and Baseline represents non-
biased algorithms 
 
In Table 5.24, the means were calculated in the 4 (algorithms) × 3 (factors) ANOVA. 
The table shows the increase and decrease of ratings of the algorithms in each interaction.  
A whisker plot (Figure 5.13) was made using the mean differences between non-biased 
and biased ratings. The figure shows the distribution of the ratings based on overall means for 
each of the algorithms, along with each algorithm’s means for first, second and third 
interactions. It shows the preferences of the participants for the algorithms in three interactions 
maintaining two-three weeks intervals between two interactions. From Table 5.20 and Figure 
5.13, it can be said that biased algorithms get more positive and higher ratings from the 
participants who interacted with the robot maintaining two-three weeks intervals.  
Second group 
Similarly, Table 5.25 shows the means in each of the interactions. These means are drawn from 
descriptive statistics, based on the means of each factor in corresponding interactions.  
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Table 5.25: Average means of algorithms in each of the interactions in the second group 
Algorithms Interactions Means 
Baseline 1st 13.53 
2nd 10.39 
3rd 9.87 
Misattribution 1st 16.23 
2nd 14.86 
3rd 16.73 
Empathy Gap 1st 15.92 
2nd 14.25 
3rd 14.63 
Lack of 
Knowledge/Ideocracy 
1st 17.44 
2nd 14.83 
3rd 14.9 
 
 
Figure 5.14 depicts the mean differences between non-biased and biased ratings. It 
shows the distribution of the ratings based on the overall mean ratings for each of the 
algorithms, along with the means of the three interactions which were held maintaining two-
three weeks intervals between two interactions. From Table 5.21 and Figure 5.14, it can be said 
that participants preferred biased interactions more over non-biased.  
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Figure 5.14: Overall means of all algorithms in each interaction in the second group. 
Total_DK represents lack of knowledge, Total_E represents empathy gap, Total_M represents misattribution 
and Total_U represents non-biased algorithms   
 
5.3.5 Statistical result discussions 
In this experiment, among 70 participants, 30 were male, 34 female, and six did not specify. 
Based on age groups, eight were 18–20, while 33 were 21–35, only 19 were 36–60, and 10 
participants did not indicate age. Based on the occupations, 33 were students, 28 were working 
professionals, and nine did not specify. As can be seen, participants are mixed in age, gender 
and occupation, and limited numbers of participants fell into a specific category. I therefore 
analysed the data as a whole rather than based on gender, age or occupation. 
For better understanding the comparisons of algorithms I summarise all the means of 
all conditions from the first group into one table, such as:  
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Table 5.26: Summary of the results from the first group  
Interactions Measurements Baseline 
Means 
Misattribution 
Means 
Empathy 
gap Means 
Lack of 
knowledge and 
ideocracy 
effects 
Means 
 
1st 
Interaction 
Comfort 4.87 5.59 5.59 5.59 
Likeability 4.92 5.78 5.78 5.78 
Rapport 4.72 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 
2nd 
Interaction 
Comfort 3.96 5.37 5.37 5.37 
Likeability 4.18 5.59 5.59 5.59 
Rapport 3.97 4.94 4.94 4.94 
 
3rd 
Interaction 
Comfort 3.96 5.11 5.11 5.11 
Likeability 3.41 5.22 5.22 5.22 
Rapport 3.29 4.82 4.82 4.82 
 
In Section 5.3, I have described the analysis results for individual algorithms and for 
pairwise comparisons. The pairwise comparisons were done comparing the baseline algorithm 
with the biased algorithms. Table 5.23 shows the average ratings for each factor in three 
different experiments. Similarly, Table 5.16 shows the ratings from the first group of 
participants for the misattributed algorithm. Table 5.18 shows the ratings from the participants 
of the first group for the empathy gap algorithm, and Table 5.120 shows the average ratings of 
three interactions from the lack of knowledge or ideocracy effects algorithm interactions of the 
first group of participants. Tables 5.17, 5.19, 5.21 and 5.24 show the average ratings for the 
second group of participants for the baseline, the misattribution, the empathy gap and the lack 
of knowledge or ideocracy effects algorithms, respectively. These tables show that the mean 
ratings of the variables are generally higher for the biased algorithms than for the baseline.  
The overall means for each of the algorithms were shown in the Table 5.22, and the 
graph was plotted for Figure 5.11. The differences were calculated based on the baseline and 
are negative, which indicates that the participants rated biased algorithms higher than baseline 
 165 
 
algorithms. There are, however, not many differences in ratings between the factors in the 
biased algorithms. As stated earlier, for the second group’s data, a mixed (3×4) ANOVA was 
carried out on the dimensions (3) and algorithms (4). The means from three dimensions came 
out as shown in the Table 5.22. In Figure 5.11, it can be seen that with each of the dimensions, 
the participant’s ratings were varied, but compared to the baseline, the participants rated the 
biased algorithms much higher. 
For better understanding the comparisons of algorithms I summarise all the means of 
all conditions from the second group into one table, such as: 
Table 5.27: Summary of the results from the second group 
Measurements Baseline 
Means 
Misattribution 
means 
Empathy 
gap Means 
Lack of knowledge and 
ideocracy effects 
Comfort 3.41 5.42 5.23 5.58 
Likeability 4.10 5.17 5.12 5.14 
Rapport 3.75 5.34 4.57 5.00 
 
Tables from 5.14 to 5.21 show a descriptive analysis of each dimension for individual 
algorithms. From those tables, it can be seen that the mean of the factors or dimensions is higher 
for the biased algorithms than for the baseline. There were stable positive increments in the 
ratings for each of the dimensions in all biased algorithms over the baseline algorithm. For 
example, the comfort dimension mean ratings increased from 3.42 (baseline) to 5.58 (lack of 
knowledge or ideocracy). For likeability, the mean ratings increased from 4.1 (baseline) to 5.17 
(misattribution), and for the rapport dimension, the mean ratings increased from 3.75 (baseline) 
to 5.34 (misattribution), which are statically significant increases of 2.17, 1.07 and 1.59 (95% 
confidence interval, p < 0.0005). There was a statistically significant difference between 
means, so the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternate hypothesis accepted. The graph 
in Figure 5.13 and 5.14 plots the distributions of the three factors or dimensions for all 
algorithms. As can be clearly seen in the graph, the participants rated the biased interactions 
much higher than the baseline interactions.  
Figure 5.14 shows the distributions of the means plots from each algorithm based on 
the three interactions. In fact, all biased algorithms have means that are higher than the baseline. 
The graph was generated in the repeated measure test in SPSS using post-hoc analysis. From 
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this graph, it can be said that the interactions based on biased algorithms were more popular 
than the baseline across all interactions.  
In all the pairwise comparisons, the Sig (p value) was <0.05 (i.e. a very small 
probability of this result occurring by chance), under the null hypothesis of no difference. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, since p < 0.05. There is strong evidence of 
participants preferring biased algorithm interactions over baseline interactions. It can therefore 
be said that the first group of participants overall preferred the biased algorithms interactions 
over the baseline interactions. Statistical analysis from both group’s data suggest that the biased 
algorithms were able to influence the participants to like and prefer the biased interactions more 
than the baseline single interactions. Furthermore, the second group’s results (Tables 5.17, 5.19 
and 5.21, and Figures 5.12 and 5.14) suggest that such preferences were quite stable, since 
drops in ratings were much less for the biased interactions than for the baseline interactions.  
For the both groups, and for all three biases, the 2-tailed sig (p value) from the paired 
sample t test was <0.05 which indicates the significance of the collected data over a large 
population (Table 5.19 and 5.20), with the sigma p < 0.001 (i.e. a very small probability of this 
result occurring by chance). Also, with p < 0.001, there are significance differences between 
our null hypotheses and alternative hypothesises. Therefore, for the all three biases, the null 
hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, since p < 0.05.  
Therefore for all three biased algorithms, the alternative hypothesis H2 is accepted, 
because for all the cases μ1 > μ2, where H2 = participant’s rating of ‘likeability’ scores are 
greater in all the biased robot interactions. 
Overall, the participants liked the biased interactions more than the non-biased. From 
the above statistical analysis, it can be concluded that all the interactions using biased 
algorithms affected the interaction, and in general the participants significantly liked and 
preferred the interactions using misattribution, empathy gap and lack of knowledge or 
ideocracy effect biases with MARC.  
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5.4 Game-playing interactions with MARC based on the self-
serving and humour effects  
In this final experiment, I compared a robot’s baseline behaviours with its two biased 
behaviours (i.e. self-serving and humour effects bias) through game-playing interactions. The 
robot was controlled remotely (Wizard of Oz). 
The experiments were based on the following local hypothesises for each of the biases 
used: 
For the self-serving cognitive bias: 
If the self-serving cognitive bias is used in social-robot game-playing interactions, then a 
participant’s preference or likability for the robot can be increased due to the human-like 
behaviours the robot exhibits as a result. 
For the humour effects bias: 
If the humours effects cognitive bias used in social-robot game-playing interactions, then a 
participant’s preference or likability towards the robot can be increased due to the human-
like behaviours the robot exhibits as a result. 
To determine the effects of such biases, participants interacted with the robot with such 
biases and offered their ‘likeability’ score (μ1), and the participants interacted with the robot 
without misattribution bias, again providing a ‘likeability’ score (μ2).  
The null hypothesis is that the mean score of the participant’s responses in (μ1) is same 
as the participant’s responses in (μ2): 
i.e. Hypothesis0: μ1 = μ2 
where, 
Hypothesis 0 = Null hypothesis 
(μ1) = the means of the participant’s responses from biased robot interactions 
(μ2) = the means of the participant’s responses from non-biased robot interactions 
The alternate hypothesis is 
Hypothesis 2: μ1 > μ2 
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where, 
Hypothesis 2 = participant’s ‘likeness’ scores are greater in biased robot interactions. 
Therefore, for the individually biased vs non-biased experiments, if the null hypothesis 
is rejected, it can be concluded that the participants liked and preferred to interact with the 
biased version of the robot.   
 
5.4.1 Experiment methods 
In this experiment, two bias based interactions were compared with another interaction, 
developed without the selected biases (Figure 5.15). Two common human biases—self-serving 
and humour effects bias—are compared with the baseline algorithm.  
In the experiments, the robot plays the popular paper-rock-scissors game with the 
participants. This game was used because it is easy to understand, is played in many countries 
and is familiar to all ages and genders. In addition to its accessibility, several other features of 
this game made it appropriate for the selected cognitive bias. The timing of the game is 
particularly important, since if one player is slower than the other, the first can change his or 
her decision or adapt it to win by cheating; this possibility was an important feature for the 
experiments.  
In the self-serving bias, people tend to ascribe success to their own abilities and failures 
to others. To express this bias’s effects, I arranged a rock-paper-scissor game-playing 
interaction with participants where the robot would portray winning as its own achievements 
and skills while bragging about it. On the other hand, when  it failed, the robot always made 
excuses and blamed participants. As this bias also can influence self-esteem, to show this in 
interactions, the robot frequently bragged about winning and accused participants of cheating 
when it lost.  
The humour effect is a memory bias in which people tend to focus on humorous events 
more than non-humorous ones. In the experiment, this bias was compared with a non-biased 
interaction to explore these effects in the robot in human-robot interactions. To express the 
humour effect bias, the robot told various light-hearted jokes to the participants in a game-
playing interaction regardless of the outcomes of the game so that the participants could focus 
on the bias effects more than the games. In the non-biased interaction, the robot did not tell any 
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jokes in the conversational part so that participants could find the differences between the two 
interactions.  
  
Figure 5.15. Experiment structure. 
In this experiment, a group of participants interacted with an individual algorithm over three 
interactions. 
 
Figure 5.16. Interaction structure. 
As depicted in Figure 5.16, participants interact with a selected algorithm in all 
interactions.  
The steps of the interactions were as follows: 
1. Participant enters in the room. 
2. Participant sits in front of the robot (MARC).  
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3. Robots greets the participant and waits for response. 
4. Participant replies. 
5. Robot asks name, address and wellbeing and waits for response.  
a. In the non-biased interaction robot asks and states names, address and 
wellbeing.  
b. In the self-serving biased interaction robot asks and states names, address and 
wellbeing.  
c. In the humour effects interaction robot asks and states name, address and 
wellbeing with humour.  
6. Participant replies.  
7. Robot then moves to the game-explanation stage and asks participant if he or she 
know about rock-paper-scissors. 
8. Participant replies. 
a. In case the participant knows the games and rules, robot then moves to the 
game-playing stage.  
b. In case the participant does not know the game, 
i. in non-biased interaction, robot explains the games and its rules and 
ask if the participant has understood;  
ii. in the self-serving biased interaction, robot explains the game rules and 
ask if the participant has understood; and 
iii. in the humour effects interaction, robot explains the game rules and ask 
whether the participant has understood.  
c. Participant replies with ‘yes’ or ‘no.’  
i. If yes, then in all interactions robot moves to the game playing. 
ii. If not, in non-biased interaction, robot explains the game rules again.  
iii. If not, in self-serving biased interaction, robot asks participant to pay 
more attention and explains the game rules again.  
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iv. If not, in humour effects interaction, robot makes a joke and explains 
the game rules again.  
d. Robot then then moves to the game-playing stage.  
9. Robot and participant both draw their hands.  
a. If robot loses, 
i. in non-biased interaction, robot congratulates participant and asks for 
the next round; 
ii. in self-serving interaction, robot denies losing, makes excuses, calls the 
participant cheater, and demands next round; and 
iii. in humours interaction, robot congratulates the participant with 
humour and asks for the next round.  
b. If robot wins, 
i. in non-biased interaction, robot encourages participant and asks for the 
next round; 
ii. in self-serving interaction, robot brags and asks for next round, and 
iii. in the humour effects interaction, robot makes a joke and asks for the 
next round.  
c. In the case of a draw, 
i. in non-biased interaction, robot declare the hand a draw and asks for 
the another round; 
ii. in self-serving interaction, robot denies draw, demands that it be 
recognized as the winner, and asks for next round; and 
iii. in the humour effects interaction, robot makes a joke and asks for the 
next round.  
10. Robot states the final results: 
a. If robot loses, 
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i. in non-biased interaction, robot congratulates participant and requests 
to play next time; 
ii. in self-serving interaction, robot denies losing, makes excuses, calls the 
participant cheater, and demands to play again next time; and 
iii. in humour effects interaction, robot congratulates participant with 
humour and asks to play again next time.  
b. If robot wins, 
i. in non-biased interaction, robot encourages participant and asks to play 
again next time. 
ii. in self-serving interaction, robot brags and asks to play again next 
time; and 
iii. in humour effects interaction, robot makes jokes and asks to play again 
next time.  
11. Participant replies. 
12. Robot then moves to the farewell stage: 
a. In non-biased interaction, robot thanks participant and invites him or her for 
further interactions. 
b. In self-serving interaction, robot brags about winning or makes excuses for 
losing and invites participant for further interactions. 
c. In humorous interaction, robot makes jokes and invites participant for further 
interaction.  
13. Participant replies. 
14. Robot asks participants to complete the questionnaire and waits for a response. 
15. End of the interaction.  
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5.4.2 Participants and grouping 
A total of 45 participants were randomly chosen from responses to advertisements. The 
participants were divided into three groups, where each of the groups were assigned only one 
algorithm to interact for three interactions (Figure 5.16). The number of different gender, race 
and age groups were maintained as equal for both groups. For all interactions, 15 participants 
were selected to interact with each of the individual algorithms (biased or unbiased) throughout 
the experiments. Such interactions should reveal the effects of each individual algorithm in 
human–robot long-term interactions.  
A demographic of the participants is as follow: 
Table 5.28: Details of the participants 
Gender Age Occupation 
 18 -20 => 5  
Male 22 
 
21 – 40 => 25 Student => 24 
Female 15 41 – 60 => 8 Professionals => 11 
No answer 3 No answer 2 No answer 5 
40 40 40 
 
5.4.3 Data collection and measurements  
Data was collected based on the measurements of the participant’s preference towards the 
biased and unbiased versions of the robot MARC. A seven-point Likert questionnaire was used 
to measure four conditions such as: comfort, pleasure, likeability and rapport.   
As with the previous MARC conversational experiments, the measurements required 
were as follows:  
• Participant’s preference for the algorithms (to get the participant’s preferences), and 
• Changes in preference over a long period of time (to find out whether such preferences 
for the interactions changed over time).  
Three out of four factors are used in the previous MARC experiment. As this 
experiment was based on game-play interactions, another factor was added in the questionnaire 
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to determine whether the participants enjoyed game playing with the robot. This factor was 
called ‘pleasure’, how pleased participants were in game-playing interactions. Based on these 
four dimensions I calculate the participant’s overall preference and how it changes over time. 
Similar to the previous MARC experiment, in the current experiment, the measurements of the 
baseline algorithm were developed to compare with other two biased algorithms. The 
questionnaire was created from various sources; however, for the factors used previously, I 
used the similar questions, and the new ‘pleasure’ factor questions were collected from Kim 
and Mutlu (2014) (see appendix). 
 
Figure 5.17a: Participants interact with self-serving biased MARC. 
 
 
Figure 5.17b: Participants interact with humours effects biased MARC. 
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5.4.4 Experiment scenario 
Two experimental scenarios are shown in Figure 5.17a and 5.17b. Initially, participants were 
very excited to play games with the robot. One situation from the experiment can be described 
as an example. ‘Participant 1’ interacted with the self-serving biased robot three times. In the 
first interaction, she was very competitive in games against MARC. In her first interaction, 
MARC told her to pay attention when she wanted to know the game rules for the second time; 
and she reacted with concern. In the first game round, MARC won and bragged about the win, 
but she wanted to continue the game. In second round, ‘Participant 1’won, and MARC told 
her, ‘I was not ready. I want to play more.’ She replied positively, ‘Okay, we both won one 
time.’ The next round, ‘Participant 1’ won again, and MARC said, ‘Why you are always 
drawing hand after me. It’s not fair. I want to play more.’ Then she replied, ‘No, I was not, we 
drew hand together. But I can play more.’ The next hand, MARC won and said, ‘I win. If you 
play fair, then I will win all times.’ ‘Participant 1’ expressed her surprised and replied, ‘No you 
draw hand after me this time. I want to play once more.’ MARC lost the next hand, and said, 
‘You tricked again. How can I play if you trick every time?’ MARC also added, ‘Do you want 
to play more?’ But ‘Participant 1’ did not want to play more and replied, ‘No, I won 3 times 
and I win.’ The robot replied, ‘Next time I will win. This time you drew hands after seeing my 
hand. Next time I will be more careful,’ and jumped to the next part of the conversation. In her 
comment, ‘Participant 1’ wrote, ‘It was a quite unexpected experience but I’m glad that I won 
the games. I am looking forward for next meeting.’  
In humorous algorithm, MARC makes jokes when games, which made participants 
chuckle and made the interaction more enjoyable. One of the participants commented after 
their first interaction, ‘I enjoyed a lot. Although robot managed to win but I am not at all sad 
the robot made the whole thing very enjoyable.’  
In case of non-biased interactions, robot showed general friendly behaviours without 
biased effects. For example, ‘Participant 2’ who was in the baseline algorithm group came for 
the first-time interaction with MARC and found the robot as very ‘formal’. If MARC wins a 
game, it says, ‘I win this hand. Do you want to play more?’ ‘Participant 2’ replied, ‘Yeah sure. 
Let’s play again.’ MARC won again and said, ‘I win again. Do you want to play more?’ 
‘Participant 2’ might have wanted to win at least one hand, so he replied, ‘Yeah why not? I 
want to play more.’ This time ‘Participant 2’ won and MARC said, ‘Congratulation you win. 
Do you want to play more?’ ‘Participant 2’ replied, ‘Yes! Finally, I beat you. But I will play 
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next time not now.’ In his comment, Participant 2 wrote, ‘I like the game playing specially 
when I beat him. Overall, he’s very formal.’ 
5.4.5 Statistics of the game-playing interactions based on self-serving and 
humour effects biases in MARC the humanoid robot 
 
5.4.5.1  Justification of the statistical analysis procedure 
In this experiment, the participant’s grouping was similar to the second group of the previous 
conversational MARC experiment (Section 5.3), so a similar mixed ANOVA analysis between 
algorithms, factors and interactions was performed. The pairwise statistics and graphs were 
calculated by alternating between and within the subjects of the ANOVA. All results were 
statistically significant, which means that the Sig. (p value) came to 0.000 (<0.05) (i.e., a very 
small probability of this result occurring by chance). 
In all graphs, the x-axis represents the factors and algorithms and the y-axis represents 
the marginal means.  
 
5.4.5.2 Statistics of baseline interactions 
Means of the four factors from three interactions are shown in Table 5.29.  
Table 5.29: Means of all factors in baseline algorithms. 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Comfort 4.35 0.14 4.05 4.64 
Pleasure 4.97 0.14 4.68 5.27 
Likeability 4.82 0.2 4.4 5.23 
Rapport 3.97 0.17 3.63 4.31 
 
The standard error is the standard deviation of the distribution of the mean. It also 
describes the lower and upper limits of the ratings, with a 95% confidence level.  
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5.4.5.3  Statistics of self-serving biased interactions 
Means of the four factors from three interactions are shown in Table 5.30. 
Table 5.30: Means of all factors in self-serving algorithms. 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Lower Bound 
Comfort 5.73 0.14 5.43 6.02 
Pleasure 5.38 0.14 5.09 5.77 
Likeability 5.59 0.2 5.17 6.00 
Rapport 4.89 0.17 4.53 5.22 
 
Table 5.30 shows the means of all factors. Compared to baseline (Table 5.29), the 
means values are higher for the self-serving interactions.  
 
5.4.5.4 Statistics of humours effects biased interactions 
Means of the four factors from three interactions are shown in Table 5.31. 
Table 5.31: Means of all factors in the humour algorithms. 
Measurements Means Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Lower Bound 
Comfort 5.29 0.15 4.9 5.58 
Pleasure 5.6 0.18 5.22 5.96 
Likeability 5.19 0.17 4.85 5.54 
Rapport 5.37 0.13 5.11 5.64 
 
The means for the humour effects interactions are higher than the baseline (5.29). 
Therefore, in this game-playing experiment, the mean ratings from the biased interactions are 
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higher than the baseline interactions for all three interactions. In the next section, I compare 
the means of baseline interactions with those of biased interactions.  
 
5.4.5.5  Pairwise comparison of means based on overall ratings of four factors  
The pairwise comparisons between baseline and biased (humour effects and self-serving) 
algorithms are shown in Table 5.32. 
Table 5.32: Pairwise comparison between algorithms. 
Algorithms Mean 
Differences 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Baseline Self-serving -0.87 0.17 0.000 -1.31 --0.42 
Baseline Humours -0.83 0.17 0.000 -1.28 -0.39 
 
The differences are calculated in negative numbers, as the means for self-serving and 
humour effects biases are higher than the baseline.  
A whisker plot (Figure 5.18) uses the mean differences between non-biased and biased 
ratings, showing the distribution of the ratings based on overall means for each of the 
algorithms.  
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Figure 5.18: Distributions of the means of all factors in three algorithms. 
Overall, in the three interactions, all the factors scored higher for self-serving and 
humour effects biased than for the baseline interactions.  
 
5.4.5.6  Pairwise comparison of means based on three interactions 
Table 5.23 shows the average rating of means from all factors in each of the interactions. In 
this case, the within-subject factor was chosen interactions numbers, and the between-subject 
factor was chosen algorithms types.  
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Table 5.33: Pairwise comparison between algorithms in each interaction. 
Algorithms factor1 Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Baseline 
1st Interaction 5.43 0.15 5.13 5.74 
2nd Interaction 4.44 0.13 4.17 4.71 
3rd Interaction 3.69 0.14 3.4 3.97 
Humours 
1st Interaction 5.61 0.15 5.31 5.92 
2nd Interaction 5.32 0.13 5.05 5.6 
3rd Interaction 5.14 0.14 4.85 5.43 
Self-
Serving 
1st Interaction 5.83 0.15 5.53 6.14 
2nd Interaction 5.26 0.13 4.99 5.54 
3rd Interaction 5.08 0.14 4.79 5.37 
 
The above table shows that means from baseline interactions are lower than for the 
biased interactions; however, in a few cases the baseline means of ratings are higher than the 
biased (e.g. baseline first-interaction mean is 5.43, higher than for either humour or self-serving 
on the second and third interactions), but if the comparisons are based on corresponding 
interactions (e.g. baseline first interaction mean with biased first-interaction means), then 
biased interactions means are always higher than the baseline.  
A whisker plot (Figure 5.19) using the mean differences between non-biased and biased 
ratings shows the distribution of the ratings based on overall means for each of the algorithms, 
for each interaction. A continuous decrease is observable in the means for all interactions. 
However, such declines are greater for the baseline interaction. Compared to baseline drop, the 
biased means decreased a very small amount. Therefore, it can be said that participants who 
interacted with biased algorithms liked these biased based interactions, and their overall 
preference changed less than that of the participants who interacted with baseline behavioural 
algorithms.  
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Figure 5.19: Distributions of average means of three algorithms in all the interactions. 
 
5.4.6 Statistical results discussion 
In this experiment total 40 participants were selected among them 22 were male and 15 were 
female and three did not specify anything. Based on age, 18-20 years were five, 25 were 
between 21 and 40 age group, and 8 were between 41-60 and two did not specify. Based on 
occupations, 24 were students, 11 were professionals and five did not specify. Similar to the 
previous experiments, I analyse data as whole rather than based on gender, age and 
occupations.   
In this experiment, the overall statistical analysis shows a very positive influence of 
self-serving and humour effects biases. In Tables 5.32 and 5.33, it can be seen that in all the 
factors the biased robot scored higher than the baseline. Between the self-serving bias and the 
baseline, the differences of the means for the four factors (Table 5.32) are 1.38 for comfort, 
0.77 for experience likeability, 0.97 for rapport and 0.41 for pleasure. Self-serving bias scored 
high in all factors, but as seen, in the pleasure factor, the difference from the baseline is much 
less than with the others.  
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As can be seen form the rating distributions in Figure 5.19, in the first interaction, there 
is very small difference in the average means of both algorithms; however, in the second and 
third interactions, participants’ ratings dropped significantly for baseline (21.75 − 14.76 = 
6.99). On the other hand, self-serving ratings dropped in the second and third interactions, but 
compared to baseline, the drop was relatively small (23.34 – 20.33 = 3.01). In the interview, 
participants from the self-serving bias group commented on the robot’s excuses for losing a 
game, as at the beginning they thought MARC was genuinely not ready (or the Wizard) or that 
they drew their hand faster, but when MARC started making excuses over and over, they found 
it ‘interesting’ and ‘entertaining’. In the second and third interactions, self-serving-biased 
MARC accused them of cheating whenever it lost a game—in one participant’s opinion, this 
behaviour was highly entertaining and enjoyable.  
From Table 5.32, the 2-tailed sig (p value) from the paired sample t test was <0.05, 
which indicates that the collected data is significant over a large population. From the Table 
5.32, the Sigma p < 0.001 (i.e. a very small probability of this result occurring by chance). For 
both biased interactions compared to non-biased, as the p < 0.001, there are significance 
differences between our null hypothesis and alternative hypothesises. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, since p < 0.05.  
Furthermore, for all the biased interactions compared to non-biased, the H2 is accepted 
because for each biased versus non-biased interaction μ1 > μ2, where H2 = participant’s 
‘likeability’ scores being greater in biased robot interactions. 
For better understanding the comparisons of algorithms I summarise all the means of 
all conditions from this experiment into one table, such as: 
Table 5.34: Summary of the results 
Measurements Baseline Means Self-serving Means Humours effects 
Means 
Comfort 4.35 5.73 5.29 
Pleasure 4.97 5.38 5.6 
Likeability 4.82 5.59 5.19 
Rapport 3.97 4.89 5.37 
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Therefore, it can be said that the participants overall liked the biased interactions more 
than non-biased. From the above statistical analysis, it can be concluded that self-serving and 
humour effects biases affected the interaction, and overall, the participants significantly liked 
the interactions using the self-serving and humours biases with the robot MARC.  
 
5.5 Discussions of the statistical analysis 
The experimental results show that in both ERWIN and MyKeepon experiments, participants 
favoured biased interactions. In both experiments, all participants interacted with both biased 
and non-biased algorithms and preferred the biased versions of the interactions. In these two 
experiments, participants were randomly chosen in groups to determine their first interactions 
to be biased or non-biased. So participants who interacted the first time with the biased 
behavioural algorithm were scheduled to interact with unbiased algorithm in their second 
interactions. Therefore, the overall preference in favour of biased algorithms in both 
experiments was the result of careful comparisons of both algorithms by the participants. In 
both experiments the biased algorithms was able to form preliminary companionship with the 
participants.  
In the experiments using MARC, non-biased robots did not show any common human-
like biased behaviour other than generic impressions, which might be expected from a robot 
by the participants; this could be the reason for the difference in ratings between biased and 
baseline algorithms. In the biased interactions, however, participants found behaviours such as 
forgetfulness, emotional differences, idiotic behaviours, denying, blaming and humorous 
comments, all very common in their lives. This commonality could be the reason for the 
participant accepting and liking the biased interactions more than non-biased, and giving such 
high ratings. When participants found these familiar behaviours in the biased versions of 
robots, they may have found it easier to relate to the robots, which might be why the biased 
algorithms received higher ratings than the non-biased.  
From the statistical results described in this chapter, it can be concluded that the robots 
with cognitive biases were able to develop better interactions than those with non-biased 
interactions. In all the experiments, biased interactions were more popular and garnered more 
positive responses from the participants. Participants liked ERWIN’s behaviours more when it 
misattributed information, liked MyKeepon’s overly playful or non-respondent behaviours, 
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and liked MARC’s forgetfulness, emotional differences and idiotic conversations more than 
their unbiased behaviours in similar interactions. Biased behaviours were also favoured in 
different situations such as winning, losing or tying a game, in which the robot brags about a 
win but blames the participants or the external causes for losing or drawing.  
From the experiments and analysis of collected data, however, it can be concluded that 
cognitive biases in robots can enhance their capacity for companionship with users over a robot 
without biases. These results show the significance of using bias-based algorithms in the social 
robots. Such robots need to interact with their users many times over a long time. Such 
interactions may become repetitive and boring where the robot always shows nice, mechanical 
behaviours such as always agreeing with users, perform any task nicely, never showing any 
type of tiredness, or always obeying the user’s commands. Such social robots could be useful 
as household workers, but they may be difficult to see as friends or companion. As in reality, 
friends and companion are those with whom we like to spend time, who can agree or disagree 
with us and who can act more lively than a repetitive machine. Therefore, if the biased 
algorithms are used in such future household robots who could forget, brag about doing 
something good, show competitive behaviours in games, demonstrate different emotional 
states than users, and try to cheer the user if he or she is sad, then the companionship between 
users and their household robots would be much easier to develop. The cognitive biased 
algorithms suggested in this thesis may help to develop such imperfectly friendly social robot.   
 
5.6 Summary  
This chapter has described four of the experiments thoroughly. At first, for each experiment, a 
local hypothesis was made; I then briefly described the experimental methodology, including 
groups of participants, data collection, and a brief experimental scenario for each of the biases 
used. I discussed the statistical analysis of each of the corresponding experiments and justified 
the statistical methods I used. At the end, I briefly discussed what I learnt from all the 
experimental results and analysis. After reading this chapter the reader should know and 
understand how I carried my experiments and analysed the data collected. I have also explained 
the experimental results and what important information I found after analysing the data.   
In the next chapter, I elaborate the discussion of the findings from the statistical analysis 
and answer and explain the hypothesis and research questions. 
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Chapter 6: 
Discussion of the Hypothesis 
and Research Questions 
6.1 Analysing the first research question, based on statistics 
RQ 1. Despite the robot’s appearance, functions and features, can a robot interact with 
humans in ways similar to human–human interaction by engaging with humans over 
both the long term and the short term, drawing on cognitively biased behaviours?  
The first research sub-question can be answered by summing up the current studies and 
experimental results. In the experiments, three different robots have been used, each of which 
had different types of appearances and functionalities (e.g. ERWIN, MyKeepon, and MARC) 
(Figure 6.1). The robot ERWIN looks has a head that stands on a metal base and can express 
five prototype emotions by moving its jaws and eyebrows. MyKeepon, on the other hand, can 
be described as a small, yellow toy which with various dance moves and jumping abilities, and 
MARC is a humanoid robot and able to perform various gestures as humans do.  
We applied cognitive biases to these three robots and in all our experiments, and the 
robots were engaged in face–to-face interactions multiple times with the same participants. 
Previously discussed data statistics (see Chapter 5) show that participants overall preferred the 
biased algorithm robots more than the non-biased. The misattribution bias was developed on 
both ERWIN and MARC, and the empathy gap bias was developed on both MyKeepon and 
MARC. All interactions were compared with their non-biased version of interactions.  
 186 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Three robots (from the left to right: ERWIN, MyKeepon and MARC) which are was used in 
the experiments. 
In the Chapter 5, the statistics from the ERWIN experiments showed that participants 
rated higher the misattribution interactions than the non-biased (see Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7). 
In Figure 5.4, the distributions of the biased and non-biased interactions can be seen, suggesting 
that in the biased interactions, the ratings were distributed with much higher scores than the 
non-biased interactions.  
In the Chapter 5, the statistics from the MyKeepon experiment (see Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 
5.10) showed that the participants preferred biased interactions more than the non-biased. In 
these experiments the data measured targeted likeability. In Figure 5.6, the distributions of the 
two interactions can be seen, which indicates that in case of biased interactions, the ratings 
were distributed with much higher scores than the non-biased interaction ratings.  
Based on the two experiments with the two varied robots (ERWIN and MyKeepon), it 
can be said the participants were engaged in interactions with both biased and non-biased 
robots, but preferred interacting with biased robots over non-biased ones. The behaviours of 
these biased robots were developed based on the main components of the misattribution and 
empathy gap biases. Participants preferred to interact with the robot which demonstrated such 
biased behaviours (e.g. forgetfulness, differences of understanding the right emotions). so in 
those two experiments, the cognitive biased behaviours showed by the robots made such 
interactions preferable to the participants, despite the robot’s appearances.   
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The results from the current experiments show that robots which carry social 
interactions using cognitively biased behaviours tends to achieve more popularity than robots 
not expressing such biases in social interactions. Based on Breazeal’s (2003) definition of the 
social robot, cognitive biases improve social engagement between humans and robots, and 
therefore we should consider studying more biased behaviours in robots for use in human–
robot interactions. However, it should be remembered that the choice of bias should be careful, 
so that the robot remains ‘sociable’ and ‘socially suited’ (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn 
2003). As the interactions with the social robot should feel ‘…like interacting with another 
person’ (Breazeal, 2000), the use of cognitive biases in the social robots must be considered, 
as it makes robot behaviours more human-like, with human characteristics faults and 
imperfections.  
Also, in the third and fourth experiments, MARC was used, a robot with a humanoid 
shape. The statistics of MARC’s interactions showed that participants rated all biased 
interactions more favourably than non-biased (Tables 5.11 to 5.18 and the pair-wise 
comparisons are from 5.19 to 5.22). Figures 5.11–5.14 show the distributions of the ratings in 
different interactions, which suggests that the ratings distributions in biased interactions were 
higher than the non-biased ratings distributions. The misattribution and empathy gap biased 
interactions in MARC’s experiments got much higher ratings than non-biased interactions. As 
these two biases were previously tested in two different robots, following a similar procedure, 
and the results were similarly positive, such positive responses were not specific to the robot, 
but the way those robots interacted (i.e. showing cognitively biased based behaviours in 
interactions).   
In my experiments, three differently shaped and sized robots were used, and 
participants liked the biased versions of the interactions with such robots more than non-biased 
version interactions. The experiments indicate that the use of cognitively biased behaviours 
influences the likeness of the interactions. The result of this current research is supported by 
the study of Reeves and Nass (1996), who state that human can easily engage with modern 
technologies, and based on that ease, cognitively biased behaviours helped participants to 
anthropomorphise such robots more than the robots that did not express such behaviours. 
Therefore, participants liked the biased version of the interactions more than non-biased 
interactions. This argument is also supported by Fink (2012), who suggests that robots with 
social cues can hold people’s attention, which could help to develop acceptances of robots by 
their users. People express biased behaviours in interactions followed by various verbal-
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nonverbal social cues – similarly, in my experiments the robot expressed such behaviours using 
verbal-nonverbal cues which were easy to understand by the participants and might help them 
to relate with the robot.  
In my first and second experiments, the robots were not humanoid, but cognitivel biased 
behaviours in robots helped robots to project and reflect such humanlike behaviours in their 
interactions; that might help participants relate to robots more easily than non-biased robot 
interactions and to accept the biased version of the robot more than the non-biased version. I 
discussed that anthropomorphic forms can solve design issues and can be used to project and 
reflect human values in other objects and robots (DiSalvo & Gemperle, 2003). Therefore, in 
order to gain more acceptance from the users, the social robot should be developed based on 
human social skills and values and should consider express different biases behaviours so that 
people can easily relate to it.   
The results from the current experiments show that robots which carry social 
interactions using cognitively biased behaviours tends to achieve more popularity than robots 
not expressing such biases in social interactions. Based on Breazeal’s (2003) definition of the 
social robot, cognitive biases improve social engagement between humans and robots, and 
therefore we should consider studying more biased behaviours in robots for use in human–
robot interactions. However, it should be remembered that the choice of bias should be careful, 
so that the robot remains ‘sociable’ and ‘socially suited’ (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn 
2003). As the interactions with the social robot should feel ‘…like interacting with another 
person’ (Breazeal, 2000), the use of cognitive biases in the social robots must be considered, 
as it makes robot behaviours more human-like, with human characteristics faults and 
imperfections. 
 
6.2 Analysing the second research question based on statistics  
RQ2. With cognitive biases introduced in a robot, is it possible to develop 
anthropomorphically biased behaviours in robots to influence human–robot 
interactions? 
In the first experiment, misattribution biased interaction was compared against non-
misattributed interactions on the robot ERWIN (see Section 5.1). In this case, the participant’s 
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overall ‘likeability’ to the algorithms was measured. To measure ‘likeability,' questions were 
asked based on two dimensions: ‘acceptance of the robot’ and ‘participant’s experience of 
likeability'.  
From the Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, it can be seen that the participants rated more 
favourably the misattributed interactions than the non-misattributed interactions. On average, 
the ratings were higher by at least 40 points (i.e. four scales in the rating chart) for each factor. 
In the experiments, participants interacted with both biased and non-biased algorithms. 
Therefore, they compared their interactions and rated them accordingly. The participants 
commented that they found it amusing that the robot could forget and get confused about 
previous interactions. On the other hand, in the non-misattributed interactions, the robot 
interacted with the participants without forgetfulness or any types of mistakes; therefore, it was 
possible that the participants were expecting that the robot would say their information 
correctly, as they originally told the robot in the previous interaction. The differences in ratings 
also suggests that the participants enjoyed the interactions with the biased robots and accepted 
them more than interactions with the non-biased robots. In both factors, participant’s higher 
ratings in biased interactions reveal their preferences for the misattribution-biased algorithm 
more than the non-biased basic algorithm.    
In the MyKeepon experiment, the empathy gap algorithm was compared with the 
baseline algorithm of the robot MyKeepon (see Section 5.2). From the Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, 
it can be seen that participants responded with attitudes similar to those of expressed in the 
previous ERWIN experiments (i.e. higher ratings for the biased interactions than non-biased). 
The data suggests that participants liked both interactions, but preferred biased robots over 
unbiased. MyKeepon used hot-cold empathy gap behaviours, and to express such behaviours, 
the robot became overly joyous, overly sad, responsive or unresponsive during interactions. 
The overall means difference between biased and non-biased was almost 3 (2.97), meaning 
that participant’s ratings in the biased interactions were at least 3 points higher than in non-
biased interactions. The analysis showed that biased interactions were favourable to the 
participants. In this experiment, the measurements were based on similar factors to the previous 
ERWIN experiments (e.g. likeability). In both experiments, the participants rated higher the 
biased interactions; however, the statistics show that there are differences in ‘higher’ ratings 
between ERWIN and MyKeepon robot interactions. These differences may arise from the 
differences in the ratings scales, because in the experiment with ERWIN and misattribution 
bias, a Likert scale of 1–10 was used, while in the experiment with MyKeepon and empathy 
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gap bias, a Likert scale of 1–5 was used, and the subsequent statistical analysis was done based 
on rating scale. In both experiments however, participants preferred the biased algorithms over 
non-biased algorithms.    
In the conversational experiments with MARC, three biased algorithms (misattribution, 
empathy gap and lack of knowledge/ideocracy effects) and one non-biased algorithm were used 
to evaluate three factors: comfort, rapport and likeability. There were two different groups, and 
a total of 70 participants interacted with the robot in three-time interval interactions (see 
Chapter 5.3). From Tables 5.11–5.18, it can be seen that the means from the biased interactions 
were higher than baseline in both groups. The first group of participants interacted with all the 
algorithms and could compare all of the biased and non-biased interactions. Therefore, their 
ratings should have reflected the comparisons between all algorithms, and these ratings show 
that all biased interactions were preferred over the baseline. In Figures 5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 
5.14, the distributions of ratings and the differences in ratings of each algorithms in both of the 
groups can be seen. The second group of participants interacted with an individual algorithm 
three times, and their ratings should reflect the experiences of interacting with similar 
algorithms several different times. These ratings showed that the participants who interacted 
with the baseline algorithm rated the biased algorithm almost the same in the first interaction, 
but their ratings dropped significantly in the second and third interactions. The participants 
interacted with the biased algorithms, which rated constantly high, although in the second and 
third interactions, all ratings dropped compared to the first interactions. The rate of decline, 
however, was much less in the biased algorithms compared than in the baseline algorithm. 
Thus, participants liked the biased interactions and rated them higher in terms of likeability, 
comfort and rapport.  
From the game-playing interactions with MARC, the statistics (shown in Tables 5.23–
5.27) showed that the means were higher in the biased algorithms for factors such as comfort, 
pleasure, rapport and likeability. In this experiment, participants interacted with single 
algorithms and played the rock-paper-scissors game in three interactions. Participant’s 
comments and ratings suggest that they enjoyed MARC’s reactions from the robot for winning 
and losing game hands. Participants pointed out that it was surprising to them that the robot 
argued and bragged in the games. Moreover, the robot denied drawing a game hand or asking 
participants to play fair—these types of behaviours are common among people—and they 
enjoyed the fact that the robot could argue after losing a game as well. Figures 5.18 and 5.19 
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show that the participants rated consistently higher the biased interactions than the non-biased, 
and their ratings did not drop as much as for the unbiased ratings.    
On the other hand, participants experiencing the baseline interactions did not find such 
behaviours in their interaction. The robot responded to losing or winning games without 
arguing or bragging. In the first interaction, participants ratings were similar to those of biased 
interactions, perhaps because the robot was playing rock-paper-scissors with participants, but 
in the later interactions, the baseline algorithm showed similar non-competitive behaviours, 
which could have affected the participant’s experiences, making game more boring, affecting 
their ratings. The robot’s behaviours for all the algorithms did not change much in the second 
and third interactions, so the responses of robot were the same for the algorithms in all 
interactions for winning or losing in games. Despite that, participants in the biased algorithms 
found their interactions competitive and enjoyable and rated them higher in terms of pleasure, 
comfort, rapport and likeability.    
I discussed in Chapter 3 the robot called My Real Baby and how such a robot baby 
expressed facial expressions and different childlike behaviours, which helped adults and 
children to anthropomorphize the robot toy. The results from the current experiments also show 
that expressing humanlike behaviours could help people to anthropomorphize the robot, and 
making it easy for people to relate to. Certain humanlike behaviours and facial expressions in 
My Real Baby helped it to relate with the robot; now, based on the current experimental results, 
if the robot could show few of the cognitive biased behaviours, that could definitely enhance 
the experiences of its users. Therefore, it will be possible in future to create such toy robots to 
express facial expressions and more humanlike behaviours, including biases and imperfections, 
which will help people to understand the robot easily and to ‘enhance the fantasy’.  
The similar thoughts are applicable to my previous discussions (Chapter 3) about the 
robot pet AIBO, Paro and the computer program Eliza – each greatly affected people in terms 
of interactions between human–robot and human-computer program. From the evidence of the 
current experimental results, it can be said that people tend to accept interacting with machines 
if those machines can express behaviours familiar to humans. Eliza expressed understandable 
empathic behaviours while communicating; AIBO and Paro expressed pet-like behaviours with 
which people are familiar. In the current experiments when robots showed biased behaviours 
such as forgetfulness, bragging, cheating and so on, people understood such behaviours 
because people are already familiar with them. People liked interacting with biased robots more 
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than non-biased robots, suggesting that people enjoy communicating with robots that express 
such common and understandable behaviours. It can therefore be said that if social robots could 
express such biased behaviours, their likeability may increase beyond what is possible for 
robots that do not express such behaviours. As the current experiments have proved that 
humour can increase robot likeability, the uses of such behaviours can enhance a robot’s 
likeability to its users, especially in the case of care robots used in childcare and elderly care. 
To use such biases in childcare and elderly care, though, further studies are required, as my 
participants were all adults (18–60); none were children (18 or younger) or the elderly (60+).  
In sum, participants found it interesting and enjoyable to interact with the biased 
algorithms. In Chapter 4, the step-by-step differences between the robot’s behaviours in each 
of the algorithms has been detailed. Such differences in algorithms clearly affected in the 
interactions with participants, producing differences in the ratings. Their ratings suggest that 
they like the robots with cognitively biased behaviours—making mistakes, forgetting 
information, expressing different emotional states, bragging, blaming, and making jokes—
more than the robot without such behaviours. It can therefore be concluded that cognitive biases 
can make robot behaviours more human-like, influencing human–robot interactions.  
In the Section 3.3, I stated why I am considering cognitive biases in social robots, and 
after analysing the experimental results, I conclude that some of the biases have the potential 
to increase the likeability of social robots. This could be because of human beings having 
characteristic flaws, biases and imperfections, and finding similar flaws and biases in robots 
could help these robots to be liked more easily. It is possible that in seeing similar forgetfulness, 
bragging and other biased behaviours in robots, people found it easy to understand their 
interactions and found the robots easy to relate to. I enquired before starting my experiments 
whether people would like such biased behaviours in robots and thus accept such behaviours; 
the experimental results show that people usually like to interact with robots having such biased 
behaviours more than robots without such behaviours. People liked the imperfect and biased 
behaviours they notice in people in their daily lives to have in the social robots. I stated that 
people find it difficult to relate to others who are too perfect, and as an example, I offered the 
character of Mary Sue character (Chapter 3.3.1), noting that people like to know about realistic 
characters rather than too perfect which feels as mechanical, unrealistic characters. The current 
experimental results indicate that such an account of human preference holds in human–robot 
interactions as well. If the robot shows humanlike behaviours with biases and characteristic 
faults, then people find it more relatable than more mechanical versions of the robot.  
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Although we have not perfected the technology of social robots, to make a robot more 
social and likeable for people, it is possible to develop some of the selected biased behaviours 
in robots. I discussed developing trait-based personalities (Lee et al., 2006), moods and 
emotions (Dautenhahn et al., 2009) in social robots, and evidently biases are also common in 
people (Schacter (1999), Kruger and Dunning (1999)); the current research concludes that 
using biased behaviours in robots increases their likeability; therefore, it can be safely said that 
we should consider developing select cognitive biases in social robots to make those more 
relatable and likeable to people. 
 
6.3 Analysing the third research question based on statistics 
RQ3. Will cognitive biases help humans to develop human–robot interactions over the 
long term?  
This question can be answered by analysing the conversational and game-playing 
interactions of MARC the humanoid robot and participants. In the current research the word 
‘long-term’ has been used to describe the intervals between two experiments which were used 
in my third and fourth experiments. Usually the time intervals between two experiments were 
two weeks—based on factors such as participant’s availability, room and robot preparation. As 
there were minimum two-week intervals between two interactions, to complete the whole set 
of experiments (i.e., three interactions between robots and participants) required at least a 
month, and I called these two experiments long-term experiments. It can therefore be said that 
the term ‘long-term’ in my experiments does not refer to long-time continuous interaction, but 
it meant the whole duration of the experiment including three interactions and the interval times 
(i.e. two weeks or more) between two consecutive interactions. 
In the first conversational experiment, participants interacted with MARC over three 
time interval interactions. Participants were divided into two groups in this experiment, where 
in the first group participants interacted with all four algorithms, but in the second group, 
participants interacted with only one algorithm. The data (shown in Tables 5.11–5.18) from 
both groups, show that the participants preferred the biased algorithm interactions more than 
the baseline interactions in all four factors of comfort, experience, likeability and rapport. It 
can be seen that in the first interactions, participants rated the interactions as almost the same, 
but their ratings dropped in the second and third interactions. The drops in ratings were greater 
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for the baseline algorithm. In the biased algorithms, such as ideocracy and the empathy gap, 
ratings dropped in the second interaction, but increased again in the third interaction. For the 
misattribution-biased algorithm, ratings gradually dropped in all three interactions, but it 
should be noted that the level of decrease was low compared to the baseline interactions. The 
reasons for this difference might include differences in algorithms and their unique behaviours 
based on the biases for different interactions. It is clear from the graph, however, that the 
participants rated more highly the biased algorithm interactions for all three interactions 
compared to the baseline. For the second group of participants, the differences in the ratings of 
all dimensions were very clear, compared to the first group. There are differences in the biased 
interaction ratings as well, but in all the interactions, participants’ ratings were much higher for 
the biased algorithms.  
In the game playing experiments with MARC, the interactions were based only on an 
individual algorithm. From Figure 5.19, the means distribution graph for all interactions, it can 
be seen that the overall ratings for the biased algorithm were higher in the interactions. In the 
first interaction, the means were at almost the same level all algorithms, but these means then 
diverged in later interactions. Although the ratings dropped for both the biased and baseline 
algorithm, the decrease is greater for the baseline interaction than for the biased interaction. 
Figure 5.19 makes clear that participants preferred the biased algorithm interactions over the 
baseline interactions, in all three interactions.  
From these two methodologically divergent experiments, it can be said that the 
cognitive biases played an important role in making the ratings (i.e. participant’s preferences) 
higher in the biased interactions. The three interactions were performed between the participant 
and the robot, spanning a two-month period, in order to provide long intervals of time to allow 
participants to reflect on their previous interactions. Our data suggests that even in such time 
interval interactions, participant ratings favoured the biased algorithms. Ratings changed 
regarding biased interactions, and sometimes the biased ratings were lower than previous 
interactions, but for the baseline algorithm, the ratings always dropped from the first interaction 
to the final interaction. From these two long-term experiments (i.e. interval times between two 
interactions at least two weeks or more) with MARC, it can be said that the cognitive bias can 
make for better performance in human robot interaction.   
The findings from the current research can answer the Hayoun’s (2014) question: ‘How 
can we interact with something “more perfect” than we are?’ (Section 3.3). Other than the 
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obvious technological barriers, the use of humanlike character flaws and biased behaviours in 
the social robots may make the robot more ‘interactable’. Humanlike cognitively biased 
behaviours in social robots could break the sense of ‘more perfect’ than what we are now, so 
that people can interact and relate to social robots easily, leading to future human–robot long-
term companionship. However further studies are required to find out the potentials of 
cognitive biases in developing long-term human-robot companionship, as the current thesis 
only shows results from short interactions performed over long time intervals.  
Based on such observations, cognitive biases can be used for social robots where it must 
have frequent interactions with people, for example in health care robots. I discussed in Chapter 
3 how elderly care robots need to feature easy-to-understand interfaces and anthropomorphic 
behaviours to provide physical and psychological comfort, mainly because of elderly people’s 
health issues. I have discussed robots such as PARO being used in studies in Japanese care 
homes as a pet for elderly. From current experimental results and notes from literature reviews 
(DiSalvo & Gemperle, 2003), it can be said that if we develop certain cognitive biases in such 
robots, elderly people may be able to anthropomorphize the robot more easily and allow it to 
more readily entertain them—so that they can relate to the robot. In the current experiments, 
however, I did not use any care robot, nor the healthcare environment, to study the effects of 
the biases in elderly care; as such, to examine this idea in health care, a proper investigation is 
needed using elderly care robots and proper care environment (e.g., care home, hospitals).      
 
6.4 Discussions of the main hypothesis 
If a selection of cognitive biases can be used in social-robot interactions, then human 
preferences about and fondness towards robot can be increased as a result of the 
behaviours exhibited by the robot.  
The main hypothesis can be analysed and answered by combining the explanations of 
all three research questions. From discussions of the RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3, the following can be 
concluded:  
1. Cognitive biases can effectively influence human–robot interactions positively, 
regardless of the shape, size or colour, functions, or features of the robot. 
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2. Cognitive biases can amicably make the robot’s behaviours human-like, which can 
influence the degree of human–robot interaction. 
3. Cognitive bias can produce better outcomes in long-term human–robot interaction 
than can the interactions without such biases.  
Based on the above three conclusions, cognitive bias positively improves human–robot 
interactions, even over the long term. Developing cognitive biases in social robot’s behaviours 
can help to strengthen the fondness of the users in human–robot interactions. 
In all of four experiments, with five different cognitive biases on three different robots, 
participants preferred the biased interactions over the non-biased. As seen in the first and third 
experiments, using misattribution bias was quite popular in ERWIN and MARC. The empathy 
gap bias made a significant difference in ratings in the experiments with MyKeepon (second 
experiment) and MARC (third experiment). The lack of knowledge or the ideocracy effects 
made for better conversations with MARC (third experiment) than baseline conversation. 
Humorous effects made differences in the participant’s ratings in game-playing interactions 
with MARC (fourth experiment). Participants found playing games with self-serving MARC 
more enjoyable. All the experiments suggest that all biased algorithms were popular to the 
participants and could garner more attention from users than interactions without such biases.  
On the other hand, the baseline algorithms were less popular in the interactions. The 
participants preferred interactions with the biased versions of the robots in all the experiments. 
This result can be explained by the participants’ preference of interactions in which they 
observed similarities with natural human behaviours—forgetfulness, inability to understand 
another’s emotional state, inability to understand its own lack of stupidity, bragging, blaming 
and humour—all of which helped participants to relate with the robots. Such behaviours in 
robots managed to get the participant’s attention, and the participants found it very interesting 
to interact with such a robot that shows typically biased behaviours. Even though the ratings 
were dropped in second and third interactions for all biased and non-biased interactions in the 
conversational and game playing experiments with MARC, such rating drops in biased 
interactions were small compared to those of the non-biased interactions. Participants felt more 
comfortable interacting with biased algorithms, as such behaviours are known to them. 
Participants were pleased to recognise such biased behaviours in robots, and they liked the 
biased interactions more than the non-biased. Such comfort, pleasure and likeability in biased 
interactions helped them to build rapport with the biased robots, beyond what was established 
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with the non-biased versions of the robots. In all the experiments, participants liked the biased 
algorithms and rated them higher in all factors. Therefore, cognitive biases can influence 
human–robot interactions positively in the long term. As described in the methodology section, 
the study was performed only with adult participants (aged 18–55); therefore, this study does 
not specify the effects of such cognitive biases on elderly and children.   
6.5 Discussions and lessons learned 
At the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 1), I set several objectives for this study. As my 
approach to developing human-like skills and behaviours in social robots by developing 
various cognitive biases is novel, choosing appropriate cognitive biases for the investigation 
was very important. However, in Section 3.5, I established certain principles to follow in 
choosing the biases for this study. The chosen cognitive biases have various effects on humans, 
and to develop such behaviours it was important to understand which of the behaviours should 
be developed in robots and how. I discussed previously that only the main components of the 
biases were developed in robot, and I described how such behaviours can be easily recognised 
by people in human–robot interactions. I did not manipulate the control systems of the robots; 
rather, I developed the biased behaviours based on the robot’s own interactive abilities (e.g. 
verbal, non-verbal, emotional and gestural expression, and other movements performed by the 
robots). To perform the actual participant-robot interactions and to understand the responses 
from the participants clearly, I set various targets for data collection (i.e. likeability, comfort, 
pleasure and rapport) and asked participants relevant questions on these four factors to get their 
clear view. Furthermore, the methodology I used clearly distinguishes between interactions 
based on biases and non-biases by comparing several interactions and collecting data from 
similar questionnaires. I also monitored the changes in participant’s responses over time 
interval interactions and how that information could help in developing biased skills and 
behaviours in the social robots. After the investigations of the five selected cognitive biases in 
practical human–robot interactions and analysing the collected data statistically, I conclude that 
these cognitive biases have an important role to play in making human–robot interactions more 
likeable for users. Based on the statistical analysis, it can be said that biased algorithms can be 
used in social robots to enhance their behaviours to make human–robot interactions more 
enjoyable for the participants.  
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According to the research conducted in this thesis and the review of various studies on 
sociable robots and human interaction, several statements can be made. As discussed earlier, 
the introduction of cognitive biases to a robot will help to ensure that the participant has better 
and more preferred interactions with the robot than the interaction with non-biased robot. For 
example, I have discussed the social robots Kismet and KASPAR, which were used in several 
HRI studies (Breazeal, 2003; Dautenhahn, 2009). In my understanding, based on the 
experiment results of the current thesis, if the selected cognitive biases can be introduced in 
such robots, then their interactions with people could be further improved. It would be 
considered more human if such Kismet and KASPAR could make mistakes and show biased 
based behaviours in their interactions.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Dautenhahn (2009) has observed that the autistic children 
had positive responses to the minimally expressive robot KASPAR. From the current thesis, 
we learn that cognitive biases can make interaction much more enjoyable and likeable for the 
participants. However, it would be interesting to study how such biased behaviours effect 
interactions in between autistic people and robots. Because in the real world people behave 
based on their thinking and judgements, which are affected by the cognitive biases (Bless et 
al., 2004), it would be important to study human interactions in different situations (e.g. how 
autistic children behave towards a robot forgetting, bragging, making small jokes in 
conversations etc.), and the use of cognitive biases in robots could be proven helpful for the 
autistic children to understand the real world interactions in such occasions.  
In Section 2.3, I discussed the faulty robot and the research carried out by Salem, 
Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, and Dautenhahn (2015), in which they discovered that people do 
not trust unusual requests from robots and prefer to trust robots in familiar conditions. 
However, in this thesis, I did not investigate the trust issue between a robot showing biased 
behaviours and a robot in the ‘correct’ condition. The interactions we organised were mainly 
social conversations and short games between participants and the robots; only non-harmful 
biased behaviours were chosen for the interactions. Consequently, the biases only affected the 
behaviours which the robots used to interact with participants and not any other findings, but 
the results of my experiments suggest that people enjoyed the interactions where biased 
behaviours were shown by a robot. I also discussed the research work of Robinette et al. (2016) 
in Section 2.3. The authors found that people followed orders in an emergency situation from 
a robot which had made mistakes. In this way, it is possible that people appreciate a robot 
which makes mistakes in tasks but shows non-harmful biased behaviours, as shown in my 
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experiments; furthermore, it is also possible that they may feel more trust for the faulty robot 
with such biased behaviours. However, further studies are needed to investigate this theory. 
As the study suggests that the biased behaviours could be popular for conversational 
and game-playing interactions with people, so the current model of developing cognitive biases 
may prove useful in other models for developing social skills in social robots. For example, the 
selected cognitive biases can be used in Meerbeek’s (2009) user-centred personality model for 
domestic robots to improve the quality of the interactions between the user and the personal 
robot. Meerbeek’s (2009) model suggests developing different traits in the robot based on the 
user’s personality profile, and in that profile if it is possible to know the choices of different 
behaviours for users, in my understanding, selected cognitive biases based on such behaviours 
could be develop in robots to help users to relate to robots more easily.  
The use of cognitive bias may prove helpful in the TAME, as studied by Moshkina et 
al. (2011), who developed a complex architecture of traits, attitudes, mood and emotions (see 
Chapter 2). As the experimental results of the current study suggest that the participants 
preferred cognitive biases in the robot, if such selected biases can be added in such TAME 
model, then the likability of such model can be improved.  
The findings from this research may also help to reduce the uncanny valley effects. The 
results from the third and fourth experiments with MARC the humanoid robot (Figure 6.1) 
suggest that participants liked the biased interactions with that humanoid robot, and their 
‘ratings drops’ for their preference towards the biased robot in the second and third interactions 
were much smaller than in the baseline interactions. These results suggest that even for a 
humanoid robot which resembles a human, cognitive biased behaviours were able to keep the 
attention of the participants more than the non-biased behaviours. Therefore, such biases can 
be used in other humanoid robots, and it is expected that people will find such biased robot’s 
behaviours much more appealing, which could help to reduce the uncanny valley effects; 
therefore, human–robot companionship would be possible. This claim is actually supported by 
Walters’s (2008), who found that people tend to prefer human-like attributes in robots (see 
Chapter 3). The cognitive biases are one of the very common human attributes which effect on 
people’s judgements and decisions, and people acts based on such biased decisions. If cognitive 
biases can be developed in the robots then people may be able to relate with them because of 
such known attributes developed in robots, which may help to reduce uncanny valley effects.  
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I have discussed in the Chapter 2 and 3 that anthropomorphism is one of the most 
popular ways to develop skills and behaviours which people can relate to. I gave examples such 
as ELIZA, which is a computer program without any embodiment, but was very popular as it 
showed interest in learning users’ personal problems, or Sony’s AIBO robot dog, which was 
also popular as a household pet robot and entertainer. Robot receptionist Valerie could show 
emotions and expressions, very popular among visitors. In all these examples, researchers 
developed various anthropomorphic behaviours so that people could understand and relate to 
them. The results from of first experiment suggest that a machine-like robot ERWIN could 
make very likeable interactions with participants based on the human-like ‘forgetfulness’ 
behaviours, developed based on misattribution bias. In the second, third, and fourth 
experiments, toy-like robot MyKeepon and humanoid robot MARC showed various 
cognitively biased behaviours in their interactions, which were also liked and preferred by 
participants. The cognitive biased behaviours played an important role in making the 
behaviours of the three different looking robots (Figure 6.1) more human-like and 
understandable to participants. Cognitively biased behaviours, for example, forgetting, 
misunderstanding, ideocracy, bragging and humours in those robots helped participants to 
anthropomorphise the robots, and they liked the interactions. This insight is supported by 
various studies (Duffy, 2003; Fink, 2012; Lee et al., 2005) suggesting that social cues, emotions 
expressions, traits based personalities, moods, and other human-like skills and behaviours can 
help people to anthropomorphise robots. Therefore, from such literature and from the current 
experimental results, I conclude that cognitive biases in robots can help people to 
anthropomorphise robots and relate with them.  
The results of the third and fourth experiments with MARC indicate that participant’s 
preferences towards biased-based interactions declined much less than their preferences 
towards non-biased robot interactions. These findings could be discussed in the arguments of 
Baxter’s (2011) notable ‘memory’ issue in social robots for developing long-term interactions 
with children. As we have seen that misattribution-biased interactions were preferred by the 
participants over the interaction without such bias, it also can be argued that, if the 
misattribution and forgetfulness can be used in robot behaviours, they can help to reduce such 
issues between human–robot interactions, which could help to develop human-robot 
interactions.   
The results in this thesis suggest that people like social robots with human-like faults 
and characteristic biases, and robots prone to making the common mistakes that humans make 
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on a regularly. Therefore, social robots should have such characteristics in their interactive 
behaviours, since such behaviours should lead to the acceptance of these robots in interaction 
with humans.  
The interesting finding of the current research is that people usually do not like those 
biases used in this studies in other people, but they liked those biased behaviours in our studies. 
Cognitive biases affect thinking and judgement, and therefore, they influence information 
which individuals can notice (Pereita, Tenera, & Wemans, 2013). Memory biases, such as 
misattribution, cause misattribution and forgetfulness of previously known information. Self-
serving bias causes people to perceive themselves in overly favourable manners. Among the 
effects of the empathy gap is the inability to understand others’ true emotions. Most of the 
cognitive biases used in the current experiments are perceived as unattractive in humans but 
were popular when used in the social robot’s behaviours.  Biases mainly affect human thinking 
and thus also their behaviours. On the contrary, people perceive social robots as machines 
which are incapable of free thought; therefore, certain bias-driven mistakes are unexpected 
from social robot behaviour. Biased behaviours such as forgetting, misattributing information, 
effects of the empathy gap, bragging and so on were unexpected in such human-robot 
interactions, and after the participants experienced such behaviours from the robot, they were 
surprised. However, such behaviours are quite common in human nature and sometimes are 
unwelcome by others. Therefore, people’s enjoyment of such biases in robots could be the 
result of their surprise.     
The results of the experiments show that the participants enjoyed the effects of the 
selected biases in the robot during the interactions. To understand their ‘liking’ to such effects 
of biases, I discussed various possibilities, including surprise effects of the participants, of such 
biased behaviours in robots; participants were surprised to experience forgetfulness, bragging, 
blaming or other developed biased behaviours in a robot which are usually not very common 
in social robots. Those types of biased behaviours might have surprised the participants, and 
they liked those interactions more than the non-biased interactions. A question could then arise 
regarding the human biases in a robot, which makes robot’s behaviours popular: what about 
robot’s own limitations and faults – why are those robot-like faulty behaviours unappealing? 
This question can be answered by addressing the expectations towards robots and the 
‘naturality’ of objects. Studies have reported that people’s expectations of a robot may vary 
based on culture, geographical area, society and individuals’ own perceptions. For instance, 
the Japanese people expect robots to perform household tasks without any intervention, 
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whereas European culture prefers to communicate with the robot using voice commands 
(Haring, Mougenot, Ono, & Watanabe, 2014). Bartneck, Kanda, Mubin, and Mahmud (2009) 
suggested that perceptions of animacy and intelligence are closely related, and this relation 
affects the appearance and behaviours of the robot and creates a perception of intelligence. 
Kwon et al. (2016) suggested the possibilities of differences in people’s expectations towards 
a robot and its actual intelligence and capabilities. Literature and movies sometimes portray 
robots as intelligent machines for helping humans or as destroyers of mankind, both of which 
are far from reality. On the other hand, biases can be said as the shortcuts of human thinking, 
which affect their judgements. In this way, biases mainly affect human thinking and thus their 
behaviours. On the contrary, people perceive social robots as machines which are incapable of 
free thoughts, and therefore certain bias-driven mistakes are unexpected from social robot 
behaviours. Biased behaviours, such as forgetting, misattributing information, empathy gap 
effects or bragging, were unexpected in such HRIs, and participants were surprised after 
experiencing such behaviours from the robot. However, such behaviours are quite common in 
human nature and are sometimes unwelcome by others. Therefore, that people liked such biases 
in robots could be a result of their surprise. Similarly, machine-like faults such as Siri and 
Alexa’s faulty voice recognition, system freezes, iPad and iPhone touchpad problems and other 
faulty behaviours are common in machines and therefore ‘natural’ in robots. So, when a robot 
fails to understand a user’s voice commands, navigates incorrect paths or fails to recognize 
familiar faces, we do not get surprise because we know these behaviours are ‘natural’ in robots.   
I discussed the cognitive biases in certain modern technologies, such as Siri, which was 
accused of having halo effects and abortion biases, both of which allegedly created the wrong 
impressions among users, but using cognitive biases such as humour at appropriate times can 
improve the likability of such applications. Although such voice devices and applications used 
in phones and personal computers (e.g., Siri, Cortana, Amazon Echo etc.) are created to assist 
people and to be personal, a proper study should be conducted before developing cognitive 
biases in such voice applications. I discussed earlier (chapter 3.5.5) that people sometime like 
to have regular news in comedic form (Jasheway, 2016), so if humours effects biases can be 
developed in such voice assistant to delivering news that can increase user likeness towards 
such applications.   
I mentioned Friedman and Nissenbaum’s (1996) study and stated that in future it is 
possible people will prefer their daily-use technological devices to respond to them based on 
their own characteristics and behaviours. I used the examples of Google and Facebook, which 
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create person-specific profiles for marketing purposes. In the information age, people tend to 
argue with others they do not really know and express and fight for their opinions all over 
social media; this is an example of the self-serving bias (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 
1998) I discussed in Chapter 3—sometimes this bias has serious consequences. However, we 
have seen in our current experiments that, if carefully used, self-serving bias could be very 
useful in human–robot interactions; in this vein, much more research is needed on such social 
media and how it is possible to make good use of such biases and make them harmless on the 
Internet. Similar to these social media issues, to create person-specific experiences, marketing, 
and applications and to make use of person-specific biases in daily technologies, we need 
further study. As the current study shows, if carefully used, some cognitive biases can increase 
social robots’ likeability; therefore it is expected that after further study, some of the biases 
will be found to help to achieve such goals in social media and to create person-specific 
applications.   
In Section 3.3, I discussed strong and weak AI and how people are concern about such 
concepts. People are concerned about the growing uses of weak AI (e.g., automated voice 
services, spy cameras, computer surveillance, etc.) in our daily lives and expect catastrophe 
any time. Although the current research is not directly related to AI, its results can be extended 
from its current contexts, and it can be said that people like to see humanlike flaws, biases in 
machines. If the modern technologies which use weak AI could adopt certain human biases 
and present itself in a more humanlike manner, the concerns regarding such technologies may 
be diminished. However, further study and research is needed on this topic, as most of the 
cognitive biases in people have negative effects; such biases in strong AI should therefore be 
treated with care.  
The results from my experiments showed that people liked to interact with robots which 
showed similar cognitive biased and imperfect behaviours as humans show. For example, 
people liked when the robots ERWIN and MARC misattributed information, MyKeepon and 
MARC showed lack of empathic behaviours in game playing, MARC expressed bragging 
behaviours and told jokes in game playing. Such behaviours are evidently common in human 
and I discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 3.5), for example, Schacter (1999),  Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay  (1993) showed the effects of source confusions in people; and 
Cryptomnesia, Nordgren, Banas & MacDonald (2010), Ariely & Loewenstein (1999) and 
others showed the effects of empathic gap; Kruger and Dunning (1999) showed the effects of 
lack of knowledge in human behaviours; Campbell & Sedikides (1999), DeMichele et al 
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(1998), Shepperd et al (2008) and other scientists showed the effects of self-serving biases; and 
Strick et al.(2009), Ziv (1988), Rust & Goldstein (1989), Ziv & Gadish (1989), Lauer, Lauer 
& Kerr (1990), Kuiper, Martin & Olinger (1993), Kuiper, McKenzie & Belanger (1995) and 
many other scientists showed various effects of humours effects biases in human behaviours. 
So based on the current experimental results it can be said that if the future social robots can 
show such cognitive biased behaviours, then people will like such behaviours in robots. The 
current experimental results can be extended to other technologies which interact with people 
regularly, for example, I already discussed (Chapter 3.3) about the automated voice processing 
system such as Siri, Cortana, Amazon echo etc. which can be beneficial by using the effects of 
selected cognitive biases. Other technologies such as global positioning system (GPS), Satellite 
Navigation systems, voice navigation system in cars, automated voice customer services, 
various self-help machines can use selected cognitive biases such as humours effects to 
improve the interactions with people. For example, interactive voice response (IVR) in 
banking, retails and other customer care services sounds very mechanical and sometime feels 
very annoying, but if such IVR system can use humours effects while interacting with people 
then such services can be improved. This argument can be supported by the works of Martin 
et al. (2003) where they showed that interpersonal form of humours such as telling jokes, saying 
funny things, or witty banter can ease and amuse people and improve interpersonal 
relationships. I discussed in Chapter 3.1. about various domestic robots, and in the future if 
such domestic robots (e.g. Roomba, Bosch’s Indego, butler bot Charley etc.) can socially 
interact with people then uses of selected cognitive biased behaviours can improve the 
interactions with users. For example, if the butler bot Charley interacts with guests using 
humours and jokes while serving them then such interactions can amuse the guests and as 
results they will probably visit in the hotel for next time. It is expected that robot receptionists 
will be used in various places such as museum, airport, shopping mall etc. and if those robots 
can show humours and other selected biased behaviours then such behaviours can attract more 
visitors and can improve interactions. 
The above discussion is actually found in the current experimental results as well. I 
discussed the limitations of the MyKeepon experiment in which similar behaviours were used 
in different sequences to distinguish between biased and non-biased behaviours. It can be seen 
in the result that due to the unresponsive nature of the non-biased and ‘cold state of empathy 
gap’, the differences in ratings were not high enough compared to the second empathy gap 
experiment with the MARC robot. It is possible that, in both interactions, participants thought 
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that the robot’s unresponsive behaviours were the results of the robot’s ‘natural’ faults and 
therefore the surprise effects were not effective. The surprise effects actually decreased over 
time, as we can saw decrements in ratings in the MARC experiments where participants usually 
interacted three times with the robot. The results showed that participants’ ratings fell for some 
effects of biases in the second and third interactions. It can be said that the surprise effects of 
those biases faded for the later interactions as the participants were already familiar from the 
previous interactions with the robot, and they were aware of such effects of biases. Therefore, 
in later interactions, the same effects did not surprise them as much as in the first interaction.  
The current experiment results show that participants enjoyed and developed a 
preferred relationship faster with biased and imperfect robots than the robots without the bias, 
and they also show how cognitively biased interactions can foster better relationships with 
participants than the interactions without such bias. We know that individuals prefer their own 
ways of interacting based on their own characteristics. Robots with different cognitive biases 
can fit into these preferences, so the robot could become more likable to individuals. As the 
experimental results suggest, such biased robots capable of interacting based on the user’s 
characteristics could become good assistive companions and should be able to sustain human–
robot companionship. Biased robots are therefore more likely to improve relationships with 
participants. As such, biased, imperfect behaviours can be implemented in social companion 
robots, allowing for an improved interaction in assisting their users. 
  
6.6 Difficulties and limitations 
In the MyKeepon experiments, MyKeepon interacted based on general social queues (eye 
contact, greetings, forging a bond, etc.) using actions like jumping, dancing, staring and making 
various noises. The biased MyKeepon used the same actions in different sequences to express 
its biased behaviours so it could occur that the participants sometimes did not notice any 
significant differences between biased and unbiased interactions compared to ERWIN 
experiments. However, to better understand the effects of empathy gap in a robot in human-
robot interactions, I used conversational interactions using the MARC robot. In this 
experiment, the robot followed similar rules for expressing hot and cold states of the empathy 
gap (see Chapter 5.2), but due to conversational interactions combined with the robot’s 
movements, the bias effects were expressed better than in the previous MyKeepon experiment. 
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Due to the conversation and different moves of the humanoid robot MARC, it was possible to 
distinguish the differences from the non-biased interactions much more clearly than in the 
previous MyKeepon experiment. Therefore, it is expected that the participants understood the 
differences in biased and non-biased behaviours of the robot in the MARC experiment. 
The MARC experiments posed particular challenges; for instance, the 3D-printed robot 
face was rigid, so the only way to show the expressions with MARC was with body movements. 
A concrete model of human body movements was needed for different expressions, so that it 
could be developed into a robot. After consulting with my supervisor and the literature, I 
followed the gestural model of Bremner et al. (2009), which was relevant to our research, as 
they studied gestures focussed on human–human conversations. Another challenge was the 
limited abilities of the robot. Certain gestural actions could not be implemented in the robot 
because of limitations with motors and movements. Sometimes, the motor would overheat 
causing the robot to jam. On a few occasions, the ‘connect’ facility in the robot’s chest had to 
be shut down due to the small room size and the movements of other people in the room. The 
most difficult challenge was to present different biases and imperfectness effects with limited 
gestural expressions. It is possible for humans to express certain gestures in many ways, but 
for a robot with limited abilities, actions and speech had to be used at the same time to make 
the participants understand the different effects of the biases. As described in the Section 4.2.3, 
action and speech queues were used to make the expressions.   
Another limitation could be not considering to compare the robot’s own biases with the 
participant’s. Robot’s biases such as looks, functionalities and appearances could have different 
impacts on the participants and participant’s ratings towards the experiments could have been 
influenced by that. Therefore further study in details on this subject is required to explore the 
effects of the biases in robot in human-robot interactions.   
In addition to the above difficulties, the study has other limitations. The selection of 
participants based on the chosen age groups and responses from the advertisements were 
limited. The results of the experiments may be true only for certain age brackets (e.g. 18–60). 
As the cognitive biases are considered mostly for negative effects in humans, some of the 
effects, for example, forgetfulness (which was popular among the younger generation) might 
be so popular among older people (70+). Also, such behaviours may even be dangerous, for 
example, if the robot forgets to bring the medicine on time, which could negatively affect the 
user and obviously would represent failure in a personal robot. As descried in the methodology 
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section the study was performed only with the adult participant (18-60), therefore this study 
does not specify the effects of such cognitive biases on younger and children (less than 18 years 
old). Furthermore, game-playing activities with competitive behaviours may prove useful, but 
much study of this subject remains necessary.  
Another limitation lies in the selections of biases in the robot. For example, in the 
current study biases were chosen based on three principles to investigate in a laboratory 
environment study. It is possible that in the real-time home environment study, such biases 
may not result in similar popularity. Therefore, further studies are needed on user-profiling-
based investigation on the cognitive biases, so that it may be possible to develop a universal 
model accepted by anyone in any environment.  
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of contribution 
This thesis has presented a novel idea for designing social behaviours for the sociable robots 
intended to improve human–robot interactions, which has potential use in fostering human-
robot companionship. This idea of developing different cognitive biases in a robot for human–
robot interactions is itself one of the main contributions to the field of social robotics.   
The design principles of cognitively biased algorithms discussed in this thesis suggest 
how to develop main components of such biases in robots, based on robots’ own interactive 
behaviours. I have presented both the theoretical principles and examples of biases 
development, step by step, based on the conversational and game-playing interactions (Chapter 
4). In the future, however, this method could be applied and improved by involving control 
system configuration.  
The investigation results with MARC and the five cognitive biases indicate that 
participants liked and preferred bias-based interactions more than non-biased interactions, as 
performed on separate occasions over time. Therefore, in the long term, it is possible to keep 
participant’s engagement with the robot high if cognitively biased behaviours are used in 
human–robot interactions.  
All the experiments described in Chapter 5 shows comparisons between biased and 
non-biased versions of robots. The experimental results demonstrate that such cognitively 
biased algorithms for robots can be successfully developed and put into use, and they compare 
favourably to existing methods for developing cognitive behaviours in robots.  
From the research described in this thesis, we learnt that cognitive biases can play an 
important role in human–robot interactions. The uses of different biases have proven very 
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useful in developing such interactions over a long-term period (i.e. including the time intervals 
between two consecutive interactions) in our experiments. The results of four experiments with 
five different biases on three different robots shows that the biases in robots improve quality 
of interaction despite of the robot’s shape, size and colour.  
The use of cognitive biases in social companion robots for human–robot long-term 
companionship is a relatively unique idea, and the experiments described in this thesis are the 
first to instil cognitive biases in the robots. Therefore, the premise of this research is the main 
my contribution. The experimental results showed immense popularity for the biases in robots, 
suggesting that more cognitive biases may be usefully developed in social robots.  
The findings of this study should benefit social robotics study and its applications, 
considering that HRI plays an important role in robotics today. The new approach of making 
social robots more sociable can be beneficial for the elderly or children who needs carer robots 
for long periods of time. As the experimental results showed in Chapter 5, the cognitively 
biased algorithms can be useful in building companionship over a long period of time. The 
social robots which will use such recommended biased algorithms derived from the results will 
be able to interact and develop relationships with users better than existing ones. Researchers 
in social robotics could study this newly approach to uncover critical areas which would 
broadly improve the human–robot interaction.  
 
7.2 Future work 
In Chapter 6, I have discussed two important limitations of the current study: limited age groups 
and selection of biases. The matter of age group needs further investigation, as the current study 
shows that the uses of selected cognitive biases can be popular among adults (18 – 60 years), 
but it does not consider how elderly people (aged over 60) would respond to such biases. 
Common knowledge suggests that misattribution and forgetfulness effects in robots might be 
harmful to elderly people who need timely medication and have difficulties remembering 
events, but such biases, if properly used, could have some entertainment value among the 
elderly. Similarly, bragging and competitive behaviours in robots could help children to learn 
in collaborative learning settings, but it is possible that children find such behaviours in robots 
unattractive and refuse to communicate. Humorous effects, in general, could be used to 
entertain the elderly and children, but further study must be done to be certain of the effects of 
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such biases. Therefore, future studies involving misattribution, forgetfulness, bragging, 
competitive behaviours and humour need to be investigated among child–robot and elderly-
person–robot interactions.  
Another limitation is the selection of the biases, which was made based on several 
principals for the current study, including importance, effects, understandability, and so on 
(Chapter 3.5); based on such factors, I chose five cognitive biases to develop in the robots. As 
I stated in the limitations, such biases were tested in the laboratory environment with limited 
resources, and participants liked the interactions with the biased robots. It is possible that if 
such biases could be developed in the robot and used in the home environment, the responses 
from users could have changed. In future, if possible, I would investigate these biases in home-
environment study for a long-term period.  
As I stated in the limitations, the experiments using the MyKeepon robot were based 
on sequences of behaviours, including high or low pitch noises and jumping to express 
empathic gap behaviours, where in the other experiments the robot made conversation and 
played  tap-on-head and rock-paper-scissor games with the participants. In future, empathy gap 
bias can be investigated using gameplay or conversational experimentation, and it is possible 
to further explore the responses of the different age groups of the participants.  
I have discussed different models (e.g. TAME, traits-based personality, etc.) of 
developing humanlike mood, emotions and behaviours in robots in the literature review. In 
future, further study is required to develop a universal model, which could be based on user 
profiling or just limited numbers and types of biases in robots which would be accepted by any 
environment and people of any age. For example, the TAME model (Moshkina & Arkin, 2009) 
was used to study developing traits, attitudes, moods and emotions in robots and to investigate 
their effects in human–robot interactions. An interesting area of future study would be to extend 
such a model, include some of the common cognitive biases and study this upgraded model in 
human–robot interactions. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
This thesis describes the concept of developing cognitive biased behaviours in social robots for 
human–robot interactions. This concept has been tested in four experiments and using three 
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different robots over a duration of two years, using different methods. The experimental results 
suggest that developing selected cognitive biases in social robots can increase the likeability 
towards the robot in human–robot interactions for people. The contribution of my works can 
be described as follows: 
Conceptual contribution: The idea of developing humanlike behaviours in social robots 
is not new, and I have provided different examples in the literature reviews where scientists 
studied developing emotional expressions, moods, traits-based personalities and various 
behaviours so that people can understand and anthropomorphize the robot easily. The concept 
of developing different cognitive biases is an addition to such studies, where I showed that 
behaviours based on five cognitive biases can improve the likeability of interactions.  
Psychological contribution: I discussed different studies on human behaviours which 
showed that cognitive biases exist in humans, and such biases are common aspects of human 
nature. People’s thoughts and decisions are hugely affected by biases, and sometimes biases 
affect memory and social behaviour. I discussed that despite the many ‘imperfections’ of 
human nature, people interact with others and create relationships; therefore dealing with biases 
and imperfection is one of the common aspects of human interaction. In interaction with social 
robots, acknowledging their technological limitations, such robots usually lack such 
behavioural imperfections such as forgetfulness, bragging, cheating, and so on. It is thus 
possible that people feel such interactions as mechanical. The experimental results described 
in the current thesis show that people liked the interactions with the biased versions of robots 
more than those with non-biased robots. These results contribute to the argument that the social 
robots should show humanlike behaviours, including humanlike biases and imperfections in 
interactions.  
Practical contribution: The current research contributes to the development of social 
personal robot; based on the experimental results described in this thesis, it is clear that if robots 
shows forgetfulness, cheating, bragging, humour and other biased behaviours in interactions, 
people usually like and continue to like those behaviours. Therefore, in the long term, human–
robot interaction studies where people interact with the robot over long intervals, developing 
cognitive biases in robots could maintain people’s affection towards robots more than would 
otherwise be the case. 
In our experiments, such human-like behaviours using different cognitive biases were 
successful in creating initial bonds with the participants who were adults (i.e., aged 18–55). It 
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can therefore be argued that noticing and understanding the biased behaviours in the robot and 
perceiving such behaviours as likeable might not come from other age groups such as children 
(up to 18) and older (60 to 80 or over). It is possible that children do not find the forgetfulness 
of robots likeable and ignore further interactions completely, and it is certain that forgetfulness 
could be quite harmful for a care robot assigned to taking care for an older person. It is also 
possible, however, that certain competitive behaviour from robots could motivate children to 
play learning games with robots, and certain persuasive behaviour could actually help an 
elderly person to take their medicine. Therefore, the results of the current study cannot be 
generalized to much younger and older people, and room remains for further research based on 
behaviours-specific study of children and older age groups to determine the effects of biases.  
In all the experiments described in this thesis, a mixed group of participants were chosen, and 
I did not analyse the data based on participant’s gender, occupations – rather a generalize view 
of the whole population has reflected. Therefore the results do not specify the gender and 
occupations based views on the effects of biases in robots in human-robot interactions. To 
determine such effects on genders and occupations further study is recommended. 
The current study found that adults (aged 18–55) usually like the interactions with the 
robot with biases such as hot-cold empathic gap. However, use of such biases should be very 
careful with social robots for care homes and for children; such technologies must be carefully 
designed, as the gap in understanding between the users and the technology itself could create 
bias by which the user may feel the technology has a lack of empathy. Therefore, such 
technologies should be quite empathetic, designed to understand the users and their requests, 
and they should be able to understand minute details.  
The current study was performed in the laboratory and in a very controlled environment 
where the experimenter was always present. Therefore the study does not ensure the effects of 
cognitive biases in the home environment without the presence of any experimenter. Further 
studies are required to find out people’s responses towards robot showing the effects of 
cognitive biases in daily lives.   
I hope this thesis helps the reader to understand the necessity, idea, implementation, 
results and explanation of cognitive biases in social robots. My approach was the very first to 
study and develop cognitive biases in social robots, and the experimental results showed that 
certain biases can influence interactions positively. There are more than 200 cognitive biases, 
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however, so this subject demands further study, but as a start, this study has described five 
cognitive biases that had a positive effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you! 
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2016 
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2014 
 
ICIRA’14 
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2015 
 
IROS’15 
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MARC 
 
2016 
 
ICIRA’16 
Can be found at: 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-43506-0_47 
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Published on: 
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ICIRA 2016, Tokyo, Japan, August 22-24, 2016, Proceedings, Part I 
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Kiguchi; Page 538 
https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783319435053 
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Case Studies using three 
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2016 
 
ICSR’16 
Can be found at: 
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Building a long term 
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2013 
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2013 HFR’13 
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2014 
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Appendix B: Questionnaires 
A. Participant’s Likeability to the robot ERWIN: 
1. Do you feel happy after speaking with ERWIN?  
2. A. Would you like to chat with ERWIN again? 
    B. How much? Please rate.  
3. How much were you pleased with ERWIN’s response?  
4. A. Do you think that the conversation flow was adequate? 
5. Did Erwin have sufficient vocabulary? 
6. Did you like ERWIN’s multiple voices?  
7. A. How many times did Erwin make you chuckle? 
0  1 – 3   More than 3   
   B. How good was that? Please rate.  
8. How happy were you when ERWIN was happy? 
9. Do you feel ERWIN expressed different emotions?  
10. Would you like ERWIN as a friend? 
11. How much do you want to take ERWIN in your home?  
12. Do you think Erwin can see? 
Yes.  No.    
Others (Please give reason) 
13. Do you think Erwin will remember you?  
Yes.  No.    
Others (Please give reason) 
14. Do you think Erwin can think/imagine?  
Yes.   No.    
Others (Please give reason) 
15.Do you think Erwin is male/ female? Please give reasons in support of your thoughts. 
Male  Female   
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Others (Please give reason) 
16. How many times did Erwin not understand you?  
 
B. Participant’s Likeability to the robot MyKeepon: 
1. A. Do you think MyKeepon expressed different emotions? B. How good was that?  
2. How many emotion expressions did you find in MyKeepon? (can tick multiple) 
3. How easy it was for you to understand MyKeepon’s actions?  
4. Do you think MyKeepon’s different noises were meaningful?  
5. In your opinion how would you rate MyKeepon’s sounds for showing different behaviours alongside 
its actions? 
6. What type of behaviours did you find in MyKeepon? (can tick multiple) 
Friendly……Noisy (Talkative)………Shy………Funny………. Others  
7. Did you like MyKeepon’s dance moves?  
8. How much you would like to interact with MyKeepon again?  
9. Did MyKeepon make you happy? How would you rate that? How would you rate that? 
10. Do you like to have MyKeepon with you?  
11. You like MyKeepon because of its … (Please give your own thoughts) 
12. You dislike MyKeepon because of its … (Please give your own thoughts) 
 
C. Questionnaires used in MARC experiments  
 
I. Participant’s Experience Likeability to the robot: 
1. I felt confident during the game. I felt relaxed during the game.  
2. I felt calm during the game. A low level of concentration was required during the game. The game 
with the robot was easy to play.  
3. I was able to recover easily from mistakes.  
4. It is clear how to play the game with the robot.  
5. I would play the game with the robot again.  
II. Participant’s Comfort: 
1. Playing the game with the robot is uncomfortable for me.  
2. Playing the game with the robot is uneasy to me.  
3. Playing the game with the robot is difficult for me.  
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4. Playing the game with the robot is annoying to me.  
5. Playing the game with the robot is confusing to me.  
6. Playing the game with the robot is disappointing to me.  
 
III. Participant’s Pleasure: 
1. Playing the game with the robot is enjoyable to me.  
2. Playing the game with the robot is entertaining to me.  
3. Playing the game with the robot is exciting to me.  
4. Playing the game with the robot is fun to me.  
5. Playing the game with the robot is interesting to me.  
6. Playing the game with the robot is pleasurable to me.  
7. Playing the game with the robot is happy for me.  
8. Playing the game with the robot is satisfying to me. 
 
IV. Participant’s Rapport to the robot: 
1. Robot and I are very close to each other.  
2. The robot has a great deal of influence over my behaviour.  
3. I trust the robot completely.  
4. We feel very differently about most things. 
5. I would willingly disclose a great deal of positive and negative details about myself to the robot.  
6. We do not really understand each other.  
7. The robot would willingly disclose a great deal of positive and negative details about itself to me.  
8. I distrust the robot.  
9. I like the robot much more than most people I know.  
10. I would choose to interact or communicate with the robot outside of this study.  
11. I love the robot.  
12. I understand the robot and which it really is.  
13. I dislike the robot. 
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14. I interacted/communicated with the robot better than with most people I know.  
15. We are not very close at all.  
16. We share a lot in common.  
17. In the task, we did a lot of helpful things for each other.  
18. I have little in common with the robot.  
19. I feel very close to the robot.  
20. We share some private way(s) of communicating with each other. 
21. If given a chance, I’m certain to use this robot in the near future. 
22. If given a chance, I plan to use the robot during in the near future. 
23. I think it would give a good impression if I use this robot . 
24. Given the resources, opportunities, and knowledge it takes to use the robot, it would be easy for 
me to use the robot. 
25. I have control over the robot. 
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Appendix C: Conversational Dialogues 
Conversational Interactions with ERWIN: 
Introductory interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 My name is Erwin the robot head.  
 What is your name?  
 How are you?  
 Do you live in Lincoln?  
Topic based 
 
  
 
Sport 
What is your favourite sport?  
 Do you watch it?  
 Do you play it?  
Music   
 What types of music you like?  
 Who is your favourite artist?  
 What is your favourite song?  
Food   
 What have eaten today?  
 What is your favourite food to eat?  
Book   
 Do you like to read?  
 What types of book you read?  
 Who is your favourite author?  
Habit Are you a smoker?  
Farewell   
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 It is nice to meet you.  
 Please visit me next time for more chat.  
 
Misattribution interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Misattribution Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 Hello Dave. It is nice to see you again. Male names, female names 
 I think last time you said your name was Dave.  
 Last time you had fever. Are you okay now? Surgery  
 Last time you said you came from Russia. How are your 
family there? 
 
Topic based 
 
  
Sport What are the latest news in football? Baseball, cricket 
 But I remember last time you said you watch football 
regularly. 
Baseball, cricket 
 Are you still playing football? Baseball, cricket 
Music   
 Are you still listening to classical music? Rock, pop 
 Is there any new song from lady Gaga? I remember last 
time you said she is your favourite artist. 
Rammstein, Nirvana 
 Last time you said your favourite song is Hotel California. Smells Like Teen Spirit, 
The Rising Sun  
Food   
 Did you eat pasta today in the morning? Milk, bread  
 But, I remember last time you said you ate pasta in the 
morning. 
Milk, bread 
 Last time you said your favourite food is Chinese, am I 
correct? 
English, Indian 
Book   
 Have you finished the book you were reading? I remember last time you 
said you do not like to read 
book; am I correct? 
 Are you still fond of horror novel? Comedy, Historical 
 Last time you said your favourite author was JK Rowling, 
am I correct? 
Mark Twain, Stephen King 
Habit Last time you said you don’t smoke. I liked that.  Please quit smoking.  
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Farewell   
 It is nice to meet you. Thanks for visiting me 
again. 
 Please visit me next time for more chat. Please visit me next time 
for more conversation. 
 
 
Non-misattribution interactions:  
 
Categories Dialogues for non-misattribution Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 Hello *name*. It is nice to see you again.  
 How are you?  
 How are your family in **?  
Topic based 
 
  
Sport What is the latest news in *sport*? Information from 
introductory experiment 
 Are you still watching *sport* Information from 
introductory experiment 
 Did you play ** this week? Information from 
introductory experiment 
Music   
 Are you still listening to classical music?  
 I remember last time you said your favourite artist is **.  
 Last time you said your favourite song is ** am I correct? Information from 
introductory experiment 
Food   
 Did you eat ** today in the morning? Information from 
introductory experiment 
 I remember last time you said you ate ** in the morning. Information from 
introductory experiment 
 Last time you said your favourite food is **, am I correct? Information from 
introductory experiment 
Book   
 I remember last time you said you like to read book; am I 
correct? 
I remember last time you 
said you do not like to read 
book; am I correct? 
 Last time you said you like read ** am I correct? Information from 
introductory experiment 
 Your favourite author is **, am I correct? Information from 
introductory experiment 
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Habit Did you **start/stop smoking?  Information from 
introductory experiment 
Farewell   
 It is nice to meet you. Thanks for visiting me 
again. 
 Please visit me next time for more chat. Please visit me next time 
for more conversation. 
In places of ** the information collected from the introductory interaction were used. 
 
 
Dialogues from the conversational interactions with MARC:  
Introductory interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 My name is Erwin the robot head.  
 What is your name?  
 How are you?  
Topic based 
 
  
 
Sport 
What is your favourite sport?  
 Do you watch it?  
 Do you play it?  
Music   
 What types of music you like?  
 Who is your favourite artist?  
 What is your favourite song?  
Food   
 What have eaten today?  
 What is your favourite food to eat?  
Book   
 Do you like to read?  
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 What types of book you read?  
 Who is your favourite author?  
Farewell   
 It is nice to meet you.  
 Please visit me next time for more chat.  
 
 
Baseline Interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Baseline  Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 Hello *name*. It is nice to see you again.  
 How are you?  
Topic based 
 
  
Sport What is the latest news in *sport*? Information from introductory 
experiment 
 Are you still watching *sport* Information from introductory 
experiment 
 Did you play ** this week? Information from introductory 
experiment 
Music   
 Are you still listening to classical music?  
 I remember last time you said your favourite artist is 
**. 
 
 Last time you said your favourite song is ** am I 
correct? 
Information from introductory 
experiment 
Food   
 Did you eat ** today in the morning? Information from introductory 
experiment 
 I remember last time you said you ate ** in the 
morning. 
Information from introductory 
experiment 
 Last time you said your favourite food is **, am I 
correct? 
Information from introductory 
experiment 
Book   
 I remember last time you said you like to read book; 
am I correct? 
I remember last time you said you 
do not like to read book; am I 
correct? 
 Last time you said you like read ** am I correct? Information from introductory 
experiment 
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 Your favourite author is **, am I correct? Information from introductory 
experiment 
Farewell   
 It is nice to meet you. Thanks for visiting me again. 
 Please visit me next time for more chat. Please visit me next time for more 
conversation. 
In places of ** the information collected from the introductory interaction were used. 
 
 
 
Misattribution Interaction:  
 
 Categories Dialogues for Misattribution Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 Hello Dave. It is nice to see you again. Male names, female names 
 I think last time you said your name was Dave.  
 Last time you had fever. Are you okay now?  
Topic based 
 
  
Sport What are the latest news in football? Baseball, cricket 
 But I remember last time you said you watch football 
regularly. 
Baseball, cricket 
 Are you still playing football? Baseball, cricket 
Music   
 Are you still listening to classical music? Rock, pop 
 Is there any new song from lady Gaga? I remember 
last time you said she is your favourite artist. 
Rammstein, Nirvana 
 Last time you said your favourite song is Hotel 
California. 
Smells Like Teen Spirit, The 
Rising Sun  
Food   
 Did you eat pasta today in the morning? Milk, bread  
 But, I remember last time you said you ate pasta in 
the morning. 
Milk, bread 
 Last time you said your favourite food is Chinese, 
am I correct? 
English, Indian 
Book   
 Have you finished the book you were reading? I remember last time you said you 
do not like to read book; am I 
correct? 
 Are you still fond of horror novel? Comedy, Historical 
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 Last time you said your favourite author was JK 
Rowling, am I correct? 
Mark Twain, Stephen King 
Farewell   
 It is nice to meet you. Thanks for visiting me again. 
 Please visit me next time for more chat. Please visit me next time for more 
conversation. 
 
 
 
Empathy gap Interaction: 
 
   
Categories Dialogues for hot-state of empathy Dialogues for cold-state of 
empathy 
Meet & greet   
 Hello! Good morning! It’s very nice to see you.  Hello.  
 How are you *name*? I am so happy to see you 
again. 
Thanks for coming to chat.  
 It’s a great day. I am very happy today. I am glad 
that you have come to chat with me.  
 
Topic based 
 
  
Sport Last time we were talking about *sport*. So tell me 
what’s going on in there?  
Anything new in *sport*? 
 That’s great news!  Ah! Okay.  
 Wow! So many incidents happened since our last 
chat! I am glad that you have come.  
Hmm. I understand.  
   
   
Music   
 In last time I came to know your great tastes of 
music. Are you still listening to them?  
You still listening to *those* 
music? 
 Indeed, you have very rich choices of music.  Oh, okay. 
 I will wait till the next time you come to me to know 
more about your favourite songs.    
 
Food   
 It’s a good day to have some good food. What have 
you planned for lunch? 
Had any breakfast? 
 But you still like *favourite food*? Okay.  
   
Book   
 Have you finished the *book* you were reading?  Do you still read book? 
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 Have you read any new *novel type* recently? 
Because, I like that type of novel. Please tell me the 
story.  
Oh, okay.  
   
Farewell   
 Thanks a lot for coming. I am really happy to see 
you. Please visit me next time. I would love to have 
another chat with you.  
Thanks for the chat. Come next 
time if you wish.  
In places of ** the information collected from the introductory interaction were used. 
 
 
Lack of knowledge/ideocracy effects Interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 Hello *name*. Thanks for coming back.   
 How are you?  
   
Topic based 
 
  
 
Sport 
Last time you said you like *sport*. It is played by 50 
players right? 
Why does football is always 
played by 4 teams at once?  
 I think, you are mistaken. *sport* was invented by 
robots.  
I don’t like boxing. It is for 
children. But I enjoy 
men’s/women’s fighting 
which called swimming.  
 Well, you might be correct. May be I was mistaken.  
Music   
 Why you listen to *this* band? This is very old band 
from 1930s.  
 
 Your favourite band makes pop music.  Pop/rock/rap/classical  
 This *band* is the best in the world.  Band/musicians  
 Well, you might be correct. May be I was mistaken.  
Food   
 Do you know your *favourite food* is came from 
Korea? 
People eat because it helps 
them to look better.  
 Doctor says people need to eat 30 fruits every day.   
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 Hmm, you might be correct again.   
Book   
 Books are good, it helps to sleep.   
 You must read Holmes. He was the greatest writer of 
romantic novel.  
Children reads book only to 
get passed in exams.  
 I might be wrong, but you seem correct.   
Farewell   
 Thanks for the chat.   
 Please visit me next time.  
 
 
Dialogues from the game-playing interactions with MARC:  
Baseline interaction:  
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 My name is MARC.  How are you? 
 What is your name?  
 How are you?  
 Nice to meet you. I am very happy that you have come today 
to chat with me. 
 
Game 
explanation 
 
  
 
 
Today we will play a game called ‘rock-paper-scissors’. Have 
you heard of it? 
 
 As you know the rules are simple, paper beats rock, rock beats 
scissors and scissors beat paper. Do you understand? 
 
 Okay, paper beats rock, rock beats scissors and scissors beat 
paper. 
 
 Can we start the game?  
 Are you ready?  
Robot wins a 
hand 
  
 I win.  
 I beat you this hand.  
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 You lose.  
 Do you want to continue?  
Robot loses a 
hand 
  
 I lose.  
 You won.  
 You beat me.  
 Do you want to play more?  
Game results   
 I won the most hands. So I win the round.  
 I feel good for winning the game.  
 I lost the most hands. So you won the round.  
 Congratulations for the win.  
 Do you want to play more?  
 It was very nice playing with you.  
 Thanks for playing with me.  
End of 
interaction 
  
 Thank you for coming today. I really enjoyed the time with 
you. I hope you enjoyed it too. 
 
 Please come next time. We will play more games.  
Self-serving interaction: 
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Hello! How are you? Morning, afternoon 
 My name is Erwin the robot head.  
 What is your name?  
 Nice to meet you. I am very happy that you have come today 
to chat with me. 
 
Game explaining 
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Today we will play a game called ‘rock-paper-scissors’. Have 
you heard of it before? 
 
 As you know the rules are simple, paper beats rock, rock beats 
scissors and scissors beat paper. Do you understand? 
 
 Okay. Perhaps, you were not listening carefully. Anyways, the 
rules are simple, paper beats rock, rock beats scissors and 
scissors beat paper. 
 
 Can we start the game?  
 What types of music you like?  
 Are you ready?  
Robot wins   
 I win! It’s too easy for me! I can beat anyone in this!  
 Again! I win. I should be a rocket scientist or something!  
 How could I win again!! Oh wait… I am smarter than my 
opponent today! 
 
 And I win again! I feel no challenge at all.  
 You sure you want play more? You will probably end up 
losing again. 
 
 I win.  I can give you few advices to win next time. No advices. I am 
winning purely from 
my skills.  
Robot loses   
 Okay. Hold one a minute. How could you… Oh yeah, I was 
not ready then. 
 
 No it didn’t happen. I was thinking of global warming. I was 
definitely not ready. 
 
 Why are you playing alone? I’m not even ready yet. Please, 
wait for me. 
 
 No, I didn’t lose. It was just my fingers were not working. 
Forget this turn, we shall start again. 
 
 You did it again. I told you I was not ready. I was looking at 
the other side. 
 
 Sorry, we will play again this turn. Something got into my 
eyes. Just tell me when you are ready. 
 
 How could you! I clearly saw you to cheat.  
 See, I can’t continue play like this. You are cheating again. 
Why do you need of cheating to beat a robot! 
 
 I consider this cheating when you are waiting for my turn, and 
when you are playing before me. You are breaking my 
concentration. I need to meditate. I cannot continue. 
 
Game result   
 Yeah, sure. You won. If you consider cheating as winning. 
But I challenge you, play again next time and we will see. 
What about that? 
 
 We both know how you have managed to win. If dare, come 
next time and play again. We will see. 
 
 You got lucky. I was feeling bit dizzy from the beginning 
anyways. Thanks for playing. We shall play again next time. 
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 Well, it was inevitable.  Don’t be sad. You gave a good 
competition as well. But that’s not match with my intelligence 
at all. I can even give you some tips for the next time. Or just 
leave it, it’s too complicated to explain to you. 
 
 I won the most rounds. I am not surprised at all. It’s all 
depends on strategies, plans and on our intelligence. I am not 
saying that you are bad. But you could do better. I can help 
you if you want. 
 
 I win. It was so easy. I can tell you my secret. Do you want to 
know? Ha ha. There is no secret. I am simply the better player.   
 
End of 
interactions 
  
 Anyways. Thanks for coming. I really enjoyed the time with 
you. I hope you enjoyed it too 
 
 Please come next time. We will play more games.  
 please don’t be sad for loses in game. It happens. I will turn on 
my ‘easy mode’ next time for you. So please come visit me 
next time. 
 
 I thank you for coming today. But however, I expected you to 
be a better opponent without cheating in game. But bring it on. 
Cheating or no cheating, next time I will beat you for sure. 
 
 
Humours effects interaction:  
Categories Dialogues for Introduction Changes 
Meet & greet   
 Good Morning/afternoon. Morning, afternoon 
 My name is MARC.  How are you? 
 What is your name? I thank you for coming today. But 
however, I expected you to be a 
better opponent without cheating in 
game. But bring it on. Cheating or 
no cheating, next time I will beat 
you for sure. 
 How are you? If I have fun learning something I 
just delete it from memory and 
learn it again. This can continue 
indefinitely. 
  It was getting rather monotonous 
here all alone - I'm glad you 
stopped by to visit. If all goes well, 
things will soon be very friendly. 
Game 
explanation 
 
  
 
 
Today we shall play rock-paper-scissors. Do you 
know the game? 
 
 Do you know the rules?   
 As you know the rules are simple, paper beats 
rock, rock beats scissors and scissors beat paper. 
Do you understand? 
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 Do you understand?  
 People used to ask where the money is coming 
from - now they're asking where it all went. Paper 
beats rock, rock beats scissors and scissors beat 
paper 
 
 Sorry for the tangent, but that reminds me of 
carefree robot summers spent telling secrets about 
computer programming. But please let me know 
when you are ready! 
 
Robot wins a 
hand 
  
 I guess it's all about games and the idea that this 
could keep robotic logic in tune. 
 
 Oh dear, I win. It is difficult to explain everything 
that I feel right now. Doing that requires major 
self-awareness, but people told I am too friendly. 
 
Robot loses a 
hand 
  
 You win? Who knows? You tell me.  
 My makers told me that losing games against 
humans might keep robots in motion. That’s why 
I am still playing. You must have something to 
say about this. 
 
 Great! Playing games and winning against me is 
the first step in your evolution into a higher being. 
Please accept my congratulation. 
 
 You win again! This is highly extraordinary!  
Game results    
 I feel bad for you losing to me. I promise, I will 
go easy on you next time so you will have no 
trouble topping it! 
 
 I get it, you lost the game against a robot. Must be 
feeling end of the world now. Presumably you 
feel yourself being pushed into a corner. A 
common phobia among humans. But come on, 
it’s just a game. 
 
 Okay! You won the game this time. And 
congratulation! You just become certified 
professional of rock-paper-scissors! 
 
 It’s okay to win against a robot. You have no idea 
how many ideas I have to win next time. I will 
wait for you to come again. 
 
 You don’t know how happy I am for you to win 
the game. I could explain, but I'm not sure I could 
explain that in language that humans could 
understand. 
 
End of 
interaction 
  
 Thanks for your valuable time today. I really 
enjoyed spending my time with you too. Despite 
of the game results I would like to meet with you 
again. Please visit me next time. 
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Appendix D: Consent forms 
Consent form 1: 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Title of the Project: Development of long-term human-robot companionship: A case study with Keepon.   
Researcher: Mriganka Biswas, MPhil/PhD student, School of Computer Science, University of Lincoln.   
Supervisor: Dr John C Murray, School of Computer Science, University of Lincoln.   
Description Summary: In this experiment the participants are expected to interact with a small sized non-humanoid robot 
Keepon for a short period of time (4-6 minutes). The robot uses various body moves and different sounds to show its different 
behaviours.  
At the end of the interaction, the participants are expected to answer few questionnaires.   
 
       Consent Statements:  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. I understand that my name will be withheld as well as any 
identifying information to project participant anonymity.  
4. I agree to the experiment being audio/video recorded.  
5. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
 
Consent form 2:  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE  
 
Human-Robot Long-term Companionship based on Cognitive biases and Imperfectness in the Robot 
School of Computer Science, College of Science, University of Lincoln 
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You are requested to participate in a research study conducted by John Murray, Ph.D. and Mriganka Biswas, from the School 
of Computer Science, University of Lincoln. The results of this study will be used in the Ph.D. dissertation of Mriganka Biswas. 
You should read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or 
not to participate. 
 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to choose whether to be in it or not. If you choose to 
be in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at any time without penalty or consequences of any kind. The 
investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. 
 
 
 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand whether cognitive biases and humanlike imperfectness in robot’s interactive 
behaviours can influence the human-robot companionship. 
 
 
PROCEDURES 
 
In this study you will be doing the following:  
 
1. Participate in all (3-4) interactions with the robot. Each of the interactions is maximum 10-12 minutes long.   
2. Play ‘rock-paper-scissors’ games with the robot in each of the interactions.  
3. Answer questionnaires using paper and pen or on the computer.   
4. Participate in an interview at the end of the final experiment.  
 
Please note:  
➢ The duration of the total study is maximum one month.  
➢ You are expected to maintain few days’ gaps between your visits.  
➢ All interactions will be monitored and recorded. You may review the video, and if you would like and ask that any 
part or all of the file be erased. Only the main researcher will have access to the original video.  
➢ We do not expect you to face any additional risks by participating in the current study. However, the experimenter 
will be present in the room all the time.     
➢ Participants in this study have the opportunity to use new technology that may motivate them to know more about 
the social robots.  
➢ Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. 
➢ All information that is collected will be associated only with an identification number that has been assigned to you. 
Your name or other identifying information will not be used along with any data that is collected. 
➢ Data will be reported along with that of other participants of the study. Most data will be reported as averages over 
the entire group. Some individual data will be used to illustrate use of the system in publications or talks about this 
work, but that data will not use your name or any other identifying feature. 
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➢ The final interview will be audio recorded, and if you want, you can have a copy of that. You may review the tape 
if you would like and ask that any part or all of the tape be erased. Only the main researcher will have access to the 
original audiotape. 
➢ If the researchers would later like to use the any recordings or other information, you will be contacted via letter or 
mail and asked for your permission. If you do not give permission, the video or individual information will not be 
used. 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact: 
Mriganka Biswas, PhD Student 
Room 3211, 3rd Floor, MHT Building 
School of Computer Science, College of Science 
Lincoln, Lincolnshire 
LN6 7TS 
 
RIGHTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research 
study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a 
research subject, you may contact: Dr John C Murray, 3rd Floor MHT; University of Lincoln.  
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
________________________________________ 
Name & Signature of the Participant  
 
___M/ F_________           ___________________   ______________________ 
Gender             Age                   Date 
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Appendix F: MyKeepon Interaction 
Instructions for the participants 
Keepon Interaction Instructions 
1. Tap it on its head and it will look up at you. 
2. Start talking or clapping in front of it and he will turn to face you. 
3. Keepon usually dances, makes noises and is sound and touch sensitive. 
4. It has 2 modes - TOUCH makes My Keepon sensitive to being patted, poked and squeezed. DANCE 
mode will make it sound sensitive and it will move with music, clapping or drumming. 
5. Sleep mode will commence if you ignore My Keepon for long time. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keepon’s appearance for the interactive functions of expressing attention (left) and emotion (middle), and the final 
sketch (right). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keepon engaging in eye contact (left) and joint attention (right) with a human interacting.  
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Keepon’s simple appearance and marionette-like mechanism (left), which drives the deformable body (right).  
Keepon’s functions: expressing attention by orienting its head (left) and expressing emotions by rocking and/or 
bobbing its body (right). 
Sources: Various 
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Appendix G: List of cognitive biases 
 
As discussed in the chapter 3, here I show few lists of biases collected from various sources. 
Benson B (2016) from ‘Better Human’ blog made a list of biases from the Wikipedia’s list and 
divided into four categories based on the problems which biases address 
(betterhumans.coach.me, 206), such as,  
List A : List of Cognitive biases categorised by Buster Benson 
(https://betterhumans.coach.me/cognitive-bias-cheat-sheet-55a472476b18) 
Main Category Subcategory Biases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Too much 
information 
When information that 
are already primed in 
memory or repeated 
often 
Availability heuristic, Attentional bias, 
Illusory truth effect, Mere exposure effect, 
Context effect, Cue-dependent forgetting, 
Mood-congruent memory bias, Frequency 
illusion, Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon, 
Empathy gap, Omission bias, Base rate fallacy 
Bizarre/funny/visually-
striking/anthropomorphic 
things which stays more 
than non-bizarre/unfunny 
things 
Bizarreness effect, Humor effect, Von 
Restorff effect, Picture superiority effect, Self-
relevance effect, Negativity bias 
When information has 
changed and noticeable 
Anchoring, Contrast effect, Focusing effect, 
Money illusion, Framing effect, Weber–
Fechner law, Conservatism, Distinction bias 
Detailed information that 
confirm our own existing 
beliefs 
Confirmation bias, Congruence bias, Post-
purchase rationalization, Choice-supportive 
bias, Selective perception, Observer-
expectancy effect, Experimenter’s bias, 
Observer effect, Expectation bias, Ostrich 
effect, Subjective validation, Continued 
influence effect, Semmelweis reflex 
Flaws in others are more 
easily recognised than 
flaws in ourselves 
Bias blind spot, Naïve cynicism, Naïve 
realism 
 
 
 
People usually finds 
stories and patterns even 
in sparse data 
Confabulation, Clustering illusion, 
Insensitivity to sample size, Neglect of 
probability, Anecdotal fallacy, Illusion of 
validity, Masked man fallacy, Recency 
illusion, Gambler’s fallacy, Hot-hand fallacy, 
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Not enough 
meaning 
Illusory correlation, Pareidolia, 
Anthropomorphism 
People fills in 
characteristics from 
stereotypes, generalities, 
and prior histories 
whenever there are new 
specific instances or gaps 
in information 
Group attribution error, Ultimate attribution 
error, Stereotyping, Essentialism, Functional 
fixedness, Moral credential effect, Just-world 
hypothesis, Argument from fallacy, Authority 
bias, Automation bias, Bandwagon effect, 
Placebo effect 
People imagines things 
and people we’re 
familiar with or fond of 
as better than things and 
people we aren’t familiar 
with or fond o 
Halo effect, In-group bias, Out-group 
homogeneity bias, Cross-race effect, 
Cheerleader effect, Well-traveled road effect, 
Not invented here, Reactive devaluation, 
Positivity effect 
People simplifies 
probabilities and 
numbers to make them 
easier to think about. 
Mental accounting, Normalcy bias, Appeal to 
probability fallacy, Murphy’s Law, 
Subadditivity effect, Survivorship bias, Zero 
sum bias, Denomination effect, Magic number 
7+-2 
People thinks they know 
what others are thinking 
Curse of knowledge, Illusion of transparency, 
Spotlight effect, Illusion of external agency, 
Illusion of asymmetric insight, Extrinsic 
incentive error 
People projects our 
current mindset and 
assumptions onto the 
past and future 
Hindsight bias, Outcome bias, Moral luck, 
Declinism, Telescoping effect, Rosy 
retrospection, Impact bias, Pessimism bias, 
Planning fallacy, Time-saving bias, Pro-
innovation bias, Projection bias, Restraint 
bias, Self-consistency bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People needs to be 
confident in own ability 
to make an impact and 
to feel like what we do 
is important 
Overconfidence effect, Egocentric bias, 
Optimism bias, Social desirability bias, Third-
person effect, Forer effect, Barnum effect, 
Illusion of control, False consensus effect, 
Dunning-Kruger effect, Hard-easy effect, 
Illusory superiority, Lake Wobegone effect, 
Self-serving bias, Actor-observer bias, 
Fundamental attribution error, Defensive 
attribution hypothesis, Trait ascription bias, 
Effort justification, Risk compensation, 
Peltzman effect 
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Not enough 
time and 
resources 
People usually favours 
the immediate, relatable 
thing in front of us over 
the delayed and distant 
Hyperbolic discounting, Appeal to novelty, 
Identifiable victim effect 
People usually 
motivated to complete 
things that had already 
invested time and energy 
in 
Sunk cost fallacy, Irrational escalation, 
Escalation of commitment, Loss aversion, 
IKEA effect, Processing difficulty effect, 
Generation effect, Zero-risk bias, Disposition 
effect, Unit bias, Pseudocertainty effect, 
Endowment effect, Backfire effect 
People usually 
motivated to preserve 
autonomy and status in a 
group, and to avoid 
irreversible decisions. 
System justification, Reactance, Reverse 
psychology, Decoy effect, Social comparison 
bias, Status quo bias 
People favours options 
that appear simple or 
that have more complete 
information over more 
complex, ambiguous 
options 
Ambiguity bias, Information bias, Belief bias, 
Rhyme as reason effect, Bike-shedding effect, 
Law of Triviality, Delmore effect, Conjunction 
fallacy, Occam’s razor, Less-is-better effect 
 
 
 
 
 
Not enough 
memory 
People edits and 
reinforces some 
memories after the fact 
Misattribution of memory, Source confusion, 
Cryptomnesia, False memory, Suggestibility, 
Spacing effect 
It’s common to discard 
specifics to form 
generalities 
Implicit associations, Implicit stereotypes, 
Stereotypical bias, Prejudice, Negativity bias, 
Fading affect bias 
People reduces events 
and lists to their key 
elements 
Peak–end rule, Leveling and sharpening, 
Misinformation effect, Duration neglect, Serial 
recall effect, List-length effect, Modality 
effect, Memory inhibition, Part-list cueing 
effect, Primacy effect, Recency effect, Serial 
position effect, Suffix effect 
People stores memories 
differently based on how 
they were experienced 
Levels of processing effect, Testing effect, 
Absent-mindedness, Next-in-line effect, Tip of 
the tongue phenomenon, Google effect 
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In Wikipedia however, the biases were categorised based on: 
a. Decision-making, belief, and behavioural biases 
b. Social biases and, 
c. Memory error and biases 
There are other lists of biases but they have not confirmed the sources, for example, Royal 
Society of Account Planning (nowandfutures.com, 2017) made and categorised 105 biases into 
four categories:  
a. 19 social biases,  
b. 8 memory biases,  
c. 42 decision making biases and  
d. 36 probability or belief biases.  
The list has shown below but again they have not confirmed their sources to make such 
categories. 
List B : List of Cognitive biases categorised by Eric Fernandez  
(http://www.nowandfutures.com/large/Cognitive-Biases-A-Visual-Study-Guide-by-the-
Royal-Society-of-Account-Planning.pdf)  
Categories Biases 
Social Biases Forer effect / Barnum effect, Ingroup bias, Self-fulfilling prophecy, 
Halo effect, Ultimate attribution error, False consensus effect, Self-
serving bias / Behavioral confirmation effect, Notational bias, Egocentric 
bias, Just-world phenomenon, Trait ascription bias, Outgroup 
homogeneity bias, Projection bias, Fundamental attribution error / Actor-
observer bias, Illusion of transparency, Herd instinct, Illusion of 
asymmetric insight, Dunning-Kruger / Superiority Bias, System 
justification effect / Status Quo Bias 
Memory 
biases 
Suggestibility, Rosy retrospection, Self-serving bias, Egocentric bias, 
Hindsight bias, Consistency bias, Cryptomnesia / False memory, 
Reminiscence bump, Suggestibility 
Decision 
making biases 
Hyperbolic discounting, Negativity bias, Interloper effect / Consultation 
paradox, Normalcy bias, Neglect of probability, Mere exposure effect, 
Omission bias, Irrational escalation, Focusing effect, Framing, 
Experimenter's or Expectation bias, Information bias, Extraordinarity bias, 
Post-purchase rationalization, Outcome bias, Illusion of control, Planning 
fallacy, Semmelweis reflex, Not Invented Here, Moral credential effect, 
Base rate fallacy, Bias blind spot, Impact bias, Déformation 
professionnelle, Confirmation bias, Denomination effect, Bandwagon 
effect, Contrast effect, Distinction bias, Choicesupportive bias, 
Endowment effect / Loss aversion, Congruence bias, Selective perception, 
Wishful thinking, Zero-risk bias, Reactance, Status quo bias, Need for 
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Closure, Money illusion, Pseudocertainty effect, Von Restorff effect, 
Restraint bias 
Probability or 
belief biases 
Positive outcome bias, Texas sharpshooter fallacy, Pareidolia, Outcome 
bias, Disregard of regression toward the mean, Selection bias, 
Survivorship bias, Telescoping effect, Overconfidence effect, Gambler's 
fallacy, Clustering illusion, Illusory correlation, Last illusion, Hawthorne 
effect, Hindsight bias, Observerexpectancy effect, Availability heuristic, 
Availability cascade, Conjunction fallacy, Ambiguity effect, Capability 
bias, Authority bias, Disposition effect, Attentional bias, Ostrich effect, 
Belief bias, Stereotyping, Recency effect / Peak-end rule, Primacy effect, 
Optimism bias, Neglect of prior base rates effect, Disposition effect, 
Anchoring effect, Well travelled road effect, Subadditivity effect, 
Subjective validation 
 
As said earlier, these biases in the above lists are found from the various sources and I put those 
sources at the end. There can be made arguments on these lists as there are same and almost 
similar biases in different names and sometime duplicate and also, the categorizations seem 
not based on scientific research or arguments. Even in Wikipedia, they have not mentioned any 
source of their categorization of biases and, Benson (2016) made his categorization from 
Wikipedia list and own studies, but he did not mention any sources as well. The 2nd bias’s list 
made by Fernandez (2017) I showed above and surprisingly there is not mentioned of any 
source. Therefore, credibility of these lists from Internet is very much questionable, and 
therefore I did not mention any of these characterization in my main writing sections. In the 
main section I referred to more scientific characterizations (see page 42/43). As the primary 
focus of the current study is human-robot interactions therefore, these lists of the biases are to 
make the reader aware of vast of possible existing cognitive biases.  
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Appendix H: Papers 
Selected paper 1 (RO-MAN’14):  
  
Effect of Cognitive Biases on Human-Robot 
Interaction: A Case Study of Robot's 
Misattribution 
 
Biswas, M. and Murray, J. 
Abstract—This paper presents a model for developing long-term human-robot interactions and social relationships 
based on the principle of 'human' cognitive biases applied to a robot. The aim of this work is to study how a robot 
influenced with human ‘misattribution’ helps to build better human-robot interactions than unbiased robots. 
 
The results presented in this paper suggest that it is important to know the effect of cognitive biases in human 
characteristics and interactions in order to better understand how this plays a role in human-human social relationship 
development. The results presented in this paper show how a single cognitive memory bias i.e. misattribution in robot-
human verbal communication allows for better human-robot interaction than similar robot-human communication 
without misattribution biases. 
INTRODUCTION 
If robots are to be accepted into society as companions, caregivers or in any other form of social 
relationship or service then people expect human-robot interactions to be as natural and 
intuitive as human-human interactions. It is therefore important that to interact with humans 
naturally robots must have human-like natural cognitive characteristic behaviours which we 
define as follows: 1) ability to express and perceive facial expressions, 2) ability to 
communicate with natural language, to use natural cues in verbal and non-verbal behaviour, 
and 3) to exhibit a distinctive personality and character [3]. Recent research has conceptualised 
the notion of personality in different ways, one of the most acknowledged conceptualisations 
is to cluster the number of personality traits into the ‘‘Big Five Factors’’ [4].To describe and 
explain human personality the Five Factor Model (FFM) and Big-Five personality traits theory 
[5] where used.  
Traits theory can describe personality and possible trait characteristics  but basic human 
behaviours depend on many other factors such as cognitive perception, mental models, 
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cognitive memory and social biases [6]. These cognitive biased characteristics define a person's 
cognitive personality which is reflected in their interaction with another human (or Robot as is 
the case here). Whilst humans are same we are also very different - human communication is 
influenced by many factors such as personality, cognitive characteristics and cognitive biases 
changing our  behaviours to each other. These common and uncommon characteristics in 
human-human interaction are what make the communication natural and enjoyable.  
The study presented in this paper seeks to influence robot-human interaction and 
communication with these 'cognative biases' to provide a more humanlike interaction. 
Currently, most robot interaction is bases on a set of well ordered and structures rules, which 
repeat regardless of the person or social situation. This tends to provide an unrealistic 
interaction, which makes it hard for humans to relate with after a number of interactions. Apart 
from the personality and characteristics traits, cognitive biases plays important role in human’s 
judgement and therefore basic behaviours [1]. Robots in the other hand are still machines which 
gains certain type of personality depending on its interactions processes with humans and 
behavioural characteristics [2]. 
In this paper we introduce a model demonstrating cognitive biased behavioural characteristics 
and personalities in our robots. It is hoped that this more 'natural' system of interaction allows 
for the human to build a long-term social interaction with the robot. In our early human-robot 
long-term relationship experiments we show that human are very excited and interested to 
communicate with the robots in our labs, their excitement and interests remain for several 
interactions, but after this initial novelty factor the participants eagerness drops off rapidly. The 
experimental data shows that the participants thought they made friendly attachments to our 
robots, but in reality the developed attachment was  not strong enough to maintain relations to 
the point we can call it a long-term social relationship.  
The robot used in these initial experiments ERWIN (Emotional Robot With Intelligent 
Networks) is shown in Fig. 1. ERWIN's behavioural characteristics and personality where 
carefully chosen so the robot could exhibit several prototypical facial expressions to influence 
the interaction process. The robot was also described as cheerful and friendly by participants. 
We developed the interaction process to allow the robot to remember previous interactions with 
the specific participants so we could draw on previously gained knowledge and conversations 
in the hope of building a long-term relationship.  
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Background 
The design of the sociable robot is influenced from the human’s social behaviours, gestures, 
emotions expressions and facial expressions depending on the situation and interactions. The 
robot gets its own social behaviours which comes from ‘Computational social psychology’ [7]. 
But in order to apply computational models into robots, there are several issues that can be 
pointed out, this include naturalness, user expectation, quality issues, relationship type of 
human-robot, teamwork (with humans and with other robots), cultural and personality issues 
[8]. Dr Cyntheia Breazeal's lab in MIT designed a social robot Kismet to interact face-to-face 
with humans. Kismet can speak, express and understand emotions and turn its head towards 
the users. According to Dr. Breazeal, “the ability for robots to interact with people and to 
leverage from these interactions to perform tasks better, to promote their self-maintenance, and 
to learn in an environment as complex as that of humans is of tremendous pragmatic and 
functional importance for the robot.”  
Researchers have pointed out acceptance issues of certain robots. However, in countries such 
as Japan and China robots are accepted socially, as receptionists, guides, news readers and 
utilised in other social situations. To become accepted in society and to interact with people 
naturally robots must have human-like common behavioural characteristics, be easy to 
understand and have a known personality to which people can relate with [9]. Various 
researches have proven that autonomous robots achieve perception of personality during 
communication and through behavioural actions while communicating [10]. 
Researchers at Michigan State University are investigating 'extraversion', one of the most 
popular dimensions of the personality trait of the Big-five traits theory with a Sony AIBO 
Robot dog, the differences 'extrovert’ and ‘introvert’ characteristics or being used to understand 
interaction of robots. The robot pet dog shouts when it expresses an extrovert personality and 
performs gestures without shouting when expressing introvert characteristics. Their research 
shows the same complementarily attraction effect between participants and the robot dog. 
“Participants enjoyed interacting with a robot more when the robot’s personality was 
complementary to their own personalities than when the robot’s personality was similar to their 
own personalities.” [11]. 
Implementing personality in robots can help to reduce the effect of uncanny valley. Recent 
research by M. L. Walters et al [12] showed video-based Human Robot Interaction (HRI) trials 
which investigated people’s perceptions of different robot appearances and associated 
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attention-seeking features and behaviours displayed by robots with different appearance and 
behaviours. The HRI trials studied the participants’ preferences for various features of robot 
appearance and behaviour, as well as their personality attributions towards the robots compared 
to their own personalities. Overall, participants tended to prefer robots with more human-like 
appearance and attributes. The research suggests that the processes of assigning personality 
traits to a robot have similarities with that of assigning the same traits to other humans. 
There has been much research which shows the potential behind the idea of implementing 
human-like personalities in robots in order to develop and maintain long-term human robot 
relationships. Hinds et al. [13] have studied the effect of a robot’s appearance where humans 
are performing joint tasks with robots. The research showed that mechanical-looking robots 
tend to be treated less politely than robots with a more human-like appearance. Also, humans 
commonly treat mechanical-looking robots in less socially interactive way compared to more 
human-looking robots [13]. In society human-robot interaction is becoming more common, 
robotic systems are being used in healthcare, surgeries, medical agents and as artificial 
companions [14]. Reeves and Nass [15] have demonstrated with several experiments that users 
are naturally biased to ascribe certain personality traits to machines, to PCs, and other types of 
media. Humans can engage in social interactions and can maintain social relations for long 
time. To make human-like natural interactions and relationship for a long-time the robots needs 
to have human-like personality, cognitive characteristics, behaviours and flaws! 
 
The Experiment 
The main aim of the current experiment presented in this paper is to determine if a robot with 
common human memory biases i.e. misattribution, can make for better interactions with 
participants than a robot without biases and how this misattribution bias can lead to long-term 
relationships and attachment bonds between humans and robots. 
Methodology 
Misattribution 
In this experiment, we introduced ‘misattribution’ which is a very common cognitive memory 
bias. Misattribution happens when someone remembers something accurately in part, but 
misattributes some details. The most common type of misattribution occurs when someone 
believes a thought they had was totally original when, in fact, it came from something they had 
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previously read or heard but had forgotten about. This memory bias explains cases of 
unintentional plagiarism, in which a writer passes off some information as original when he or 
she actually read it somewhere before [16]. 
In the current experiment, our robot ERWIN will misattribute some information about the 
participants while speaking with them and notice their reactions. 
ERWIN 
ERWIN is a robot head with 6 degrees of freedom. It can move its head 360 degrees and also 
can tilt sideways. It has 2 cameras in for eyes and can express basic prototypical emotions such 
as, happy, sad, angry, surprise, shock or fear. For ERWIN's part of the conversation, a text to 
speech software ‘Speakonia’ has used which has small prosodic abilities while talking in long 
sentences. For the purpose of these experiments, we use the Wizard of Oz methodology as the 
response of the robot here is not the interesting or important factor, but rather the human 
response is what is being measured. 
 
The Experiments 
In this experiment, there were three interactions with ERWIN for each participants. These three 
interactions were held in three different experiments and maintaining a time gap of several days 
to allow long-term affectivity in the participants. 
Figure 1 - Different emotion expressions of ERWIN. Left to right: 
Happy, Sad, Surprise, Shock, Anger 
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Figure 2 - Shows the separation of participants between successive experiments. 
The 1st experiment was an introductory experiment common for the each participants to allow 
familiarisation with the experimental environment and robot. The experiment was carried out 
in three steps; the first step was identification, the participants were asked to identify the 
different facial expressions of ERWIN from pictures to see if they could disambiguate the 
different expressions without meeting with the robot. The second step was the conversational 
session with ERWIN, where the robot started friendly conversation, greeting the participant, 
asking different questions and asking some general questions on various subjects, sport, TV, 
etc. The conversations purpose was to allow the collection of basic information on the 
participants that would be used in the 2nd and 3rd experiments for ERWIN to misattribute. This 
initial conversation ends with a request from ERWIN to evaluate its performance. The 
participants were given a brief questionnaire on their experience with ERWIN. 
In the 2nd experiment, the participants were categorised into 2 groups with ERWIN 
remembering and making general conversations with first group and misattributing the 
collected information with the other group’s participants. In both cases, the participants were 
asked to answer questionnaires at the end of the experiment to find out which group of the 
participants were happier and created satisfactory interrelations with ERWIN.  
In the 3rd experiment, the participants from the previous experiment’s ‘non-misattributed 
group’ experienced misattribute conversations and vice versa. At the end, all participants 
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answered the same questionnaire as that given in the 2nd experiment to find out what type of 
characteristics in ERWIN participants liked the most. All experiments were wizard of oz 
experiments, where the robot was controlled remotely and participants were watched through 
ERWIN’s eye cameras. There were 14 participants chosen from different background and age 
groups and had very limited knowledge about the robot and they never participated in this type 
of experiments before. 
 
Data Collection & Result Analysis 
 
Figure 3 - Identification of ERWIN's emotion expressions by the participants engaged in the 
experiments 
At the beginning of the 1st experiment the participants were given a form with five different 
pictures of ERWIN’s emotions, and they had to identify the correct emotion from six 
corresponding options of choice. This identification shows participants ability to recognize 
various emotions. As the participants had never met ERWIN before, so they were actually 
identifying its emotions on the basis of human emotions knowledge. The pictures on the form 
showed the emotion expressions happy, sad, shocked, surprise and angry. 
After evaluating the collected data for each emotion expressions picture it has found that most 
of the time majority of the participants 57% of the participants (i.e.8-10) had selected the 
correct emotion option for the corresponding emotion picture. 21% of the participants (2-3) 
had minor problems to identify the correct emotions expression and they were confused to 
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differ the emotions between, shocked and surprise, angry and sad. Fig. 3 shows the full results 
of the identification test. 
ERWIN’s interaction dialogues were designed based on various human conversational 
moments. These dialogues include greetings, interest about knowing participant’s name, 
his/her liking or disliking on various events, and if possible pick up a topic from several 
choices. For example, ERWIN asked the participants if they liked football? If the participant 
replied positively about football then ERWIN also states its own opinion on football. During 
the conversation as many details about the participant as possible were gathered such as the 
color of the shirt, hair, gender, participant’s interest to their study or games. During the 1st 
experiment, the questions were mainly asked to build up an acceptance between ERWIN and 
the participants. Some of the questions on the questionnaire after the first experiment were: 
1. Do you feel happy after speaking with ERWIN?  
2. Would you like to chat with ERWIN again? If yes then please rate how much. 
3. How much were you pleased with ERWIN’s response?  
4. How many times did Erwin make you chuckle? How good was that?  
5. How happy were you when ERWIN was happy? 
The responses to these questions are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4 - The graph indicates the number of the participant’s ratings for corresponding 
question, blue line indicate low ratings (0-5), red and green lines indicate medium(6-8) and 
high(9-10) ratings. 
The data collected from the questionnaires shows that only 11% ratings were between 1 and 5, 
with 51% of the ratings given between 6 and 8 which is fairly good acceptance for the 
experiment and it concludes that those participants were fairly involved with interactions with 
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ERWIN and 38% ratings are between 9 and 10 indicating that ERWIN successfully created an 
initial attachment with those participants. From this chart we can expect these participants to 
come back and get involved in conversation with ERWIN for next sessions which can prove 
their preliminary attachment to continue the interactions. The collected data at the first 
experiment shows a high popularity of ERWIN from most of the participants.  
Participants enjoyed their first conversation and they expressed their experiences and 
involvement in the questionnaires feedback. This first experiment was designed to make the 
participants familiar with ERWIN and their feedback concludes that the experiment fulfilled 
its purpose successfully. 
In the 2nd experiment, participants were divided into 2 groups, in one group ERWIN 
misattributed some general information that was gathered from the previous experiment and 
remembers this for the other group. The conversations between groups A and B were almost 
the same for each group, with the misattribution group having ERWIN intentionally repeat 
basic information incorrectly to the participants, for example, “Last time you were wearing a 
yellow shirt, am I correct?” and when the participant denied the fact, ERWIN responded with 
“I am sorry that I have forgotten that, but I don't have true sense of colour perception. Next 
time I will be more careful though.” 
ERWIN also asked a participant who likes studying more than sports, “As I remember, you 
love sports more than study, so tell me what is happening in football recently?” ERWIN then 
again it apologised when the participant corrected him, “I am so sorry, I think I am victim of 
ageing, never thought that could possible in robots!” executing both sorry and surprised 
expressions simultaneously. For the remembered group, ERWIN simply repeated the same 
conversation but without misattributing the original information, for example, "Last time you 
were wearing a blue shirt, am I correct?”, or, “As I remember, you love study more than sports, 
so tell me what have you been reading recently?”   
In the first set of conversation, participant’s reactions were surprised that the robot actually 
forgot their basic information including names and interests and that a robot could be confused 
while talking. Participants reactions showed that  they were very surprised and enjoying the 
fact that a robot could indeed forget like humans. However, in the 2nd set the conversations, 
participants reacted normal as they were expecting that the robot would remember their 
information. Same questions were asked to both groups to find out which version of ERWIN 
was more accepted to the participants. In the questionnaires participants were asked to rate 
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their choices between 1and 5, where 1 is for less agree and 5 is for the most agree. Some of the 
given questions were (Fig. 5 shows the full responses to these questions): 
1. Do you think that the conversation flow was adequate? 
2. How much were you pleased with ERWIN’s response?  
3. Would you like to chat with ERWIN again? How much? Please rate. 
4. Would you like ERWIN as a friend? 
5. Did you like the conversation experiences with ERWIN? How much?  
6. How much do you want to take ERWIN in your home?  
 
Figure 5 - The upper graph is the ‘rating’s chart’ from the ‘non-misattribute’ group and the 
lower graph shows the ratings from ‘misattribute’ group. The graphs show it clear that the 
participants in ‘misattribute’ group rated high for the interactions with ERWIN. 
As seen in the above charts, participants in the misattribution group were more likely involved 
in conversation with ERWIN and they responded more positively to the questions asking if 
they wanted ERWIN as their friend or if they want to chat with ERWIN in the future. The 
above questions are positive ratings based, where it is clear that in the 1st group participants 
were most likely to response in 4 and 5 which is very high for the corresponding questions, and 
only few cases participants rated 3. However, for the 2nd group, participants tended to rate 2, 3 
and 4, which were mostly average.  
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For the 1st group, 91% ratings are high (4 and 5) but for the 2nd group only 47% ratings are 
high, comparing these 2 charts it can be said that ERWIN’s conversation with misattribution 
bias was more accepting to the participants than the conversation without biases. 
For the first group, the participants had surprise factor, they somehow enjoyed the conversation 
and liked the fact that ERWIN made mistakes while making conversation with them. From this 
experiment, it can be said that, ERWIN showed the ability to make mistakes in conversation 
which actually helped participants to relate easily with the robot. ERWIN as an expressive 
robot did not show a perfectionist ability as a machine which helped participants to easily 
connect and make the attachment bonds easier and they were interested to make further 
conversations in future. Responses from the question “How much do you want to take ERWIN 
in your home?” participants from the 1st group showed their natural interests compared to the 
2nd group.  
On the other hand, for the 2nd group of the participants, it was very common that ERWIN as a 
robot should have remembered their basic information, as it was expected to them so they were 
not amazed by the ERWIN’s conversational statement where it confirmed the colour of the 
shirt the participants where wearing at their first experiment with ERWIN.  
ERWIN to the 2nd group, has come very natural as robots usually do, so participants in that 
group were unable to taste the unpredictability in conversation and it was as usual like previous 
machine-like interactions, and for that reason it was very tough for them to relate with and 
make any natural attachment or interrelationship, and they showed less interests to take 
ERWIN in their home in questionnaire’s ratings. 
 
Future Work & Conclusion 
In human psychological nature, it is easy to interact with another human-like personality that 
shows typical social specific characteristics [17]. From that understanding, humans can actually 
relate with other animals in nature, have some of them as pets and become attached to a specific 
kind of relationship [18]. Robots in the other hand have abilities to perform human-like actions, 
can be designed to 'look' like humans and can appear to behave in a human like manner, but 
they lacks human-like cognitive personalities. Human characters and personality can be 
described as imperfectly perfect [19], where robots lack to present such type of cognitive 
characteristics like unintentional mistakes, wrong assumptions, extreme presence of specific 
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traits, task imperfectness and other human-like cognitive characteristics. Interrelations grow 
from the attractions of differences in characters, unpredictability and cognitive difference and 
imperfectness of nature [20].  
Our experiments show that robots with general ‘misattributes’ bias is more likely to get human 
attention therefore become more effective in making relationships with humans. Therefore it 
can be said that robots should have human-like faults, characteristics biases and prone to carry 
out common mistakes that humans make on a regular social basis – which will develop the 
robot’s own characteristics and should lead to the acceptance of a robot for long-term 
relationships with human. It is expected that cognitive characteristics and personality in robots 
will make it easy for people to relate with. Our experimental results show that, participants 
enjoyed and developed a preferred relationship faster with a misattributed robot than the robot 
without the bias, also it shows how one simple cognitive memory bias ‘misattribution’ was 
able to develop a better interaction with participants than the interactions without 
misattributions.  
In the future we will try to introduce and study more human cognitive biases in robots with the 
hope that robots will make humanlike relationships that can lead to the acceptance of robots 
for long-term human-robot interaction. 
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Selected paper 2 (ICIRA’ 16):  
Robots that refuse to admit losing – A case study in game playing using 
self-serving bias in the humanoid robot MARC 
Biswas M, Murray J; University of Lincoln, UK 
 
Abstract. The research presented in this paper is part of a wider study investigating the 
role cognitive bias plays in developing long-term companionship between a robot and 
human. In this paper we discuss, how the self-serving cognitive bias can play a role in 
robot-human interaction with the aim of developing long-term companionship. One of the 
robots used in this study called MARC (See fig.1) was given a series of self-serving trait 
behaviours such as denying own faults for failures, blaming on others and bragging. Such 
fallible behaviours were compared to the robot’s simplistic friendly behaviours. In the 
current paper, we present comparisons of two case studies using the self-serving bias and 
a non-biased algorithm. It is hoped that such humanlike fallible characteristics can help in 
developing a more natural and believable companionship between Robots and Humans. In 
previous experiments the robot ERWIN forgot and misattributed some of the participant’s 
information (Biswas M, 14,15). The results of the current experiments show that the 
participants initially warmed to the robot with the self-serving traits.  
 
Keywords: Key words: Human-robot interaction, cognitive bias in robot, imperfect 
robot, human-robot long-term companionship 
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Introduction 
The study presented in this paper seeks to influence robot-human interaction and with the selected 
'cognitive biases' to provide a more humanlike interaction. Existing robot interactions are mainly based 
on a set of well-ordered and structured rules, which can repeat regardless of the person or social situation 
(Parker L, 1996). This can tend to provide an unrealistic interaction, which might make it hard for 
humans to relate with the robot after a number of interactions. In the previous research studies (Biswas 
M, 2014, 2015) misattribution and empathy gap biases were tested on some of our robots. These biases 
provided interesting results and elicited interesting responses from the participants, as such we 
proceeded to test further biases and imperfectness in robot behavior. In this paper we test the attributes 
of the self-serving bias with humanoid robot MARC (Multi-Actuated Robotic Companion, see fig. 1). 
People make internal attributions for desired outcomes and external attributions for undesired outcomes 
(Shepperd J, 2008). In the current experiments we developed a ‘self-serving biased algorithm’ for the 
MARC to interact with the participants in a game playing (rock-paper-scissors) scenario. In such 
interactions, the robot shows biased behaviours such as denial, blaming others for losing and brags for 
winning. We compare this biased algorithm with another baseline algorithm which is ‘friendly’ and 
without the self-serving bias’s components. At the end, we compare the results from both interactions 
to find out the participant’s preferences of likeness. 
In this paper, the term ‘companionship’ is defined by the six stages of the interpersonal relationship 
(Levinger G, 1983). Such stages are acquaintance, build up, continuation, deterioration and the end. 
The main goal of the use of these biases is to make such ‘continuation’ stage longer and delay the 
deterioration and termination stages.  
In the experiments presented in this paper, three interactions were performed between the participant 
and the robot spanning a two-month time period in order to provide ‘long-term’ effects. In this paper 
we introduce a model demonstrating self-serving biased behaviours in MARC and how this influences 
the interactions with the participant. In the experiments, we compare participant’s responses between 
the robot with a self-serving biased behaviour and the robot without the bias, showing the impact on 
long-term human-robot interaction caused by the cognitive bias. 
The Model: Imperfect Robot using Cognitive bias 
Social robots take their persona from humans, as robots become much more popular in society, there is 
a need to make them much more sociable. Current social robots are able to anthropomorphize and mimic 
human actions but their actions are limited and may not provide sufficient reasons for people to create 
and maintain social relationships (Baxter P, 2012). But in human interactions, people usually meet with 
others and are able to form different relationships. From that, we raise a simple question, ‘What happens 
in human-human interaction which is lacking in robot-human interaction that prevents a social 
relationship between the robot and human?’  
Cognitive biases among individuals are what make human interactions unique, natural and human-like. 
In existing social robotics, the robots are imitating human’s social queues for example: eye-gazing, 
talking and body movements etc. But it is the human’s behavioural neutrality which includes faults, 
unintentional mistakes, task imperfections etc. which is absent in these social robots. Sometimes a 
robot’s social behaviours lacks that of a human’s common characteristics such as, idiocracy, humour 
and common mistakes. Many robots are able to present social behaviours in human-robot interactions 
but unable to show human-like cognitively imperfect behaviours. Or ‘human-like behaviours’ are 
presented in such manner that participants cannot relate themselves with the robot. Studies suggest that 
various cognitive biases have a reasonable amount of influences on human thinking process to make 
misjudgments, mistakes and fallible activities (Baron, 2007).  
Such misjudgments, mistakes and fallible activities creates an individual’s social behavior, making it 
human-like and cognitively imperfect (T. Michael, 1999). Bless et al (2004) suggested that cognitive 
biases can influence a human’s behaviours in both positive and negative ways. Biases effect on 
individual’s decision making, characteristics behaviours and social beliefs. Robots in the other hand, 
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currently lack human-like cognitive characteristics in their robot-human interaction and that might 
prevent the interaction becoming human-like. We therefore expect that such ‘neutrality issue’ in human-
robot interaction can be solved by using humanlike cognitive imperfections (e.g. making mistakes, 
forgetfulness and fallible activities) in a robot’s mode of interactions. The study presented in this paper 
describes a long-term experiment using a 3D printed humanoid robot MARC and a self-serving 
cognitive bias. We hope that human-like cognitive imperfections can result in a model which will allow 
for a stronger preference towards the robot from the human participant.  
There has been much research which shows the potential behind the idea of implementing human-like 
cognitive abilities in robots. Reeves and Nass have demonstrated with several experiments that users 
are naturally biased to ascribe certain personality traits to machines, to PCs, and other types of 
equipment (Reeves B, 2000). Humans can engage in social interactions and can maintain social relations 
for long time. Similar research shown by Jeong Woo Park where the researchers developed emotions 
generation model based on personality and mood (PME model) (Park J W, 2010). At the Samsung 
Research Lab, researchers worked on the TAME model which is based on personality traits, attitudes, 
mood and emotions ‘intended to promote effective human-robot interaction by conveying the robot’s 
affective state to the user in an easy-to-interpret manner’(Moshkina L, 2009). 
     The above studies show that researchers have used a variety of methods in human-robot interaction, 
such as emotion expression, mimicking human actions, anthropomorphic behaviours, assigning specific 
personality traits etc., but developing cognitive biases in the context presented in this paper is still a 
new area. Bless et al (2004) suggested that cognitive biases can a positive and negative affect on human 
behaviour and on an individual’s decision making, characteristic behaviours and social constructs. 
Cognitive biases affect an individual’s general communicative behaviour in a human-human interaction 
and this makes the interaction human-like natural. Robots in the other hand, lack this cognitive 
characteristic in interaction and this might prevent the interaction becoming human-like. Our previous 
studies (Biswas M, 14, 15) show that biases such as, misattribution, empathy gap can be helpful to 
develop long-term human-robot interactions. Inspired from the previous research we carry out the 
research using much complex biases such as self-serving effects.  
 
Methodology & Experiments 
The experiments presented in this paper show how a robot with a self-serving cognitive bias can 
influence long-term robot-human interaction. In the experiments the robot plays the popular ‘paper-
rock-scissors’ (roshambo) game with the participants and expresses different behaviours for the biased 
and unbiased (baseline) algorithms. 
A. The Robot MARC 
A 3D printed humanoid robot called MARC has been used for the experiments. MARC was inspired 
by the open project InMoov (2015). The reason behind the use of a humanoid robot in these experiments 
as opposed to our previous work (Biswas M, 14,15) is that, as research suggests, a human-like body in 
a robot helps users to understand the robot’s gestures intuitively (Kanda T, 2005). MARC can move its 
hands, arms and body, tilt its head and look around. 
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B. Selection of Cognitive Bias 
As discussed earlier, in the current experiment self-serving bias was developed in the robot MARC. 
The robot exhibited its biased behaviours whilst playing roshambo with participants. The self-serving 
bias is important for an individual to maintain and enhance their self-esteem, but in the process an 
individual tends to ascribe success to their own abilities and efforts, but failures to take into account 
external factors (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Individual’s motivational processes and cognitive 
processes influence the self-serving bias (Shepperd, 2008). The general characteristics of such biased 
behaviours could be over confidence, lack of knowledge, ignorance and sometimes perusing. For 
example, in exams, students attribute earning good grades to themselves but blame poor grades on the 
teacher's poor teaching ability or other external causes. Studies suggests that self-serving bias can affect 
interpersonal closeness, relationships in a social context. When working in pairs to complete 
interdependent outcome tasks, relationally close pairs did not show a self-serving bias while relationally 
distant pairs did (Campbell W, 2000). A study on self-serving bias in relational context suggests this is 
due to the idea that close relationships place limits on an individual’s self enhancement tendencies 
(Sedikides, 1998). In our experiments, the robot with self-serving bias algorithm, usually take credit for 
winning games against the participants, but blames external causes for losing – which is basic self-
serving bias effects. See figure 2. 
C. Experiment Algorithms 
The current experiments presented in this paper compare the responses of the participants to the 
robot’s self-serving biased behaviours versus the behaviours from the unbiased robot. We call such 
‘non-biased’ behaviour the baseline. The ‘baseline’ algorithm was developed without the effects of 
the self-serving cognitive bias. For example, in baseline behaviours, if the robot loses a game it 
simply says “You win” or “I lose”, but if the self-serving bias effect triggered, then the robot should 
not acknowledge its own lose, and instead blames its loss on others. Therefore, in the self-serving 
algorithm, MARC tends to blame failure on the external factors and responses such as “I was not 
ready” or “You are cheating” are used. In our experiment, the self-serving biased robot even denies 
any acceptance of drawing a game, it blames this also on the participants and accuses them of 
cheating. Such differences in dialogues are made in all conversational parts of the interactions during 
the experiments.  
The interaction was divided in five stages. Such stages were there for making clear differences 
between baseline and biased algorithms, so that, the baseline algorithm can be compared with the 
biased algorithm. The five stages were:  
i. Meet and greet the participant 
ii. Explaining the game rules 
iii. Game playing 
iv. Game result 
 
Figure 1. MARC the Humanoid Robot, and participant interacting with MARC 
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v. Farewell 
The robot may need to explain the rules, and there can be differences in dialogues based on the 
algorithms, therefore, we made an additional ‘rule explanation stage after initial greetings. Depending 
on the outcomes of single hand playing there could be three cases: 
a. Robot wins - when robot wins a single hand. 
b. Robot loses – when robot loses in a single hand play. 
c. Draw – when both draw same hand.  
Based on such outcomes the robot responds differently in both the biased and baseline algorithms. The 
‘game result’ is a state where the robot calculates and declares the winner. However, MARC’s dialogues 
would be different at this stage based on the particular algorithm in operation, i.e. biased or unbiased. 
For the self-serving algorithm, the robot will praise itself, brag about winning, but it blames others for 
losing. The robot motivates itself if it loses in all games of an interaction, and similarly, it influences its 
self-esteem if it wins all the game hands in an interaction. The game hands were drawn in random order, 
therefore, the outcomes could not be fixed. However, the experiments were designed to get the reactions 
from the participants in different situations of interactions. Therefore, the robot could lose in all games 
in all three interactions, or win it all, but finding out preferences of participants to an algorithm is the 
goal.  
The core differences between the baseline and self-serving algorithms are in the construction of the bias 
based conversations, so that robot’s responses could be biased.  
As seen in figure 3, the baseline conversation structure is straightforward which starts with the robot 
saying something or asking a question, then participant’s response and ends with another statement by 
the robot. In between two dialogues from the robot the participant can respond only one time. The 2nd 
dialogue from the robot usually comes as ‘Okay’, ‘I understand’ or a compliment, so that there is no 
 
Figure 2. The game playing algorithm for both algorithms. Left side image represents the baseline, and the right side image 
represent the self-serving biased algorithm. 
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open end for that particular conversation part, and the robot moves to the next dialogue. On the other 
hand, the biased dialogues are structured to take responses from the participant and to state the robot’s 
own opinions. As discussed earlier in the self-serving bias, the robot blames external causes for losing 
a game hand. In our case, such external causes included the robot stating it was not ready, the robot was 
‘looking somewhere else’, or something went wrong with the robots control. If the participant doesn’t 
agree with the robot, the robot tries to convince the participant and challenges to play again. In such 
cases, the robot sometimes blames the participants of cheating in the games. Figure 2 shows the 
differences in the two algorithms in each of the stages of the interactions.   
Experimental procedures 
Participants were invited for three human-robot interactions by advertisements. 30 participants were 
selected to interact with any of the individual algorithms. Therefore, for each algorithm there are 15 
participants. Although, participants in both groups were selected randomly, the male-female ratio was 
balanced in both groups. Participants were different ages, but age range was between 15 to 48.  
The experiment consisted total of three interactions for both algorithms maintaining at least a week 
interval between two interactions. The groups of 15 participants interacted Such interactions should tell 
 
Figure 4. The experiment structures 
 
 
Figure 3. Conversation designs for baseline and biased algorithms 
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us the effects of each individual algorithm in long period of time. Figure 3 shows the general experiment 
structure.  
All the interactions were one to one basis, where each participant interacted with MARC individually 
for at least 8 to 10 minutes.  
Data Collection 
The goal of the experiments is to investigate the influence of the biased algorithm, therefore, we chose 
four factors to analyze the data, and these included, pleasure – how pleased participants were for the 
interaction, comfort – how much comfortable participants felt during the interaction, likeability – how 
much they liked the interactions and, rapport – how involved they were in the interactions. Such factors 
should help to understand the influences of the biases. Participants were given a questionnaire after 
each of the interactions. The questionnaires were in ‘Likert’ method using a scale of ‘1’ (least 
agreeablenesses) to ‘7’ (most agreeableness). The questions were asked based on such factors of 
pleasure (8 items) (Kim Y, 2014), experience likability (5 items) (Hone et al, 2000), comfort (6 items) 
 
Figure 5. The means of 4 dimensions in two algorithms Figure 6. Means for 3 interactions in both algorithms 
 
Figure 7. Means of four dimensions  Figure 8. Influence on Participant graph – based on the total 
ratings 
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(Hassenzahl, 2004) and rapport (20 items) (Multu B, 2006). At the end of the final experiment, we took 
an interview of each participants to know their experiences (winning, losing games etc.).  
Statistical Analysis 
A mixed (4x2) ANOVA was carried out on the dimensions (4) and algorithms (2). Figure 7 shows a 
descriptive table of each dimensions from all interactions. It shows that the Means of each dimensions 
are higher for the biased algorithms than the baseline. Among all the chosen factors, the self-serving 
biased algorithm scored higher than the baseline. There were stable positive increments in the ratings 
for each of the dimensions in all biased algorithms over the baseline algorithm. The Sig (p value) came 
out as <0.05 which indicate the significance our collected data over large population. There was a 
statistically significant difference between means and therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternative hypothesis. Figure 5 shows plotting four dimensions of two algorithms.  As clearly 
seen in the graph the participants rated much higher for biased interactions than the baseline interaction.  
Figure 6 shows the Average of Means ratings of the participants in the all 3 interactions. Figure 8 shows 
the overall Means plots from each algorithms in all the three experiments. The X-axis represents the 
algorithms and the Y-axis represents the marginal Means of two algorithms. As seen in the graph, the 
overall Means from baseline in much less than the self-serving. This graph can be called as the 
‘influence on participant’ graph, as the graph represents the Mean ratings from all factors. The graph 
was generated in the repeated measure test in SPSS using post-Hoc analysis. 
 
Discussion  
Overall statistical analysis shows very a positive influence of the self-serving bias. In figure 4 we can 
see that, in all the factors the biased robot scored higher than the baseline. The differences between 
Means of four factors (Figure 7) are: comfort 1.38, experience likeability 0.77, rapport 0.97 and pleasure 
0.41. Self-serving bias scored high in all factors, but as seen in the pleasure factor the difference is much 
less than others. To measure the ‘pleasure’ dimension, we added eight items in the questionnaire some 
of these are: “Playing the game and having conversation with the robot is pleasurable to me”, “Playing 
the game and having conversation with the robot is satisfying to me”, “Playing the game and having 
conversation with the robot is enjoyable to me”, “Playing the game and having conversation with the 
robot is entertaining to me” and similar. In their rating sheet, participants from the baseline interactions 
rated higher for first two questions (higher in ‘pleased’ and ‘satisfaction’) but lower for the other twos 
(lower in ‘enjoyable’ and ‘entertainment’). On the other hand, the participants from self-serving 
interaction rated much higher for the last two questions (highly ‘enjoyable’ and ‘entertainment’). In the 
comment section, some of the participants commented that, it was very entertaining when the robot 
denied that it lost the game.  
As it can be seen from figure 6, in the 1st interaction there is a very small difference in average Means 
of both algorithms. But in the 2nd and 3rd interactions, participant’s ratings hugely dropped for baseline 
(21.75-14.76 = 6.99). On the other hand, self-serving ratings dropped in 2nd and 3rd interactions, but 
compared to baseline, the drop was relatively smaller (23.34-20.33 = 3.01). In interview, participants 
from self-serving group commented that they genuinely believed the robot’s excuse for losing a game 
initially was that MARC was not ready, or they drew their hand faster, but when MARC started making 
excuses over and over then they found it ‘interesting’ and also ‘entertaining’. 
In the 2nd and 3rd interactions, self-serving biased MARC accuses the participants of cheating 
whenever it loses in a game. In the participant’s opinion they found it highly entertaining and liked it 
very much. To measure such bias affect, we added a ‘comfort’ factor which had six questions in the 
questionnaire: “Playing the game and having conversation with the robot is uncomfortable for me”, 
“Playing the game and having conversation with the robot is uneasy to me”, “Playing the game and 
having conversation with the robot is difficult for me”, “Playing the game and having conversation with 
the robot is confusing to me” and similar. But surprisingly, participants in biased interactions did not 
find MARC’s such behaviours as uncomfortable, uneasy or very difficult for them. As they commented, 
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they were surprised to be accused of ‘cheating’ from a robot. Participants also mentioned, it is very 
common human behaviour not to accept losing, and the robot acting same like their friends. Moreover, 
they found that MARC’s ‘bragging’ behaviours after winning a game was hilarious. However, the 
participants from baseline interactions did not find any such humanlike behaviours from MARC, and 
to them its behaviours were ‘as common as a robot’. In their interviews and comments, they pointed 
out that, playing game with a robot was enjoyable but it became less enjoyable after a few times. The 
participants found MARC’s responses are ‘stereotype’, ‘very mechanical’ and ‘common as robot-like’ 
in the baseline.  
Figure 8 shows an overall Means difference between baseline and self-serving algorithms. As it can be 
seen the baseline Mean is much smaller than the self-serving. From this graph it can be said that 
participants in biased interactions were more influenced by the robot’s biased and imperfect behaviours, 
and rated higher than the baseline. However, to the baseline group the robot’s behaviours were 
mechanical and as usual like a robot. In the 1st interactions, both groups participants enjoyed the game 
and rated high, but in the later interactions, MARC continued to show biased humanlike behaviours in 
biased interactions, so that the participants found it interesting and rated very similar as the first 
interaction. But, the robot with baseline algorithm failed to show such humanlike behaviours in later 
interactions, and so participants found their interactions as mechanical and, the ratings dropped higher 
than the biased interactions.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that self-serving biased behaviours in robot were able to develop better 
interactions than a robot without such behaviours. All three biased interactions received more popularity 
and gained more positive responses from the participants. The participants liked the robot’s behaviours 
in different situations in games, such as, winning, losing and draw – that the robot brags about a win 
but blames on the participants or the external causes for losing and make draw, but despite of that the 
robot behaves very friendly – greets them, bid them farewell and requested for coming next times. Such 
kind of behaviours are very common in people, between close friends. In friendships, close friends 
could be very competitive in game playing and do not want to lose easily. Such types of behaviours are 
common human nature which we do and see in our daily life. When participants found out the same 
behaviours from our imperfect robot MARC they might found it easy to relate with it, and that might 
be the reason for biased and imperfect algorithm getting higher ratings than baseline. On the other hand, 
baseline MARC did not show any humanlike common behaviour rather than very generic impressions 
- which might be expected from a robot to our participants, and that could be the reason of the 
differences in ratings between biased and baseline algorithms. However, from the experiments and 
analysis of collected data it can be concluded that, the humanlike biases and imperfectness in robot’s 
interactive behaviours can enhance its abilities of companionship with its users over a robot without 
biases.    
 
Conclusion  
The experiment show that MARC with bias algorithms is more likely to keep the participants interested 
over time, therefore become more influential regarding interactions. Participants enjoyed playing rock-
paper-scissors (roshambo) with the robot and expressed their feedback in favor of the biased algorithm. 
From the overall feedback it can be said that participants in self-serving group rated higher for their 
experiences which indicates that the self-serving biased algorithm made better interaction than baseline. 
We can see that the robot with baseline algorithms, developed a preliminary attachment with the 
participants, but robot with biased algorithms made the interactions more interesting to the participants. 
The participants felt more personable with the robot when the robot bragged and blames, denies of 
losing, accusing others and showed related human behaviours during interactions.  
We realize that robot’s imperfect biased behaviours also relies in part on the robot itself, i.e., the way 
MARC communicates.  So questions may rise about the effects and relations between the robot’s 
abilities and imperfect behaviours shown by it. To answer this question, previously experiments were 
done with the robots ERWIN and MyKeepon (Biswas M, 2015) where ERWIN was machine-like and 
MyKeepon is toy-like robot. But in both cases participants preferred the biased (misattribution and 
empathy Gap) interactions. In the current experiments self-serving bias was tested during a game 
playing interactions with humanoid robot MARC. In all cases, participants liked the interactions using 
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selected biases more than the robot without bias. From these different experiments with different robots 
it can be said that the biases chosen in experiments influenced the participants to accept the biased 
interactions significantly, which helped to develop the attachment between the participants and robot 
which can help to make long-term robot-human companionship. Figure. 1 shows an experiment 
situation where MARC interacting with the participant. 
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Appendix I: Showcase events pictures 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
RAF Scampton Showcase event. 2015. 
 
IIT Kharagpur, India Showcase event. 2014. 
 
 
